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1. Introduction 
This dissertation discusses securitization of non-U.S. asset-backed securities in the 
aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis. Before 2007, securitization was a well-established 
technique used by companies to finance collections of non-tradable and non-liquid 
assets (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; Pinto & Alves, 2016; Szablowska, 2010). Undertaking 
these necessitates the originator (parent company) to found a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) (Gorton & Souleles, 2005; Klee & Butler, 2002). The collection of assets is sold 
by the originator to the SPV (Almazan & Martin-Oliver, 2015) whose primary objective 
is to facilitate the securitization of the assets while ensuring that it is established for 
bankruptcy purposes as a legal entity separate from the originator (Gaschler, 2008; 
Chang, Wang, & Liao, 2009). Moreover, one central fact that makes securitization a 
popular financial technique is the process of repayment. Repayment and the coupons of 
all collections of assets issued by the SPV depend only or at least primarily on the assets 
respectively on the cash flows pledged as collateral to the issue (Dinca, 2014). This 
element is critical to all investors, since the payments from the SPV are independent of 
the originator’s financial strengths and depend only on the financial strength of the 
underlying assets (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). Blum and DiAngelo (1997) as well as 
Choudhry and Fabozzi (2004), Fermanian (2011), and Vink and Thibeault (2008) 
mention that the securitization market which issues and trades the above mentioned 
securities, consists of three main classes: The first, comprises asset-backed securities 
(ABS). These are all securitization issues backed by consumer products, such as car 
loans, consumer or home equity loans, and credit cards, among others (Moody's 
Investors Service, 2002; Choudhry & Fabozzi, 2004; Vink & Thibeault, 2008; Culp & 
Forrester, 2015; Van Gorp & Horn, 2005; Heard & Bella Jr., 2008; Desear, 2009; 
Greene & Fleischmann, 2009). The second class comprises mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) which are all securitization issues backed by mortgages (Elul, 2016; Malkhozov, 
Mueller, Vedolin, & Venter, 2016; Bernhardt, Kolbe, & Zagst, 2013; Nabin, 
Bhattacharya, & Rafiq, 2015; O'Neill, 2005; Geidosch, 2014). The third class comprises 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO), i.e. all securitization issues backed by debt 
obligations (Nomura, 2004; Fitch Ratings, 2004; Choudhry & Fabozzi, 2004; Vink & 
Thibeault, 2008; Longstaff & Rajan, 2008; Giesecke & Baeho, 2011; Deckant, 2010-
2011; Adelson, 2016). Despite them being so distinct, the term “Asset-Backed 
Securities” is used to describe all three classes of securities. To avoid confusion, the 
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term “Asset-Backed Securities” is applied here to refer to the first class of securities. In 
the context of this study, however, we discuss—empirically—the development of the 
ABS market post the 2007 financial crisis.  
 Securitization 1.1
This chapter introduces one of the most important financing instruments-
securitization—in the global fixed income market (Solomon, 2012). Securitization is a 
financial instrument first introduced in the 1970s in the U.S. It generates asset-backed 
securities (Subido, 2003; Fabozzi & Kothari, 2007; David, 1997) and was first used in 
the U.S. mortgages market (Moyo & Firer, 2008), but eventually evolved into an 
instrument that pooled many different kinds of non-tradable assets into a tradable 
security (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; Pinto & Alves, 2016; Jobst, 2006). Owing to this, 
securitization represented a new way in which financial institutions and corporations 
could find new sources of funding (Jobst, 2008). The steady growth of the securitization 
market was interrupted by the financial crisis that hit the U.S. mortgages market in 2007 
(True Sale International, 2008; Longstaff & Myers, 2014; Bonaccorsi di Patti & Sette, 
2016; Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2011). Although the securitization market struggled 
for many years, it witnessed some recovery 2010 onwards (True Sale International, 
2014; Chtourou & Hammami, 2013; Goodman, 2016). 
 Securitization History 1.1.1
Today, asset-backed securities have become one of the most popular financing 
methods in the fixed income market. It is well-known that companies use different 
methods—in global and regional markets—to raise money for investments and stay 
competitive. This dissertation discusses securitization in the non-U.S. ABS market with 
special emphasis on the European ABS market. Historically, securitization is a 
technique first applied in the U.S. mortgage market. Government-backed agencies, such 
as Ginnie Mae, applied this technique to pool home mortgages into mortgage-backed 
securities (Segoviano, Jones, Lindner, & Blankenheim, 2013; Kothari, 2006). The 
purpose of MBS was to lower the risk of government-backed agencies and support 
expanded affordable housing in the U.S. The success of this new financial instrument 
inspired other industries to securitize non-mortgage income-producing assets in the 
early 1980s (Welsher & Penrose, 2004). The first asset class securitized using the 
techniques developed in the mortgages market, was car loans (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; 
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Fermanian, 2013). Further, the success of these securitizations immediately increased 
the number of related issues (Hu & Cantor, 2003; Hu, 2007; Kramer-Eis & Passaris, 
2015). Therefore, securities came to be backed by an increasingly diverse and ever-
expanding array of assets, including bank assets— such as payments associated with 
corporate loans, and corporate assets—such as lease receivables (Vink & Thibeault, 
2008; Jobst, What Is Securitization?, 2008). In the subsequent decades, the MBS, ABS, 
and CDO markets grew enormously (Han, Park, & Pennacchi, 2015; Loutskina, 2011; 
Lin, Chang, Chu, & Prather, 2013; Franke, Herrmann, & Weber, 2012). Securitization 
became one of the most prominent and important fixed income techniques in the U.S., 
Europe, and Japan (Prasad, 2008; Hu & Cantor, 2004). Over the years, the number of 
financial institutions employing securitization to transfer the risk of the pooled assets, 
increased. Consequently, the number of pooled asset classes increased too. Since the 
1990s, securitization not only became the fastest evolving fixed income market in 
developed markets but also, within the emerging markets (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; 
Standard and Poor's, 2006). In 2007, due to the subprime MBS market in the U.S., the 
securitization market begun to struggle (Nadauld & Sherlund, 2009). It was widely 
agreed that securitization was a key cause of the 2007 financial crisis (Adrian & Shin, 
2008; Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 2008; Kashyap, Rajan, & Stein, 2008; Schoen, 
2016; Kara, Marques-Ibanez, & Ongena, 2015; Financial Crisis Inquiry Comission, 
2011). Many investors lost their trust in securities which were issued using the 
securitization process. The financial crisis emerged and shocked the global 
securitization markets (True Sale International, 2008; Covitz, Liang, & Suarez, 2013; 
Choi, 2013). The MBS defaulted in the U.S. mortgage market and provoked a series of 
reactions in the global capital markets (Couch, 2014; Shiren & Crosignani, 2009). 
Given this, investors avoided the entire securitization market (Myles & Thomas, 2014; 
Pan, 2011) with the result of a collapse of the ABS market during 2007 to 2009 
(Ramcharan, Verani, & Van den Heuvel, 2016). Since 2010 however, the securitization 
market began to show signs of recovery through steady growth and investors started to 
consider ABS as good investments, again. The amount of money raised in the markets 
also increased ever since (True Sale International, 2014; Dalton, 2011; Dalton, 2015). 
 Legal Structure 1.1.2
This paragraph presents the process of securitization and introduces and explains 
important terminology regarding the subsequent chapters in this dissertation. The 
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process of securitization is complex, given financial institutions and corporations try to 
pool and sell non-tradable assets (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; Pinto & Alves, 2016; Jobst, 
2006). The main objective of securitization is to make non-tradable assets, tradable—
and offer financial institutions and corporations access into the financial markets. 
Further, securitization enables the originator—the financial institution or corporation 
that owns the assets initially—to remove the assets from their balance sheets (Sidki, 
2014; Dechow & Shakespeare, 2009).  
1.1.3 Basic Structure 
The securitization process can be divided into two steps (Pelletier, 2003; Jobst, 
2008; Gorton & Metrick, 2012; Adams, 2005). Figure 1
1
 provides an overview of the 
typical securitization process. A securitization transaction starts with the originator 
deciding the assets that the company wants to securitize (Cetorelli & Peristiani, 2012). 
As a first step, the originator has to consider several factors: for example, determine the 
assets to be removed from the balance sheet, the assets that have the highest possibility 
to be sold to possible investors, and the assets that provide an appropriate risk profile for 
the transaction while being likely to obtain a useful credit rating (Mansini & Pferschy, 
2004). Further, the originator pools those assets (Jiang, Nelson, & Vytlacil, 2014), such 
that they can be transferred to a so-called Special Purpose Vehicle (Jobst, What Is 
Securitization?, 2008; Segoviano, Jones, Lindner, & Blankenheim, 2013; Fermanian, 
2013; Gorton & Metrick, 2012; Bastian, 2005). An SPV is a corporation that is founded 
especially for the process of securitization. The SPV buys the engaged assets from the 
                                               
1
 Based on Jobst (2008) 
Figure 1: Securitization Process1 
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originators (Lützenkirchen, Rösch, & Scheule, 2014), such that the assets are no longer 
on their balance sheets and the risks are then, transferred to the SPV. The SPV is now 
the legal holder of these assets. This is important for the originator and the investors. 
This fact is discussed in detail subsequently in this chapter. Since the SPV does not 
dispose of its own capital but has to finance the transaction of these assets, it issues a 
security—the ABS—into the capital market. After the transfer of these assets to the 
SPV, the pool may be structured into a security. Given securitization is complex, a 
syndicate of investment banks is also included in the process. The security is backed by 
the payment claims of the assets held by the SPV. It now has all the typical properties of 
a security, for instance, a final maturity date, a coupon rate, a transaction size, a rating 
etc. Further, one important property is the division into different tranches (Pagano & 
Volpin, 2012; Gorton & Pennacchi, 1990; Plantin, 2004)—or subsamples of the original 
pool of assets. The underlying assets of the subsamples are categorized based on their 
risk profiles. This strategy ensures that different pools of assets may be sold with 
different security characteristics, such as different risk premia. (Jobst, 2008; DeMarzo, 
2005; Bougheas, 2014). Due to the categorization of the assets, the originator has the 
opportunity to structure tranches, differently. For instance, if one tranche has a lower 
risk profile, it is most likely that the coupon rate is lower than the rate of a tranche with 
a higher risk profile. Tranches also enable the SPV to use the principle of subordination. 
Hereby, higher rated tranches are privileged compared to lower rated tranches in terms 
of credit enhancement. If the security suffers from asset defaults, coupon payments of 
the higher rated tranche have the highest priority and fail last. Another important 
property of ABS is the principle of credit enhancement. Credit enhancement serves as 
an additional guarantee in order to cover against investors’ payment defaults (Mandel, 
Morgan, & Chenyan, 2012; Standard and Poor's, 2008). The different characteristics of 
credit enhancement may be the principle of subordination, an excess spread, 
overcollateralization, and a reserve account. Excess spread describes the difference 
between the interest rates of the underlying pool of assets and the offered coupon on the 
issued security. It is a defense against losses in the case of payment defaults of the 
underlying assets. Overcollateralization describes the case, in which the face value of 
the underlying portfolio of assets is larger than the value of the security it backs. If the 
security suffers from defaults of the underlying assets, the larger portfolio has the ability 
to still make payments on the ABS. A reserve account is a defense strategy against 
losses up to the amount allocated for it. Credit enhancement can be either one of the 
Introduction 
6 
above characteristics or every possible composition. The next characteristic is credit 
rating. This feature implies the existence of at least one rating of a well-known rating 
agency. Thus, the company assigns a rating agency to rate the different tranches of the 
security. During this process, the originator provides all existing documents to the rating 
agency/agencies. The latter then, determines the probability of default for the different 
tranches considering all information—general, political or economic—of the documents 
(Bonsall, Koharki, & Neamtiu, 2015; Black, Chu, Cohen, & Nichols, 2012; Furfine, 
2014). At the end of the process, the rating agency assigns a rating to all tranches. These 
are likely to be different due to the different risk profiles of the underlying assets. 
Tranches with underlying assets having lower risk profiles are assigned most probable 
higher ratings. Credit ratings are also positively affected by the type of credit 
enhancement. The security is issued after the completion of the structuring process. In 
the second step, the security is offered to capital market investors who are allowed to 
buy all the tranches issued. In addition, some of the securities can be traded on the 
secondary market (Jobst, 2008). This paper only considers the yields of the primary 
market, i.e. the gains accruing when the security is issued. The use of secondary market 
spreads is insufficient for the purpose of this dissertation because primary market 
spreads reflect the demand of risk premia more accurately than the spreads measured in 
the secondary market, which are often driven by analysts’ expectations and brokers’ 
“indicative prices” (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; Gabbi & Sironi, 2005). 
1.1.4 Advantages of Securitization 
The originator profits from the perspectives of risks and balance sheets. ABS 
transactions allow the originator to refinance at a reduced rate, because securitization is 
independent of the own issuer’s credit rating (Peicuti, 2013). Moreover, the risk of 
assets default is transferred into the capital markets and thus, does not lie solely with the 
originator (Bensalah & Fedhila, 2016). Additionally, the legal transfer of the assets to 
the SPV impacts the originator’s balance sheet and may be used to make adjustments in 
his favor. On the other hand, investors profit from the perspectives of payment and risk 
(Briggs & Beams, 2012). ABS tranches often provide a higher yield than comparable 
treasury securities, the so-called risk premia, although the securities provide similar 
credit ratings and risk profiles. The large asset portfolio, which backs the security, 
provides substantial risk diversification for capital market investors. The most important 
aspect is the legal transfer of assets to the SPV which implies that the security and its 
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payments no longer depend on the financial situation of the originator (Vink & 
Thibeault, 2008; Jobst, 2008) but solely on the underlying assets (Stakic, 2010). 
Investors purchase claims only on the SPV, not on the originator; so, if receivables of 
the engaged assets default, the originator is not obligated to reimburse the investors for 
possible losses. From the investor’s perspective, whether the originator crashes or not, 
does not affect the underlying assets. Therefore, as long as the underlying assets 
generate enough cash flow, there is no impact on repayments for the investors.  
 Literature Review 1.2
Since the 1970s, extensive literature has been published on factors that impact 
pricing in the fixed income market. A majority of the research focuses on the yield 
determinants of corporate bond issues (Fabozzi & Vink, 2012). In contrast, scarce 
empirical evidence has been published on the factors that impact pricing of ABS 
issues—a major sector of the fixed income market in most developed countries. 
Empirical research regarding asset-backed securities using statistical models is 
considerably limited however, compared to that on corporate bonds. The first published 
study examined off-balance-sheet activities of 100 of the largest U.S. banks and was 
conducted by Holland (1989). The results of this study prove that off-balance-sheet 
activities are different types of contingencies and commitments not listed on an 
organization’s balance sheet. Further, the study identified that banking organizations 
were more involved in off-balance-sheet activities given the competition in the banking 
sector. Another study by Borgman (1996) engaged with a dataset of more than 700 ABS 
issues and documented the assembly as well as the analyses of the dataset that described 
the pricing and other characteristics of the issues. Borgman’s analyses (1996) conclude 
that pricing of ABS (absolute and relative yield spreads) was not only rational but also 
reflected interest rate and reinvestment risks, marketability, and most importantly, 
premia for default risk (Bakri, Ali, & Ismail, 2014). 
Thomas (2002) maintains that empirical analysis is about impact on debt and equity 
claimants of assets sold into securitization. The paper concludes by stating that 
shareholders’ returns increase in shareholder capitalization and bonds, which are 
actively traded, generate significant and substantial gains, such that wealth transfer from 
bondholders to shareholders appears in terms of asset-backed securities among sellers 
with low credit ratings (Bakri, Ali, & Ismail, 2014). Additionally, Higgins and Mason 
(2003) show that recourse to securitized debt may benefit not only short-term but also 
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long-term returns on stocks. Moreover, they may benefit long-term operating 
performances of sponsors. Higgins and Mason (2003) used a dataset of credit card 
securities to prove this. They also find similarities between the asset-backed securities 
market and the commercial paper market, where a firm’s ability to issue was directly 
correlated with the credit quality of the issuing company (Bakri, Ali, & Ismail, 2014).  
Pelletier’s study (2004) analyzes securitization transactions. Thereby, she examines 
all steps and aspects relevant for a successful securitization transaction and finds that 
the process entails a multitude of accounting, tax, and legal issues (Bakri, Ali, & Ismail, 
2014). The study concentrates on the most central of all these issues and provides some 
insight into the future of the securitization market. Interestingly, several studies in the 
years before and after the 2007 financial crisis have addressed the usage of 
securitization financing. For example, Ayotte and Goan (2005) analyze how ABS as a 
financial product can reduce bankruptcy costs for some firms (Bakri, Ali, & Ismail, 
2014). These statistical models predict the conditions under which a firm can lower its 
overall financing costs using the principle of securitization.  
Empirical research about the determinants of securitization pricing is provided by 
Perraudin and Wu (2008). They investigated the manufactured housing sector in 2004 
and the collapse of MBS in 2007 in the U.S. subprime market. Their paper indicated the 
factors that influenced the spreads in asset-backed security prices during crises. They 
find that the pricing of securitization displayed an unusually large variation in such 
periods. The conventionally determined risk premium of MBS during the financial crisis 
was not synchronized with the market prices. Further, they notice a disagreement 
between the evaluations undertaken by the market and the rating agencies for this 
security class during periods of crisis. 
 Common Pricing Characteristics 1.3
This dissertation empirically investigates the yield and the pricing of the asset-
backed security market. Thus, the variables on which our empirical analyses are based, 
form an essential part of this dissertation. For our purpose, we introduce the variables 
associated with the pricing of asset-backed securities—the so-called common pricing 
characteristics. Further, we note that the following studies are based on primary market 
spreads and termed issuance spreads. Hence, this section discusses the common pricing 
factors driving the asset-backed securities in the primary market and their expected 
impact on the primary market spread. This implies that it is imperative to understand 
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the common pricing factors and examine how these variables can be included in the 
analyses of the research papers studied here. 
  Primary Market Spread 1.3.1
The primary market spread, also called loan spread, represents the risk premium 
at issuance. On the basis of information at the time of issuance, the risk premium 
indicates the price for the risk associated with the security. This study defines the 
primary market spread as the offered yield to maturity of the security at issuance above 
the offered yield to maturity of a corresponding treasury benchmark at issuance (Vink & 
Thibeault, 2008; Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin, 2001). Vink and Thibeault 
(2008), Vink and Fabozzi (2012), Gabbi and Sironi (2005), as well as Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein, and Martin (2001) suggest the following procedure to obtain a suitable 
treasury benchmark: First, the benchmark is obligated to provide the same currency; 
second, the benchmark is obligated to be issued at a comparable auction date, and third, 
the benchmark has to offer a comparable time to maturity. Then, we calculate the 
difference between these two yields. Subsequently, in this dissertation, if the primary 
market spreads are referred to, then, it must be construed that this is the difference that 
is under discussion. This difference also has a mathematical advantage. Since the yields 
may differ over years impacted not just by the common pricing factors but also by other 
factors such as, high or low interest rate levels in general, inflation rates, or even, the 
activity of a central bank, it would be imperative to edit the time series to filter out the 
trends that are not impacted by the common pricing factors, over the years. Since the 
yields of the treasuries are influenced precisely by those factors as well, the trends may 
be eliminated by calculating the difference between these two yields. Therefore, the 
yields at the auction of the securities may be adjusted to the primary market spreads so 
that this adjusted yield is a satisfactory dependent variable suited to this dissertation’s 
purpose.   
 Default and Recovery Risk Characteristics 1.3.2
This subsection introduces the default and recovery risk characteristics to build the 
first group of common pricing factors (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; Gabbi & Sironi, 2005; 
Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, & Mann, 2004). In referring to this group, this paper examines 
factors such as, credit rating, external enhancement, maturity, and loan to value. The 
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subsequent sections describe how these factors occur in the analyses of the research 
papers.  
 Credit Rating 1.3.2.1
The most important factor impacting fixed income notes is credit rating. The credit 
rating of a loan issue reflects the likelihood of a borrower defaulting on a loan (Amira, 
2004; Ammer & Clinton, 2004; Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkman, & Vickery, 2011-2012; 
Pagano & Volpin, 2012). The credit rating is included in the analyses to facilitate a 
study of the impact of default on a securitization issue. In the bond market, empirical 
studies on the influential factors always include credit rating as a critical variable. Since 
we need comparable data for all the issues in the data samples of this dissertation, it is 
only the tranches, which are rated by at least one of the three credit rating agencies—
Moody’s, Standard and Poor, and Fitch—that are included. This is because market 
participants do not view credit ratings by these three rating agencies as redundant 
(Fabozzi & Vink, 2015). Table 1 provides a scale with all available credit ratings of 
these agencies. Moody’s provides 19 different ratings and Standard and Poor’s and 
Fitch provide 21 different ratings. This leads to a classification of 21 rating scales for 
the three rating agencies mentioned above. 
               Table 1: Credit Rating Scale 
Assigned Value Moody’s Standard & Poor’s Fitch 
1 Aaa AAA AAA 
2 Aa1 AA+ AA+ 
3 Aa2 AA AA 
4 Aa3 AA- AA- 
5 A1 A+ A+ 
6 A2 A A 
7 A3 A- A- 
8 Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 
9 Baa2 BBB BBB 
10 Baa3 BBB- BBB- 
11 Ba1 BB+ BB+ 
12 Ba2 BB BB 
13 Ba3 BB- BB- 
14 B1 B+ B+ 
15 B2 B B 
16 B3 B- B- 
17 Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ 
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18 Caa2 CCC CCC 
19 Caa3 CCC- CCC- 
20 - CC CC 
21 - D D 
For the purpose of comparison, the credit rating of each tranche is collected at the 
time of issuance. To include the credit rating mathematically in the analyses, it is 
imperative to assign a value to every rating (Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; Vink & Thibeault, 
2008; Buscaino, Caselli, Corielli, & Gatti, 2012; Chen, Lesmond, & Wei, 2007; 
Kavussanos & Tsouknidis, 2014; Liu & Thakor, 1984). We decided to use a consistent 
rating classification and introduced a discrete variable which assigned a corresponding 
number to every rating. The variable is equal to one, when we regard the best rating of 
each rating agency. It is equal to two, when we regard the second best rating of each 
rating agency, and so on. Therefore, the variable credit rating (CR) is set as indicated 
here: CR = 1, CR = 2, CR = 3, CR = 4, CR = 5, CR = 6, CR = 7, …, CR = 17, CR = 20 
correspond to the ratings Aaa/AAA, Aa1/AA+, Aa2/AA, Aa3/AA-, A1/A+, A2/A, 
A3/A-, …, Caa1/CCC+, CC (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; Liu & Thakor, 1984). Credit 
ratings between Caa1/CCC+ and CC and lower than CC are not available in the data 
samples of this dissertation. Further, with the numerical scale of the ratings, we can 
calculate the rating of each tranche. Therefore, it is possible to get two different cases: 
First, we have a tranche with only one assigned rating of the rating agencies. This case 
is the simplest; we take the corresponding number of the credit rating and assign this 
number to the tranche. If there are at least two credit ratings available for one tranche, 
we calculate the average value of the two or three ratings. This study uses the following 
common technique: We add the corresponding values of the ratings and divide the sum 
by the number of ratings assigned to the tranche. This paper offers an example of how 
this process works: 
Example 1 
The transaction “SC Germany Auto 2010-1” issued by the Santander Consumer 
Bank has two (A and B) tranches. All three rating agencies assign ratings to the B-
tranche. Moody’s assigns “A3”, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch, both assign “A”. The 
corresponding values are 7 and 6, respectively. The sum of all ratings is equal to 19. 
The division leads to an average rating value of 6.33. Now, this value is chosen for the 
credit rating variable of this transaction. Thus, in the analyses, the rating of the B-
tranche of the “SC Germany Auto 2010-1” transaction has a value of 6.33. 
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We expect the credit rating to have a positive relationship with the primary market 
spread. This means that if a tranche is assigned a better rating, the risk margin will be 
expected to reduce (Bayar, 2014). This study notes that the credit rating scale is an 
inverse scale, i.e. the spread increases as the rating decreases. This means that we 
predict an increasing primary market spread if the value of the variable increases as 
well (Reilly, Wright, & Gentry, 2010; Vink & Thibeault, 2008; John, Lynch, & Puri, 
2003; Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, & Mann, 2001). 
 Extern Enhancement 1.3.2.2
In our studies, issues with extern enhancement refer to issues with credit 
enhancement in the form of an insurance policy guaranteed by a third party such as 
insurance companies. Thus, with this variable, we do not refer to internal credit 
enhancements but external credit enhancements. The variable extern enhancement is 
introduced as a dummy which takes the value one if an external credit enhancement for 
the corresponding issue is available and zero otherwise. According to Fabozzi and 
Roever (2003), the evaluation for ABS transactions considers the difference between the 
cost of enhancement and the reduction of the coupon rate to sell the ABS. Considering 
this trade-off, the issuer decides whether or not it is sufficient to provide a third-party 
guarantee (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). Thus, we expect a negative relationship with the 
primary market spread, because external credit enhancement should, ceteris paribus, 
lower the risk of default. 
 Time to Maturity 1.3.2.3
Time to maturity is the third default and recovery risk characteristic variable. It is 
measured in years and affects the default risk premium of the ABS transaction (Merton, 
1974). The variable is calculated as the difference between the issue date of the 
corresponding tranche and the legal maturity date. Thus, we expect the time to maturity 
to be positively related with the spread but we cannot accurately determine the 
coefficient sign of this variable apriori. From the empirical and theoretical literature, 
there is evidence of both coefficient signs (Merton, 1974; Vink & Thibeault, 2008; 
Amira, 2004; Grandes & Peter, 2004; Shin & Kim, 2013; Gabbi & Sironi, 2005). 
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 Loan to Value 1.3.2.4
Loan to value is the last of the default and recovery risk characteristics. It is a 
variable which describes the cumulative levels of subordination (Vink & Thibeault, 
2008; Campbell & Cocco, 2015; Deng & Quingley, 2012; Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund, 
2009; Bajari, Chenghuan, & Minjung, 2008; Schwartz & Torous, 1993; Wong, Fung, & 
Fong, 2004). In an asset securitization transaction with more than one tranche, the cash 
flows are split into many classes of notes. Thereby, the classes, or loan tranches have 
different priority levels. The senior tranches have absolute priority in the cash flow over 
the junior classes. If cash flow is generated as expected, the subordination is not 
applicable. However, if there are payment defaults, the generated cash flow is used first, 
for coupon payments of the more senior classes, such that the more junior tranches 
experience losses. In other words, each position benefits from all the positions 
subordinated to it. We express the level of subordination as a percentage of the 
transaction’s value (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). This process may also be explained with 
an example.  
Example 2 
We use a transaction with two tranches, Class B is the junior class of EUR 40 
million and the senior Class A of EUR 60 million. Investors in Class A will bear the 
risk that if losses exceed EUR 40 million, they will lose money on their investment. 
This means that if losses exceed the cumulative subordination level of 40% (EUR 40 
million divided by a total of EUR 100 million), the Class B tranche will be wiped out 
and investors of tranche A will lose money on their investment. When there is between 
40% and 100% for each Euro loss on the underlying assets, the investors of the Class A 
tranche suffer an equal euro loss on their investment (Vink & Thibeault, 2008).  
Therefore, it is important to calculate the loan to value ratio for each tranche of the 
data samples of this dissertation. If a transaction contains more than one tranche and if 
the size of all tranches of the transaction is available, then, the cumulative subordination 
level for each tranche of the transaction must be calculated. If we regard a single tranche 
transaction, the cumulative subordination level is 100% and no subordination exists. 
The loan to value ratio is calculated first, by considering the value of a loan cumulated 
according to the priority structure and second, by dividing this value by the total issue 
amount of the transaction (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). In general, the coefficient sign may 
be expected to be negative, i.e. with a higher loan to value ratio (senior tranches) so, the 
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originator has to grant a lower risk premium. In addition, if an issue has a lower loan to 
value ratio (junior tranches), investors require a higher coupon rate because they have a 
lower expected recovery rate when the underlying portfolio suffers losses. But, Vink 
and Thibeault (2008) analyzed ABS issues between 1999 and 2006 and they found that 
the relationship of the loan to value ratio of ABS transactions with the issuance spread 
was positive. Therefore, it is difficult to accurately determine the sign of this variable 
apriori so, it is important to wait for the findings of the analyses. 
 Marketability Characteristics  1.3.3
This subsection discusses the variables that are assigned to the group marketability 
characteristics. The second set of explanatory variables consists of loan size, 
transaction size, number of tranches, number of lead managers, number of credit rating 
agencies, retained interest, and the type of interest rate (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; Gabbi 
& Sironi, 2005). The following subsections present how variables occur in the analyses 
of this dissertation and discuss their expected influence on the primary market spread.  
 Loan Size and Transaction Size 1.3.3.1
In our studies, the variable loan size is determined as the natural logarithm of the 
issuance size of every issue among the data samples of this dissertation, i.e. the variable 
is determined as the size of every tranche contained in the high information samples 
(Gabbi & Sironi, 2005; Qi & Yang, 2009; Calem & Lacour-Little, 2004; Pennington-
Cross, 2003; Vink & Thibeault, 2008) whereas, the variable transaction size is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the issuance size of the whole transaction, i.e. the 
variable is determined as the sum of all tranches contained in the same transaction. 
Some care must be exercised when using these variables in the analyses, because 
transactions across countries and currencies are being considered here. In order to use 
these variables, we convert all the currencies with a corresponding exchange rate into 
Euros. The exchange rate for the transactions is calculated as the average of all market 
exchange rates for the issuance year. Then, we multiply the loan size and the 
transaction size with the exchange rate. Converting the currencies ensures the 
availability of comparable values for loan and transaction sizes. These can then, be 
included as variables in the analyses. Larger issuance sizes are associated with more 
secondary market liquidity, i.e. greater information is available, resulting in less 
uncertainty compared to situations of smaller issues. Then, a negative relationship with 
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the primary market spread is predicted. This means for higher loan and transaction 
sizes, the issuance spreads are expected to reduce.  
 Number of Tranches 1.3.3.2
The next variable, which is included in the analyses, is the number of tranches. In 
our studies, the number of tranches does not only refer to the ones issued but the overall 
number of all tranches contained in the corresponding transaction (Vink & Fabozzi, 
2012; Vink & Thibeault, 2008). This means that, even if the data samples of this 
dissertation contain only two tranches of one particular transaction but the transaction is 
divided into a total of five tranches, the variable takes five as the value for both the 
tranches in the analyses. The process of tranching could allow the originator to reach a 
wider range of investors and take advantage of heterogeneous screening skills related to 
asymmetric information. Thus, we expect the corresponding relationship with the 
spread to be negative. 
 Number of Lead Managers 1.3.3.3
The number of lead managers represents the number of financial institutions 
classified as lead managers in the official prospectus of the corresponding transaction. 
This variable is included to provide information about the size of the syndicate. A 
negative coefficient sign is expected, since a larger syndicate should be able to achieve, 
ceteris paribus, lower spreads for the corresponding transaction (Vink & Thibeault, 
2008; Gabbi & Sironi, 2005). 
 Number of Rating Agencies 1.3.3.4
The number of rating agencies indicates how many are involved in the process of 
assigning a rating to the issue (Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; Vink & Thibeault, 2008). 
Worldwide, there are many rating agencies involved in rating ABS transactions. 
However, many of them focus on their domestic markets. For better comparison, we 
focus on the top-three which operate globally in the ABS market. Thus, we only include 
ratings of Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch. If none of these agencies was 
involved in the rating process, the issue would not be contained in the data samples of 
the following analyses. The variable can take the values 1, 2, or 3 for having one, 
respectively two or three rating agencies involved in the rating process. Since a rating 
becomes more accurate if more rating agencies are involved, we predict a negative 
coefficient for the number of rating agencies. This in turn implies that if more rating 
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agencies are involved in the rating process, the ratings tend to be more accurate, and as 
a consequence, it reduces the risk premium. 
 Retained Subordinated Interest 1.3.3.5
The variable retained subordinated interest is included in the analyses, since there 
are many originators who may have set up this beneficial interest that absorbs the first 
losses of the loan (Childs, Ott, & Riddiough, 1996; Vink & Thibeault, 2008; An, Deng, 
Nichols, & Sanders, 2014; Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008). It is inferior or in 
subordinated position compared to the other tranches of the transaction with regard to 
collection payments in the event of default. No clear theoretical apriori conclusion 
regarding the sign of the coefficient can be made. First, a retained junior tranche should 
not affect the probability of default of the other tranches, however, it is a signal for the 
originators and can potentially lead to "investors comfort" which may affect the spread. 
Nevertheless, if the coefficient sign turns out to be negative, the retained subordinated 
interest, ceteris paribus, positively impacts payment defaults (Hansen & Demir, 2010). 
Otherwise, the retained interest indicates the impression on a poor quality of the 
underlying assets, and therefore, leads to higher spreads. The variable subordinated 
interest is constructed as a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the transaction 
has a retained subordinated interest, and zero, otherwise.  
 Type of Interest 1.3.3.6
The variable type of interest rate describes the type of interest rate of the 
corresponding issue. There are two types of interest rates in the analyses. First, we have 
fixed interest rates for ABS. This means, the coupon of the issue is a fixed rate for life 
and the investors always get the interest payments at the same rate. Second, we have the 
floating rate for ABS issues. These issues have a floating coupon rate which can change 
over the life-time of the transaction. In most cases, the floating coupon rate consists of 
the following structure: The basis is another floating interest rate such as, LIBOR or 
EURIBOR. Then, a fixed spread is added on top of the basis rate. On every coupon 
date, the sum of the current basis rate and the fixed spread adds up to the current interest 
rate. In order to include the type of interest rate in the studies, we constructed a dummy 
variable float which takes the value 1 if the issue has a floating coupon rate, and zero, if 
the issue has a fixed coupon rate (Gabbi & Sironi, 2005; Vink & Thibeault, 2008). 
Some caution must be exercised at this time because the value of the dummy variable 
refers to the type of the coupon rate of a tranche, not of the whole transaction, since 
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different tranches can have different types of interest rates. However, we expect the 
relationship with the spread to be positive because a fixed rate does not change during 
the life of the loan and is therefore, protected against changing interest rates. Thus, we 
predict the borrowers to raise funds at lower spreads than through floating rate issues. 
Nevertheless, since the risk of changing interest rates is also covered during the process 
of assigning a rating, the rating reflects the risk of raising interest rates which could lead 
to a poor statistical significance for the variable float.  
  Expected Systemic Characteristics 1.3.4
This subsection introduces the expected systemic characteristics. Within the 
systemic risk, we have several other risks that an ABS transaction has to face. One of 
them is the risk presented by the country, in which the assets are located and the legal 
rights in the corresponding country. Another, would be the risks that currencies have to 
face in the global market. The variables of interest in this section are currency risk, 
emerging market, and creditor protection and are introduced below.   
 Currency Risk  1.3.4.1
Currency risk is introduced to include the systemic risk in the analyses since it is 
not already incorporated into the rating of an issue (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). Currency 
risk describes the risk a value faces if the currency denomination of the collateral’s cash 
flows and the currency denomination of the cash flow of liabilities, differ. Therefore, we 
include a dummy variable in the analyses. This takes the value 1 if the issue faces 
currency risk, and value zero, otherwise. Since currency risk is by definition a risk that a 
value may face, we expect the corresponding coefficient sign to be positive. This means, 
if an issue is exposed to currency risk, the primary market spread is expected, ceteris 
paribus, to be higher compared to issues which are not exposed to currency risk (Vink & 
Fabozzi, 2012; Vink & Thibeault, 2008). 
 Emerging Market 1.3.4.2
Emerging markets differ from developed markets in terms of political stability, 
political and economic risks, and the development of the financial market. This makes it 
more difficult to place a securitization in the market. Thus, origination in an emerging 
market is considered by rating agencies as an important risk factor (Vink & Fabozzi, 
2012). We identified emerging market countries using the Morgan Stanley Country 
Index. The variable is constructed as follows: It takes the value 1 if a country is 
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identified as an emerging market country, and value zero, if the transaction is issued in a 
developed market. 
 Creditor Protection 1.3.4.3
Creditor protection is a very important variable in the process of assigning a 
rating to a tranche. Creditor protection measures the extent to which investors are 
protected in case the originator of the security goes bankrupt. In ABS transactions, the 
underlying assets are transferred into a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to isolate the 
assets from the originator and protect them against originators going bankrupt. 
Nevertheless, the SPV itself can go bankrupt if there are defaults of payments on the 
underlying assets. Thus, we have to obtain a suitable variable, which, on the one hand, 
reflects creditor protection and on the other, gets included in our regression model. The 
creditor protection laws vary across countries in this study. Therefore, we have gathered 
information on creditor protection in the countries of origination. La Porta et al. (2000) 
and La Porta et al. (2003) suggest that the four legal rights variables be considered in 
order to measure creditor protection for securities. One of these variables can be 
included in the regression model and measure creditor protection in each country (Vink 
& Fabozzi, 2012). The process is called No automatic stay on the assets. Vink and 
Fabozzi (2012) describe the variable as follows: “An automatic stay stops lawsuits, 
foreclosures, and all collection activity against the borrower the moment the borrower 
files a petition for bankruptcy petition. In general, a no automatic stay provision is 
viewed favorably by investors, as well as by rating agencies in assigning a credit rating, 
since the creditor can recover collateral” (Vink & Fabozzi, 2012, p. 521). The variable 
included in the regression model has the following structure: We construct a dummy 
variable, which takes the value 1 if there is no automatic stay on the assets in the law of 
the country of origination, and value zero, otherwise.   
The data samples of this dissertation include the discrete as well as the dummy 
variables. The group of discrete variables consists of credit rating, loan size, transaction 
size, loan to value, time to maturity, the number of tranches, the number of lead 
managers, and the number of rating agencies. The variables retained interest, extern 
enhancement, creditor protection, the type of interest rate, currency risk, and emerging 
market constitute the dummy variables. Table 2 provides a final overview of—the 
common pricing features that are a part of the analyses studied in the course of 
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formulating this dissertation and the expected relationship with the yield associated with 
asset-backed securities. 
Table 2: Common Pricing Characteristics 
Variable Description Expected Impact Source 
Rating Average value of assigned ratings Positive relationship Liu & Thakor (1984)
2
 
Maturity  Measured in years Positive relationship Merton (1974)
3
 
Extern Equal 1 if extern enhancement is provided Negative relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008)
4
 
Loan to Value Subordination level of tranche in % Positive relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008)
5
 
Loan Size Natural log of the tranche’s or bonds’ Negative relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)6 
Transaction Size Natural log of the ABS transactions’ Negative relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008) 
# Tranches Number of tranches Negative relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012)
7
 
# Lead Manager Number of lead managers Negative relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)
7
 
# Rating Agencies Number of rating agencies Negative relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012)
7
 
Type of Interest 1 if type of interest is floating rate Negative relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)
7
 
Retained Interest 1 if retained interest appears in transaction Negative relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008)
8
 
Currency Risk 1 if tranche faces currency risk Positive relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)
7 
Creditor Protection 1 if creditor protection is provided Negative relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012) 
Emerging Market 1 if transaction is issued in an emerging Positive relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012) 
 
 Research Objectives and Dissertation Outline 1.4
This dissertation is structured into three research papers, all of which investigate 
the ABS market post 2007. The ABS market experienced a major breakdown as a 
consequence of the 2007 crisis (True Sale International, 2008; Perraudin & Wu, 2008; 
Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; Fabozzi & Vink, 2012). Nevertheless, this security class 
revealed its importance for the fixed income market as the market began to recover in 
2010. The ABS market became one of the most important fixed income markets and 
one popular refinancing instrument for corporations. However, empirical research 
regarding the recovery of the ABS market since 2010 is scarce (True Sale International, 
2014; Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, 2012). Hence, to fill research gaps regarding 
theoretical literature and provide empirical frameworks for practical application, the 
                                               
2
 Further sources: Vink & Thibeault (2008), Vink & Fabozzi (2012), Buscaino, Caselli, Corielli, & Gatti (2012), 
Chen, Lesmond, & Wei (2007), Kavussanos & Tsouknidis (2014), Amira (2004), Ammer & Clinton (2004) 
3
 Further sources: Gabbi & Sironi (2005), Vink & Thibeualt (2008), Amira (2004), Grandes & Peter (2004), Shin & 
Kim (2013) 
4
 Fabozzi & Roever (2003) 
5
 Further sources: Wong, Fung, Fong, & Sze (2004), Campbell & Cocco (2011), Deng & Quigley (2004), Schwartz 
& Torous (1993), Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund (2009), Bajari, Chenghuan, & Minjung (2008) 
6 Further sources: Qi & Yang (2009), Calem & Lacour-Little (2004), Pennington-Cross (2003) 
7
 Further sources: Vink & Thibeault (2008) 
8 Further Sources: An, Deng, Nichols, & Sanders (2014), Ashcraft & Schuermann (2008), Childs, Ott, & Riddiough 
(1996) 
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first research paper empirically investigates the influence of the financial crisis on the 
non-U.S. ABS market.  
As a result of the financial crisis, investors lost their trust in the securitization 
market such that the issuance volumes hit new lows. Since 2010, the securitization 
market has experienced recovery, globally. Originators as well as investors started to 
regain trust in the growing role that securitization began to play in the future of the 
world’s economies despite its contribution to the financial crisis (Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; 
Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, 2012; Morgan Stanley Capital International, June 2015; 
True Sale International, 2011; Buchanan, 2016; Hull, 2009; Schwarcz, 2013). New 
regulations as well as the fear of market participants regarding another breakdown 
should significantly impact the development of asset-backed securities (Cohen & 
Hoskins, 2014; Humphreys, 2012; Price, 2016; Kemp, 2014; Ceurvorst, 2014). Thus, 
the first research paper addresses the overall research question whether the financial 
crisis influenced the non-U.S. ABS market. To provide evidence that supports the 
overall research question, the paper investigates two research hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis states that the financial crisis significantly influenced the yield determinants 
as well as the common pricing characteristics of the ABS market. As an intuitive 
follow-up, the second research hypothesis states that, in comparison to the situation 
before that crisis, investors have to look beyond the credit ratings and employ their own 
risk analyses as protection against surprising losses.  
With the purpose of finding evidence that supports the first research hypothesis, 
we compare the determinants of the primary market spread of ABS tranches after the 
financial crisis with the spread determinants prior to that crisis. After 2009, regulators 
throughout the world tried to set a new framework for ABS transactions, since this 
security class was meant to be a dominant submarket of fixed income markets 
worldwide (Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; Faltin-Traeger, Johnson, & Mayer, 2010). The first 
essay determines the influence of the new framework on the development of the ABS 
market. Further, we investigate whether market participants rely on different yield 
determinants when pricing the ABS transactions after the 2007 crisis.  
To address the second research hypothesis, Essay I performs an over-reliance 
analysis on credit rating. One common view is that investors relied exclusively or at 
least excessively on credit ratings assigned to ABS tranches by rating agencies (Fabozzi 
& Vink, 2012; Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; Scott, 2010). After the financial crisis, regulators 
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recommended that ABS investors employ their own risk analysis in addition to those by 
the rating agencies with the purpose of being independent. Hence, we investigated 
whether ratings of Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch exhibited dissimilarities in 
the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis and whether investors, compared with their 
apriori approach, looked beyond the credit rating and employed their own credit default 
risk analyses. 
In the second and third research papers, the main focus lies on the European 
ABS market. This developed into one of the most important fixed income submarkets of 
Europe’s fixed income market after the 2007 financial crisis. It has some specifics 
compared to its non-European counterparts. Several research reports by DZ Bank (2014, 
2015, 2016), Creditreform (2015), and Roland Berger (2015) discuss the phenomenon 
that the European Auto-ABS market grew enormously after the financial crisis 
compared to its European ABS submarket counterparts. Although it is a very young 
submarket instrument, Auto-ABS have emerged as the largest European ABS 
submarket in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis with a proportion of almost 43% 
in 2015. As a result of the large automobile industry in Europe, Auto-ABS are a major 
driver of the European ABS market. Thus, the second research paper performs an in-
depth analysis of the European Auto-ABS market and addresses the overall research 
questions regarding the determinants enabling the European Auto-ABS market to 
outperform its European ABS submarket counterparts. Essay II proposes two significant 
determinants of this outperformance. To conclude on the overall research question, 
Essay II addresses the first research hypothesis which states that Auto-ABS provide 
significant advantages for originators as well as investors compared to non-Auto-ABS 
issues. Hence, we investigate whether these advantages significantly explain the 
outperformance. With the purpose of finding evidence that supports the first research 
hypothesis, Essay II performs a comparison analysis on the European ABS market with 
respect to security risk profiles, yield determinants, and development over time.  
The second hypothesis states that corporations and investors prefer Auto-ABS 
compared to automobile corporate bonds (Auto-CB) as refinancing instruments in the 
automobile industry. We analyze whether the advantages of the securitization structure 
leads to a volume shift in issuance away from the corporate bond into the asset-backed 
security market. The research paper hypothesizes that this volume shift in issuance 
explains a significant part of the outperformance. To provide evidence that supports the 
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second research hypothesis, Essay II performs a comparison analysis on Auto-ABS and 
Auto-CB market with respect to security risk profiles, yield determinants, and 
development over time.  
The European Central Bank (ECB) announced in September 2014 the 
implementation of the largest quantitative easing (QE) programme in the history of the 
European Monetary Union. With the implementation of the so-called “Asset-Purchase 
Programme” (APP) the ECB decided to enter the European ABS market on the buy side 
in order to increase the inflation rate in the European Monetary Union. The programme 
not only consists of purchases of MBS but also, the ABS bonds whereas, the purchase 
of MBS was already practiced by the Federal Reserve System (FED) and the Bank of 
England to stabilize the mortgage markets of the U.S. and the U.K. as a consequence of 
the financial crisis (Hancock & Passmore, 2015; Campbell, Covitz, Nelson, & Pence, 
2011; Rossner, Carlson, Kowal, Huan, & Kreitman, 2009; Erel, Nadauld, & Stulz, 
2014). The purchase of ABS bonds is a novelty in the history of quantitative easing. 
Therefore, the third research paper discusses the influence of the ECB on the European 
ABS market. The so-called “Asset-backed Security Purchase Programme” (ABSPP) 
was implemented in November 2014 and is meant to run until at least December 2017 
(as of December 2016). The ECB wants corporations to refinance at a very low level 
thereby, enabling an increase of the inflation rate level. Thus, the ECB itself purchases 
tranches of ABS transactions to refinance corporations and force investors to purchase 
riskier securities (tranches with higher risk profiles).  
Essay III proposes three research hypotheses with respect to the overall research 
question whether quantitative easing influences the trajectory of the European ABS 
market. The first research hypothesis states that quantitative easing has affected the risk 
profile of European ABS transactions. To find evidence that supports this hypothesis, 
we analyze the risk profiles of ABS transactions prior to and during quantitative easing. 
As a natural follow- up, the second research hypothesis investigates whether yield 
determinants are influenced in the times of the ABSPP. Hence, Essay III performs a 
structural break analysis. The analysis reveals whether the two data samples exhibit 
significant dissimilarities with respect to the pricing of European ABS tranches. The last 
research hypothesis measures the direct influence of quantitative easing on the offered 
yield of European ABS transactions. To provide evidence that supports the third 
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research hypothesis, the paper performs panel-data fixed-effect regressions, which 
determine the direct influence of the ABSPP on the yield. 
For the course of investigation, this dissertation is organized as follows. It 
provides the three research essays in chapters two, three, and four. Every paper provides 
a Literature Review, identifying the research gaps in great detail, first. Thereafter, the 
Methodology is presented in each paper, followed by the Data Description. The section 
Conclusion presents the results of the empirical analyses of each paper and highlights 
contributions to the research objectives, separately. The research essays are followed by 
the last chapter Concluding Remarks. This chapter presents Limitations, Market 
Implications, and Future Research avenues. 
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 Non-U.S. Asset-Backed Securities: Yield Determinants and Over-2
Reliance on Credit Ratings 
 Introduction 2.1
In the wake of the financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 in the U.S. 
subprime mortgage market, regulations have been strengthened by governments of 
major financial markets, globally. Not surprisingly, the securitization market has been 
focused on given the dominant role it played in the crisis and, of course, given the 
course of events in the securitization market during that time (Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; 
Faltin-Traeger, Johnson, & Mayer, 2010). According to a research report by DZ Bank 
(2008), the ABS market witnessed a global collapse at the time. A U.S. Treasury 
Department report (2009) and further research by BearingPoint (2009) discuss the 
future applicability of securitization as a popular financing instrument in the fixed 
income market. Five recommendations for the securitization market have been 
proposed, one of which is to reduce the over-reliance by investors on credit ratings. 
Research reports by DZ Bank (2011), Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft (2012), MSCI (2015), 
and articles by Nomura (2015), Meister (2016), Böhmert (2014) as well as Vink and 
Fabozzi (2012), and Franke and Krahnen (2008) discuss the recovery of the market after 
the 2007 financial crisis and, despite its contribution to the financial crisis, the 
expectations of the growing role that securitization will play in the future of the world’s 
economies, since the balance sheets of banks are anticipated to shrink post 2007. In the 
same sense, a research report by the DZ Bank (2014) concludes that the recovery of 
ABS transactions is essential for a working real economy. However, the question arises: 
whether the ABS market learned from its collapse during the financial crisis and if deep 
wrongs, such as the over-reliance on credit ratings, were corrected during the recovery 
of the markets. Therefore, we examine and analyze the non-U.S. ABS market post this 
period and determine how the financial crisis influenced the ABS market. This 
empirical analysis investigates spread determinants of the primary market spread of 
ABS after the financial crisis, i.e. from beginning 2010 till the end of 2014, and 
compares the results with the findings of the late 1990s and the early 2000s. This aims 
to provide evidence that supports the conclusion that the financial crisis influenced the 
ABS markets and that the influence was a critical cause of the recovery of the non-U.S. 
ABS market.  
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Further, the second objective of this paper is to analyze whether there is an over-
reliance on credit ratings. We discuss the research path—whether investors learned from 
the collapse in 2007 and employed their own credit analysis rather than rely solely on 
the credit ratings assigned by rating agencies. Since that crisis was in many ways also a 
crisis of credit ratings (Kotecha, Ryan, & Weinberger, 2010; Seoyoung, 2012), given 
the difficulty for investors to evaluate these structured financial products and employ 
their own risk analysis, most investors relied on the ratings assigned to ABS bonds by 
the major rating agencies (Agarwal, Barret, Cun, & De Nardi, 2010; Efing & Hau, 
2015). Prior to the crisis, more than half of the securitization transactions rated by 
Moody’s carried a rating of AAA, which is the highest possible rating in the rating 
process. As a consequence, almost 40,000 Moody’s-rated tranches were downgraded 
during that time with the justification that the first assigned ratings were no longer 
applicable (Agarwal, Barret, Cun, & De Nardi, 2010; Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, & 
Vickery, 2010; Benmelech & Dlugosz, 2009; He, Qian, & Strahan, 2011; Violi, 2010). 
This is in accordance with the current debate by regulators globally regarding the 
reliance of investors on credit ratings assigned by credit rating agencies (Partnoy, 2009; 
Vink & Fabozzi, 2009). One commonly held view of regulators is that investors relied 
solely on these ratings without considering their own analyses. Another view is that 
although investors might not rely exclusively on these ratings, there is an over-reliance 
on credit ratings or at least an excessive reliance on them (Fabozzi & Vink, 2012). For 
example, a report by the Financial Stability Forum (2008, p. 37) states: “Investors 
should address their over-reliance on ratings.” Hence, this paper empirical investigates 
the over-reliance on credit ratings hypothesis.  
To fill research gaps regarding the influence of the financial crisis on the ABS 
market and whether investors and other market participants learned from the collapse of 
the ABS market during the crisis, this paper investigates the non-U.S. asset-backed 
security market between 2010 and 2014. For the course of the investigation, this paper 
provides a Literature Review, identifying research gaps as well as presenting 
background information and research hypotheses of this paper in the next chapter. 
Thereafter, the used data sample is introduced within Data Description, i.e. we explain 
the structure of the data and present the variables, which we test as influencing factors. 
Chapter 4 presents the Methodology and the Findings regarding the first research 
hypothesis. Thereafter, a section with the Methodology and the Findings regarding the 
second research hypothesis is presented in chapter 5. After every analysis, a separate 
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discussion section highlights contributions to the research objectives, while the 
conclusion presents Limitations, Market Implications, and Future Research avenues in 
chapter 6. 
 Literature Review 2.2
Empirical research regarding asset-backed securities using statistical models, 
however, compared to empirical research regarding corporate bonds, is very limited. 
The first published study examined off-balance-sheet activities of 100 of the largest 
U.S. banks and was conducted by Holland (1989). The results of this study prove that 
off-balance-sheet activities comprise different types of contingencies and commitments 
that are not listed. Further, he identifies that banking organizations are more involved in 
off-balance-sheet activities due to their intensely competitive environments. Moreover, 
another study of Borgman (1996) engaged with a dataset of more than 700 ABS issues 
and documented its assembly and analyses while describing the pricing and other 
characteristics. The analysis of Borgman (1996) concludes that pricing of ABS 
(absolute and relative yield spreads) was not only rational but also reflected interest rate 
and reinvestment risks, marketability, and most importantly, the premia for default risks 
(Bakri, Ali, & Ismail, 2014). Empirical research about determinants of asset-backed 
security pricing is provided by Perraudin and Wu (2008). The paper reveals the factors 
that influence the spreads in asset-backed security prices during crisis periods. The 
authors investigated the manufactured housing sector in 2004 and the collapse of the 
MBS in 2007 in the U.S. subprime market.  
Extant literature often mentions and analyzes the problem of over-reliance on credit 
rating in the capital markets. In the corporate bond market, there is no shortage of 
empirical research regarding the over-reliance hypothesis. Campbell and Taksler (2003) 
find that yield spreads are more correlated with the issuer’s stock price than the assigned 
rating. Further, Cantor and Packer (1996) also find that there is no over-reliance on 
credit ratings because most of the credit information is contained in macroeconomic 
variables. Two further studies—Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz (1999) and Reisen and von 
Maltzan (1999)—analyze the over-reliance hypothesis in the Asian financial market. 
They find that the over-reliance on ratings was a destabilizing factor for the 1997-98 
financial crisis in the Asian market (Vink & Fabozzi, 2012). Many researches on the 
role of credit ratings in the 2007 financial crisis have been provided in the literature. For 
example, Wojtowitcz (2014) investigates the role of credit ratings in pricing the CDO 
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during this period. Further research regarding over-reliance on credit ratings in the 
securitization market is provided by Maehlmann (2012). The study investigates the 
over-reliance in the CDO market prior to the financial crisis. The paper finds that 
investors outsourced their risk analysis to rating agencies due to the complex and 
opaque securitization market and more critically, to avoid performing costly due 
diligence on the securities they had bought (Maehlmann, 2012). 
For this paper, the most important research is provided by Vink and Thibeault 
(2008) and Vink and Fabozzi (2012). Vink and Thibeault (2008) examine the yield 
determinants for ABS, MBS, and CDO pricing. They use statistical models to identify 
the factors that influence the primary market spreads of those three financial products 
and prove how strong this influence is. The dataset contains non-U.S. ABS, MBS, and 
CDO issued between 1999 and 2006. The results of the study regarding ABS are 
discussed subsequently in greater detail.  
Vink and Fabozzi (2012) test whether there was an over-reliance on credit ratings 
during the time prior to the 2007 financial crisis. Their findings show that credit ratings 
did impact the primary market spread of securitization transactions but cannot ascertain 
any over-reliance. Further, Vink and Fabozzi (2012) investigate the credit factors that 
influence the primary market spread after considering credit ratings. The study relies on 
a European floating-rate dataset for the years 1999 to 2006. They support the conclusion 
that there are factors which determine the spread besides credit ratings, and that 
investors rely on those factors as well.  
 Background Information and Hypotheses 2.2.1
ABS, MBS, and CDO played an important role during the collapse of the financial 
system in 2007 and the securitization market needed several years to recover. In 
accordance with current research reports by DZ Bank (2014, 2011, 2008), MSCI (2015), 
and Nomura (2015), this paper investigates the overall research question: “Has the 
financial crisis affected the yield of ABS transaction?” Based on the results of the 
studies by Oliviera, Curto, and Nunes (2012), Wang and Yao (2014), Klepsch and 
Wollmershaeuser (2011), as well as Harrison and Widaja (2014), which investigate the 
influence of the financial crisis on corporate and sovereign bonds as well as yield 
determinants in the fixed income market, we expect to find evidence that supports the 
statement that the financial crisis did influence the set of yield determinants of the non-
U.S. ABS market. Hence, we propose the following first research hypothesis: “The 
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financial crisis of 2007 influenced yield determinants of ABS transactions.” We 
perform a comparison analysis for the purpose of providing evidence that supports the 
first research hypothesis. First, we compare common security characteristics of ABS 
transactions for issues prior to and post the 2007 financial crisis. The main analysis 
investigates the set of yield determinants for the ABS market after the crisis and 
compares it to the set of yield determinants that is observed in the study of Vink and 
Thibeault (2008).  
As a natural follow-up to the first research hypothesis and a conclusion on new 
regulations in the ABS market, we perform an over-reliance analysis on the credit 
rating. This study investigates whether investors look beyond credit ratings from rating 
agencies and employ their own credit default risk analysis to increase the accuracy of 
the pricing of ABS transactions at issuance. Based on the results of the studies of Vink 
and Fabozzi (2012), Vink and Fabozzi (2009), and Agrawal, Barret, Cun, and De Nardi 
(2010) as well as the results of research reports by DZ Bank (2014) and the Financial 
Stability Forum (2008) on changes of the financial crisis regarding credit ratings, we 
expect that investors learned from their mistakes and employed their own risk analysis 
to understand non-U.S. ABS issues post the 2007 financial crisis in order to avoid over-
reliance on rating agencies—one of the causes of the crisis. Thus, we propose the 
second research hypothesis, which states: “There is no over-reliance on the credit 
ratings by ABS investors after the financial crisis.” In order to find evidence that 
supports this hypothesis, we analyze whether risk factors which have already been 
considered by rating agencies during the rating assignment process, are considered by 
capital market investors during their own credit risk analysis processes.  
 Data Description 2.3
This section introduces the data samples and describes the sources used in the 
study. We also introduce common security characteristics and provide a univariate 
comparison of the different data samples.  
 Data Samples 2.3.1
The principal data sources of this study are Thomson Reuters and DZ Bank. For 
non-European ABS issued between 2010 and 2014, we used the Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. For European ABS issues, we used the Asset Backed Watcher, published 
by DZ Bank. Both Thomson Reuters and DZ Bank are leading publishers of ABS 
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issues. The database contains detailed information on securitization of non-U.S. 
securities from January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2014. The period describes the 
recovery of the non-U.S. ABS market until the year prior to the European “Asset 
Purchase Programme”. The period is chosen in order to present findings, which show 
solely the influence of the financial crisis on the non-U.S. ABS market and exclude 
other possible influential sources, such as quantitative easing programmes by central 
banks. 
The sample for this study contains information on 11,741 securitization 
transactions, which are worth a total of USD 1,776 billion. Since this data sample 
includes all transactions (ABS, MBS, and CDO), we shortlisted only the ABS issues. 
The 5,071 ABS issues in the sample are worth USD 1,125 billion. These are referred to 
as the “full sample”. The observations regarding this sample are not only multiple loan 
tranche issues but also single loan tranche issues. Therefore, we consider a single issue 
(single loan tranche) as the unit of observation. If there is more than one tranche as part 
of the issue, we have a multiple issue (multiple loan tranches) and every tranche of the 
same transaction will appear as a separate observation in the database. This means, we 
have 1,650 ABS transactions containing a total of 5,071 tranches in the full sample. 
Although the full sample is comprehensive, it has two limitations for the purposes of 
this study. First, it provides detailed information on ABS issues dated post the financial 
crisis, which should be limited to non-U.S. ABS issues, and second, some issues may 
have incomplete information for the purpose of the analyses. Therefore, the sample may 
be reduced in the analyses to support hypotheses 1 and 2. First of all, the sample is 
reduced such that it only contains non-U.S. issues. The new subsample contains 486 
non-U.S. ABS transactions with a total of 1,688 tranches. The tranches add up to USD 
570 billion. We refer to this subsample as the “working sample”. We need information 
on 12 variables for every deal. Vink and Thibeault (2008), Gabbi and Sironi (2005), 
Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2004) as well as Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and 
Martin (2001) suggest the classification of these variables into three groups. Thus, the 
working sample includes issues with default and recovery risk characteristics, 
marketability characteristics, and systemic risk characteristics. The default and 
recovery risk characteristics are: Credit rating, time to maturity, extern enhancement, 
and loan to value. The following variables are classified as marketability characteristics: 
Size of the tranche, number of tranches, size of the whole transaction, number of lead 
managers, number of involved credit rating agencies, type of interest rate, and whether 
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the issue has retained interest or not. The systemic risk characteristics are called 
currency risk, emerging market, and creditor protection. Since the spreads are a 
function of the common pricing characteristics mentioned above, we need to introduce 
the variables that describe our set of securities. The set of common pricing 
characteristics is introduced in the Tables 3, 4, and 5 below (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; 
Merton, 1974; Liu & Thakor, 1984; Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; Gabbi & Sironi, 2005; 
Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, & Mann, 2004; Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin, 2001). 
Table 3 presents the default and recovery risk characteristics (Buscaino, Caselli, 
Corielli, & Gatti, 2012; Chen, Lesmond, & Wei, 2007; Kavussanos & Tsouknidis, 
2014; Amira, 2004; Grandes & Peter, 2004; Shin & Kim, 2013; Campbell & Cocco, 
2015; Wong, Fung, & Fong, 2004; Ammer & Clinton, 2004). The first column names 
the introduced variable. The second column describes the structure of the variables used 
in this study. 
Table 3: Default and Recovery Risk Characteristics 
Variable Description Expected Impact Source 
Rating Average value of assigned ratings Positive relationship Liu & Thakor (1984)
9
 
Maturity  Measured in years Positive relationship Merton (1974)
10
 
Extern Equal 1 if extern enhancement is Negative relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008)
11
 
Loan to Value Subordination level of tranche in % Positive relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008)
12
 
The considered rating agencies are Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch. The rating values 1, …, 10 
correspond to the ratings Aaa/AAA, …, Baa3/BBB-. Ratings lower than Baa3/BBB- are not purchase by 
the ECB and hence do not appear in our data samples. 
The third column provides the expected impact of this variable on the primary 
market spread in the regression analyses (Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund, 2009; Bajari, 
Chenghuan, & Minjung, 2008; Deng & Quingley, 2012; Fabozzi & Roever, 2003; 
Schwartz & Torous, 1993). The last column provides an overview of literature, in which 
the variables were introduced. 
Table 4: Marketability Characteristics 
Variable Description Expected Impact Source 
Loan Size Natural log of the tranche’s amount Negative relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)13 
                                               
9
 Further sources: Vink & Thibeault (2008), Vink & Fabozzi (2012), Buscaino, Caselli, Corielli, & Gatti 
(2012), Chen, Lesmond, & Wei (2007), Kavussanos & Tsouknidis (2014), Amira (2004), Ammer & 
Clinton (2004) 
10
 Further sources: Gabbi & Sironi (2005), Vink & Thibeualt (2008), Amira (2004), Grandes & Peter 
(2004), Shin & Kim (2013) 
11
 Further sources: Fabozzi & Roever (2003) 
12
 Further sources: Wong, Fung, Fong, & Sze (2004), Campbell & Cocco (2011), Deng & Quigley 
(2004), Schwartz & Torous (1993), Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund (2009), and Bajari, Chenghuan, & 
Minjung (2008) 
13
 Further sources: Qi & Yang (2009), Calem & Lacour-Little (2004), Pennington-Cross (2003) 
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Transaction Natural log of the ABS transactions’ amount Negative relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008) 
Tranches Number of tranches Negative relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012)
13
 
Managers Number of lead managers Negative relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)
13
 
Agencies Number of rating agencies Negative relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012)
13
 
Float 1 if type of interest is floating rate Negative relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)
14
 
Retained 1 if retained interest appears in transaction Negative relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008)
15
 
Size and Amount describe the Euro equivalent amount at issuance. If the coupon of a transaction is 
floating rated, the coupon payments can vary over time and are linked to a floating interest rate, such as 
the 3-month EURIBOR.  
Table 4 introduces the marketability characteristics (Qi & Yang, 2009; Calem & 
Lacour-Little, 2004; Pennington-Cross, 2003). We expect all marketability 
characteristics to be negatively related with the primary market spread. All variables 
should—ceteris paribus—increase the secondary marketability for the regarding 
transaction. 
Table 5: Systemic Risk Characteristics 
Variable Description Expected Impact Source 
Creditor 1 if creditor protection is provided Negative relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012) 
Currency Risk 1 if tranche faces currency risk Positive relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)
13 
Emerging Market 1 if tranche was issued in an Emerging Market Positive relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012) 
Creditor Protection describes a dummy variable that equals one if the country in which the transaction is 
issued provides creditor protection in the form of “no automatic stay on the assets” and zero otherwise. 
Currency Risk describes a dummy variable that equals one if the currency of the collateral’s cash flows 
and the currency denomination of the cash flows of liabilities differ. 
Table 5 presents the systemic risk characteristics (An, Deng, Nichols, & 
Sanders, 2014; Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008; Childs, Ott, & Riddiough, 1996). 
Further, we include two control variables in our statistical analyses. The first control 
variable is called “year i”. Year i describes the year dummies. Each dummy variable is 
equal to value 1 if issue i has been completed during the corresponding year and, has 
value zero, otherwise. These variables should capture the variations in fixed income 
market conditions (Gabbi & Sironi, 2005). Due to the highest correlation with the 
common pricing characteristics, the corresponding dummy variable for 2012 was 
excluded from the empirical analyses of this study to avoid over sensitivity. The second 
set of control variables are currency dummies that are equal to value 1 if security i is 
issued in the corresponding currency, and value zero, otherwise. These variables should 
capture both liquidity and credit standing (Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; Vink & Thibeault, 
2008). The corresponding variable for the currency “Mexican Peso” was excluded from 
the analyses of this study to avoid over sensitivity, since the variable described the 
smallest subset of the all currency dummies. 
                                               
14
 Further sources: Vink & Thibeault (2008) 
15
 Further Sources: An, Deng, Nichols, & Sanders (2014), Ashcraft & Schuermann (2008), Childs, Ott, & 
Riddiough (1996) 
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In the empirical analyses of this study, the common pricing characteristics are 
used as variables of interest in order to determine structural differences as well as the 
effects of the financial crisis on the set of non-U.S. ABS issues. In the regression model, 
the primary market spread is used as a dependent variable. Following the above 
approach, the set of independent variables of this study consists of the common pricing 
characteristics. Since the time from issuance is equal to zero for all issues, the above 
mentioned factors are considered at the time of issuance. In order to provide 
comparability for all issues used in this study, it does not consider the probable changes 
in the variables over the time period 2010 to 2014.  
The set of independent variables consists of both discrete and dummy variables. 
The discrete variables are credit rating, maturity, transaction size, loan size, as well as 
loan to value, #tranches, #lead managers, and #rating agencies. The set of dummy 
variables consists of extern enhancement, retained interest, float, currency risk, 
emerging market, and creditor protection. In the univariate analysis, all variables are 
analyzed and tested separately. The regressions measure the effects of all independent 
variables on the primary market spread. To test the over-reliance on credit rating, the 
variables, which are already considered by rating agencies, are analyzed with respect to 
credit rating.      
In order to find evidence that supports hypotheses 1 and 2, we need detailed 
information on the common security factors of every one of the 1,688 deals. Since our 
aim is to determine the factors influencing the primary market spread of ABS issues, 
we select those issues that have comparable pricing data available. This implies that we 
select those issues, for which we can identify the common pricing factors introduced 
above. We are only able to investigate the extent to which the ABS transactions are 
priced by the common pricing features if the sample provides all the data needed for 
every tranche. Unfortunately, this means that the sample is further reduced. The new 
subsample contains 329 transactions with a total of 771 tranches. The tranches add up to 
a total of USD 266 billion. This subsample is now referred to as the “high information 
sample”. It only contains issues for which, all the information is provided. Table 6 
reports a comparison between the high information sample and the working sample, to 
examine in detail, the appearance of the variables in the two samples. Further, this paper 
examines the causes for the reduction of the working sample. The deals of the working 
sample have an average issue amount of USD 339 million. The average coupon rate of 
the 52% fixed rated deals equal 3.06%, while the 48% floating rated issues exhibit an 
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average coupon rate 2.23%. A typical ABS tranche of this sample matures after 11.8 
years. The rate of deals exposed to currency risk is 0.26. The average number of 
tranches of a transaction is 3.5, whereby 55 transactions are single-issued tranches. 
Those transactions contain only one tranche. Moreover, the average number of lead 
managers equals 2.05. One important characteristic is the existence of a credit rating 
from at least one of the three rating agencies Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, or Fitch. 
Credit rating exhibits an average value of 4.5 for the working sample. The lack of a 
credit rating, lack of existence of a maturity date, and missing information on 
subordination and extern enhancement are the reasons behind the reduced working 
sample. For instance, 466 tranches have no credit rating assigned while 81 further deals 
have no maturity dates. The other deals are filtered out, because no information is 
available on extern enhancement or subordination. This leads us to the statistical 
numbers for the high information sample. The average amount of a deal of  
Table 6: Univariate analysis of the working sample compared with the high information sample 
Variable of interest ABS working sample ABS high information sample Survival  
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev rate 
Coupon rate (bp) 1235 244 184 771 222 159 62.43% 
Risk premium (bp)
7
 771 92 135 771 92 135 100% 
Credit rating (1-21 weak) 1214 4.5 4.08 771 3.9 3.63 63.51% 
Loan to value (%)
7
 771 24.00 29.67 771 24.00 29.67 100% 
Time to maturity (years) 1513 11.8 10.85 771 11.5 9.57 50.96% 
Issues with extern enhancement 1177 4.5% - 771 3.8% - 65.51% 
Loan tranche size (USD mio.) 1688 339 590 771 346 559 45.68% 
Transaction size (USD mio.) 486 783 973 329 779 770 67.70% 
Number of tranches 486 3.5 2.36 329 3.85 2.36 67.70% 
Number of lead managers 1688 2.05 0.99 771 2.18 1.11 45.68% 
Number of credit rating agencies 1222 1.38 0.51 771 1.43 0.53 63.09% 
Loans with retained interest
16
 771 67.2% - 771 67.2% - 100% 
Loans with fixed rate 1542 52% - 771 52% - 50.00% 
Loans with floating rate 1542 48% - 771 48% - 50.00% 
Loans with currency risk 1688 26% - 771 42% - 45.68% 
Loans in emerging markets
7
 771 31% - 771 31% - 100% 
Loans with creditor protection
7
 771 65% - 771 65% - 100% 
Column 1 represents the common pricing variables. Column 2 presents the number, the mean, and the 
standard deviation of each variable in the working sample. Column 3 describes the number, the mean, and 
the standard deviation of each variable associated with the high information sample. Column 4 describes 
the survival rate for each variable. This rate is calculated by dividing the number of issues of each 
variable of the high information sample by the number of issues of each variable of the working sample.  
                                               
16 The variable was only calculated for the high information sample 
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the high information sample is USD 346 million. The average coupon rate of fixed rated 
deals equals 2.54%, while floating rated deals provide an average coupon rate of 1.87%. 
Surprisingly, the average risk premium associated with floating rate deals is 1.16%, 
whereas the risk premium of fixed rated deals equals 0.72%. A typical ABS tranche of 
this sample matures after 11.5 years. The rate of issues exposed to currency risk is 0.42. 
The average number of tranches per transaction is 3.85, whereby 55 transactions are 
single unit transactions. The tranches exhibit an average number of lead managers of 
2.18. We observe a mean value of variable credit rating of 3.9.  
We find some similarities and some differences between the two samples. The 
time to maturity, the average amount, and the coupon rate of floating rate deals exhibit 
similar results. This paper observes a dissimilar coupon rate for fixed rated issues. This 
can be explained by the fact that the high information sample requires at least one credit 
rating of the three rating agencies. Almost all junior tranches are fixed rated and have a 
higher coupon rate compared to the senior tranches because they contain underlying 
assets with lower credibility. Hence, these assets are associated with an additional risk 
premium. In addition, companies frequently do not instruct rating agencies to assign a 
rating to those tranches. Since the main cause of reduction was the lack of credit rating, 
it is satisfactory that the average coupon rate of fixed rated deals differs enormously. 
Based on these findings, we highlight that the deals of the high information sample 
exhibit similar results compared to their working sample counterparts. Hence, we 
assume that the empirical results derived from the high information sample can be 
generalized for the whole sample. This is essential because we aim at providing results 
that are valid for the whole non-U.S. ABS market. 
 Determinants of the Primary Market Spread 2.4
This section provides evidence that supports the first research hypothesis. 
Therefore, regression analyses were performed to analyze the factors that investors 
relied on when pricing asset-backed securities after the 2007 financial crisis.  
 Methodology 2.4.1
This subchapter explains the statistical methods used to analyze the data sample. 
First, three regression analyses were performed on single variables to determine the 
most important credit factors. Second, we ran an ordinary least squares regression on 
the whole set of pricing features. This empirical study analyzed how common pricing 
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factors influenced the primary market spread of ABS transactions after the financial 
crisis. Third, we also performed a residual analysis in order to investigate whether the 
statistical instruments provided valid results and if the interpretation of the coefficients 
was correct. This analysis evaluated the residuals for normal distribution with mean 
zero, constant variance, and homoscedasticity. 
 Dependent Variable 2.4.1.1
This subsection deals with the dependent variable of the regression analysis. The 
dependent variable is called primary market spread in this study. The primary market 
spread, also called loan spread, represents the risk premium. On the basis of information 
at the time of issuance, the risk premium is defined as the price for the risk associated 
with the security. This study defines the primary market spread as the offered yield to 
maturity of the security at issuance above the yield to maturity of a corresponding 
treasury benchmark (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin, 
2001). Vink and Thibeault (2008), Vink and Fabozzi (2012), Gabbi and Sironi (2005), 
as well as Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) suggest the following 
procedure to obtain a suitable treasury benchmark: First, the benchmark is obligated to 
provide the same currency. Second, the benchmark is obligated to be issued at a 
comparable auction date. Third, the benchmark has to offer a comparable time to 
maturity. Figure 2 shows a histogram of the primary market spread of our sample. The 
histogram highlights that the distribution of the dependent variable is very similar to a 
normal distribution. This is very important because this is one of the conditions for the 
Figure 2: Histogram of Primary Market Spread 
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regression analysis to lead to valid results. Additionally, we observe the phenomenon 
that floating rate issues have a lower coupon rate than the fixed rated issues (Vink & 
Thibeault, 2008; Gabbi & Sironi, 2005; Reilly, Wright, & Gentry, 2010). But on the 
other hand, we see that the primary market spread of floating rate issues is higher than 
the primary market spread for fixed rated issues. 
 Independent Variables 2.4.1.2
This subsection investigates the independent variables of this study. The 
independent variables are all variables describing the following three categories: Default 
and recovery risk characteristics, marketability characteristics, and expected systemic 
characteristics. Further, we include dummy variables for currencies and years, in which 
the tranches are issued. Except for two correlation coefficients, all other coefficients of 
the correlation matrix do not indicate critical correlation levels between the independent 
variables. The only two coefficients, which indicate a critical correlation level, are the 
coefficients for loan size and transaction size and for currency risk and emerging 
market. This may be explained by the fact that many junior tranches, which are often 
the smaller tranches, are retained or not rated by any of the three rating agencies. 
Therefore, those issues are not included in the high information sample. If the 
transaction size is large, it is likely that the tranche has a large loan size too. The second 
case can be explained by the fact that issues exposed to currency risk are often issued in 
an emerging market. To obtain valid results, two regressions are performed as solutions 
to the correlation problem. The first regression includes the variables loan size and 
currency risk. The second regression includes the variables transaction size and 
emerging market in the model. 
 Regression Analysis  2.4.1.3
This subsection presents the regression model that analyzes the common pricing 
factors that influenced the primary market spread of ABS transactions after the 2007 
financial crisis. This study uses a panel-data fixed-effects model with the following 
structure: ܻ = 𝛽ܺ + 𝑢, 
where ܻ is the dependent variable, 𝛽 is the regression coefficient, ܺ describes the 
matrix of the independent variables, and 𝑢 describes the error term. We present the 
analyses in another form with the same meaning: 
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ݕ𝑖 = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵݔ𝑖ଵ + 𝛽ଶݔ𝑖ଶ + … + 𝛽௞ݔ𝑖௞ + 𝑢𝑖    ሺ𝑖 = 1,…, 𝑛ሻ 
where ݕ𝑖, ݔ𝑖௟ , 𝛽𝑖, and 𝑢𝑖  ሺ𝑖 = 1,…, 𝑛, ݈ = 1,…, ݇ሻ represent the dependent variable, 
the independent variable, the regression coefficient, and the error term. At this point, we 
note that the regression analysis is performed with an intercept 𝛽଴. We include the 
intercept in the analyses because we expect the risk premium to be different from zero 
in every case. However, even if all the coefficients from the independent variables are 
zero, we expect that the originator will nevertheless demand a risk premium. We 
perform several regression analyses: first, a regression analyses with only one 
independent variable to measure the impact of that variable; and second, a regression 
analysis with all independent variables determining the high information sample. After 
this, we verify the results of the regression analyses. T-tests, to check whether an 
independent variable is statistically significant, are also performed. If a variable is not 
considered statistically significant, i.e. if no statistical significance exists, then, the 
corresponding variable is not considered as a determinant of the primary market spread. 
Further, we also perform an F-test—to test the goodness of fit—along with a residual 
analysis.  
 Regression Structure 2.4.1.4
This subsection introduces the structure of the panel-data fixed-effects model. This 
paper aims to analyze the impact of the common pricing factors on the primary market 
spread of ABS transactions from 2010 till the end of 2014. First, we run three 
regression analyses with only one independent variable. We also investigate three 
variables which could have dominantly impacted the primary market spread. The 
independent variables are credit rating, time to maturity and float. Second, we run an 
ordinary least squares regression and present the results for the estimator 𝛽. The 
specification for our model is: 
SPREAD𝑖 =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵCREDIT RATING𝑖 + 𝛽ଶMATURITY𝑖+ 𝛽ଷEXTERN ENHANCEMENT𝑖 + 𝛽ସLOAN TO VALUE𝑖+ 𝛽ହLOAN SIZE𝑖 + 𝛽଺# TRANCHES𝑖 + 𝛽଻# LEAD MANAGERS𝑖+ 𝛽଼# RATING AGENCIES𝑖 + 𝛽ଽRETAINED𝑖+ 𝛽ଵ଴TYPE OF INTEREST RATE𝑖 + 𝛽ଵଵCURRENCY RISK𝑖+ 𝛽ଵଶCREDITOR PROTECTION𝑖 + 𝛽ଵଷYEAR OF ISSUE𝑖+ 𝛽ଵସCURRENCY𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖 
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In this model, the variable SPREAD𝑖 describes the primary market spread. The 
variables with the coefficients 𝛽ଵ, …, 𝛽ଵଶ are the common pricing factors. The last two 
variables are included as control variables. CURRENCY describes multiple dummy 
variables that are included because the issues of the high information sample are 
denominated in several currencies. Each dummy refers to one currency. The variables 
take the value 1, if the issue is denominated in the corresponding currency, and value 
zero, otherwise. YEAR OF ISSUE describes multiple dummy variables which represent 
the issuance years of the high information sample. We included four dummies in this 
study based on the year of issue: YEAR = 1, YEAR = 2, YEAR = 4, YEAR = 5, which 
correspond to 2010, 2011, 2013, and 2014. The dummies take the value 1 if the 
transaction was issued in the corresponding year, and value zero, otherwise. Note that 
the dummy variable reflecting “Mexican Peso” and the dummy variable describing 
2012 were excluded from the analyses in order to avoid over sensitivity. The regression 
model was run to provide evidence that supported the first research hypothesis. 
 Regression Results 2.4.2
This section reports the first three regressions described in the section above. The 
results of the regressions have been exhibited in Table 7. The first regression was run on 
credit rating (independent variable) and the primary market spread (dependent 
variable).   
Table 7: Regressions on Credit Rating, Maturity, and Type of Interest Rate 
 
Variable 
ABS issues 
Reg. #1 
ABS issues 
Reg. #2 
ABS issues 
Reg. #3 
Intercept 0.1642 *** 1.1133 **** 0.6959 **** 
Credit Rating 0.1947 ****     -     - 
Time To Maturity     - -0.0157 ***     - 
Float     -     -    0.4629 **** 
Number of Observations 
Adjusted R² 
F-Statistics 
771 
0.28 
< 2.2e-16 
771 
0.01 
< 0.002 
771 
0.03 
< 1.6 e-06 
Significance Levels                                      0 ‘****’ 0.001 ‘ ***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1  
The first column describes the coefficients, the second to fourth column describe the value of the 
estimated regression coefficient for the corresponding variable. The “*” describes the statistical 
significance of the corresponding variable, i.e. a variable has an influence on the primary market spread if 
it is considered as significant. 
The adjusted R² is greater than 0.28 which indicates a satisfactory value for only 
one independent variable. The F-statistic indicates that at least one of the regression 
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coefficients is different from zero. Hence, the model has a satisfying explanatory 
quality. The intercept is statistically significant at the 1% level which is the second-
highest significance level. This means that if the regression coefficient of credit rating 
is zero, there is still a risk premium demanded by investors. The coefficient of credit 
rating equals 0.1947 as expected. This means that a worse credit rating is associated 
with an additional risk premium of 19.5 basis points. Further, we note that the credit 
rating is statistically significant at the 0.1% level—the highest significance level. 
Therefore, the variable has a strong influence on the primary market spread.  
The next regression in Table 7 was run on maturity (independent variable) and the 
primary market spread (dependent variable). The adjusted R² lies over 0.01 and it 
indicates a low explanatory power for the variance. The p-value of the F-statistic 
indicates that the regression coefficients are different from zero. It suggests a 
satisfactory explanatory power of the regression. The intercept is statistically significant 
at the 0.1% level. Time to maturity has a significantly negative relationship with the 
primary market spread at the 1% level. This indicates that a longer time to maturity is 
associated with a price discount of 1.5 basis points per every additional year. The 
significance level shows that the model is an excellent fit and there is a significant 
relationship between maturity and primary market spread.  
The last single regression of Table 7 was run on the dummy variable float 
(independent variable) and the primary market spread (dependent variable). The 
adjusted R² has a value greater than 0.02 and is as expected since we analyzed a dummy 
variable. The F-statistic suggests that the model has satisfying explanatory power. The 
intercept is statistically significant at the 0.1% level, which equals the results of the 
other regressions. The variable float is significantly and negatively related with the 
spread. The estimate of 0.4629 indicates that issues with a floating coupon rate are 
associated with an additional average risk spread of 46 basis points. 
We conclude that the three variables exercise a strong influence on the primary 
market spread. This is not very surprising because we considered credit rating and time 
to maturity as two of the most dominant variables in this study. However, no clear 
apriori conclusion about the explanatory power of the variable float can be arrived at 
from extant literature. The results show that the type of interest significantly impacts the 
primary market spread. A regression on the complete model has been performed below. 
On the one hand, we are interested in the variables that influence the primary market 
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spread, while on the other hand, we also examine how the three variables mentioned 
above behave when they are put in a model together with all the other common features. 
The regression was run on the common pricing factors (independent variables) and the 
primary market spread (dependent variable). Due to correlation issues for the variables 
transaction size and emerging market, we have performed two regressions. 
Table 8: Determinants of the Primary Market Spread 
 
Variable 
ABS issues 
Reg. #1 
ABS issues 
Reg. #2 
Constant 4.5839 **** 5.3481 **** 
Credit Rating 0.2549 **** 0.2508 **** 
Loan To Value 0.0041 *** 0.0032 *** 
Time To Maturity -0.0373 **** -0.0363 **** 
Retained Interest -0.1739 ** -0.1909 *** 
Extern Enhancement -0.2021  -0.2278 
Loan Size -0.0318      - 
Transaction Size     - -0.2248 **** 
# Tranches -0.0113 0.0077 
# Lead Managers -0.0859 ** -0.0622 * 
# Rating Agencies 0.0991 0.1145 
Currency Risk 0.0698     - 
Creditor Protection -0.4361 **** -0.4365 **** 
Float 0.4824 **** 0.5368 **** 
Emerging Market    - 0.0946 
Number of Observations 
Adjusted R² 
F-Statistics 
771 
0.57 
< 2.2e-16 
771 
0.59 
< 2.2e-16 
Significance Levels                                      0 ‘****’ 0.001 ‘ ***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1  
The dummy variables YEAR1, YEAR2, YEAR4, YEAR5, and the currency dummies are included in the 
regression but not reported in the above table. 
Table 8 provides the results from the regression analysis that was run to determine 
the yield determinants of the ABS market. Further, Table 8 reports that the adjusted R² 
is higher than 0.57, which is an extraordinary value. Both adjusted R² describe the 
explanatory power of the regression. They describe the extent to which the variance of 
the dependent variable may be explained by the variance of the independent variables. 
The values are comparable to the results of the studies of Vink and Thibeault (2008), 
Vink and Fabozzi (2012), and Fabozzi and Vink (2012). Thus, the model displays 
satisfactory explanatory power of regression. The F-statistic (p-value < 2.24-16) 
indicates that at least one of the regression coefficients is different from zero.  
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The first variable is credit rating. We predicted an inverse relationship between 
credit rating and primary market spread. The variable has a significant and positive 
relationship with the spread at the 0.1% level as expected. The pattern of credit rating 
indicates that spreads rise by 25 basis points when ratings worsen. This observation is 
as predicted and makes intuitive sense. Further, the significance level indicates that 
credit rating is a yield determinant of the ABS market. This is in accordance with the 
results from the first single regression, in which the estimate value as well as the 
significance level are comparable. Further, credit rating exhibits significant 
homogeneity with respect to the standard deviations in both regressions. We observe a 
positive and significant relationship with the spread at the 1% level for the variable loan 
to value, although we do expect a negative relation. This result is similar to the results 
of Vink and Thibeault in 2008. They also documented a positive coefficient sign for 
loan to value. This indicates that loan to value is a primary yield determinant of the 
ABS market. The coefficient suggests that issues with higher loan to value (senior 
tranches) are associated with an additional risk premium. Maturity exhibits a 
significantly negative relationship with the primary market spread at the 0.1% level. 
Apparently, yield spreads generally decrease with longer time to maturities for ABS 
transactions. The results for maturity are very similar to the results from the single 
regression.  
Moreover, we observe that retained interest is significantly and negatively related 
with the spread at the 5% level. This paper concludes that retained interest leads to 
“investors comfort” and positively influences the risk premium. The relationship of 
extern enhancement with spread is negative, as predicted. The results of the t-test yields 
an insignificant relationship. Thus, extern enhancement is ascertained to be no yield 
determinant of ABS transactions. An insignificantly negatively relationship between 
loan size and the spread is also reported and this indicates that yield spreads generally 
decrease with larger loan sizes. The statistical significance indicates that loan size does 
not influence the primary market spread. The variable #tranches is negatively related 
with the spread as expected. Thus, we did not find any support that allows issuers to 
exploit market factors to their advantage via tranching for ABS; or at least no advantage 
exists that may be associated with a lower spread. Nevertheless, we note that #tranches 
is statistically insignificant. Therefore, #tranches is not considered as a yield 
determinant of ABS issues. The variable #lead managers exhibits a significantly 
negative relationship with the primary market spread at the 5% level as predicted. Thus, 
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a larger conglomerate of investment banks is associated with an average price discount 
of 8.6 basis points. Additionally, the variable is a yield determinant of ABS issues. The 
variable #rating agencies is insignificantly and positively related with the spread. We 
predicted a negative coefficient for #rating agencies. One explanation could be that in 
the high information sample, issues with excellent rating are rated by a smaller 
conglomerate of rating agencies than issues without an excellent rating. This study 
observes an insignificantly positive relationship for currency risk and the primary 
market spread, i.e. issues that are exposed to currency risk are associated with an 
additional risk premium. The second to last variable creditor protection is significantly 
negatively related with the spread. Tranches that are issued in countries with no 
automatic stay on the assets are associated with a price discount compared to tranches 
issued in countries with no creditor protection. The variable is significant at the 0.1% 
level and therefore, consequently considered as a yield determinant of ABS 
transactions. The last variable of the regression is float. We expected a positive 
coefficient sign, since floating rate issues have higher spread rates than fixed rate 
issues. The analysis exhibits that float is significantly and positively related with the 
primary market spread at the 0.1% level. Thus, spreads rise by an average of 48 basis 
points when the corresponding security is issued with a floating rate. In addition, the 
significance level indicates a dominant correlation between float and the primary 
market spread. The results support the findings from the single regression. Hence, float 
is a yield determinant of the ABS market.  
The next regression was performed without the variables—loan size and currency 
risk. Instead, the variables transaction size and emerging market are included in the 
regression analysis. The results of the regression are very similar to the results of the 
first regression of Table 8. Nevertheless, we observe one dissimilarity. #tranches 
exhibits a positive coefficient sign in the second regression. However, the variable is 
still insignificantly related with the spread. Transaction size, compared to loan size in 
the first regression, is significantly negatively related with the spread at the 0.1% level. 
Issues with a larger transaction size are associated with higher secondary market 
liquidity and an average price discount of almost 23 basis points. Hence, transaction 
size is a determinant of the primary market spread. The variable emerging market on 
the other hand has an insignificant and positive relationship with spread. Based on the 
results of the regressions, we suggest the following list of yield determinants of ABS 
transactions. Credit rating, loan to value, time to maturity, retained interest, transaction 
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size, number of lead managers, creditor protection and float are significant determining 
variables of the spread of non-U.S. ABS transactions.  
As a next step, we analyze the residuals of the regressions of Table 8. The analysis 
of the residuals involves testing for normal distribution, analyzing the residuals plot of 
the regression analysis for constant variance, and performing the Breusch-Pagan test to 
test the residuals for heteroscedasticity.  
First, we take a look at the histogram of the residuals. We add a density curve to see 
the distribution of the residuals. Figure 3 identifies the distribution of the residuals of 
the first regression very easily. We see that the residuals are normally distributed with 
mean zero. Additionally, we observe the same result for the second regression analysis. 
Those results are very important for this study, since the normal distribution of the 
residuals as well as a mean of zero are two assumptions for the validity of the regression 
analysis. Thus, the results support the explanatory power of the regression. To further 
analyze the residuals, we test the residuals for constant variance. This means, it is very 
important that the variance of the residuals does not fluctuate with rising index. First, 
we analyze the plot of the residuals of the first regression as shown in Figure 4. The 
residual plot indicates that the variance of the residuals seems to be constant. We cannot 
detect any significant changes in the variance over the index. Further, the residual plot 
Figure 3: Histogram of Residuals with Fitted Density Curve 
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of regression two exhibits the same result. But, since this is another important 
assumption for the correctness of the results of the regression analyses and there are 
some outliers in the plot, we perform the Breusch-Pagan test to eventually support the 
fact that our model does not contain heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan test was 
developed in 1979 by Trevor Breusch and Adrian Pagan. We have used this test to 
reject heteroscedasticity in the linear regression model. Homoscedasticity is one of the 
apriori conditions of a valid regression model. The null hypothesis states that there is no 
heteroscedasticity in the regression model. We are interested in the p-value of the 
Breusch-Pagan test. If the p-value is lower than a corresponding significance level, the 
null hypothesis will be rejected and heteroscedasticity proved to exist. For our model, 
the highest significance level is α = 0.1, i.e. 10%. If the p-value is lower than 0.1, the 
null hypothesis will be rejected, if the p-value is greater than 0.1, the null hypothesis 
will be accepted and we can assume that there is no heteroscedasticity in our model. The 
Breusch-Pagan test shows that the p-value exceeds the level of 10%, and therefore, we 
can assume that the null hypothesis will be accepted. This only implies that there is a 
statistically significant homoscedasticity in our model therefore, it does provide valid 
results. A second Breusch-Pagan test for the second regression yielded the same result 
Figure 4: Residual Plot 
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and therefore, we were able to proceed with the analyses of the regression results in 
greater detail. 
 Regression Discussion 2.4.3
This section further analyzes the regression results and provides evidence that 
supports the first hypothesis by comparing the results of this study with the findings of 
Vink and Thibeault’s study (2008). The comparison results enable this paper to 
conclude whether there have been significant changes in the set of yields of ABS 
transactions after the 2007 financial crisis. 
Vink and Thibeault (2008) discovered the following statistically significant 
determinants of the primary market spread prior to the 2007 financial crisis for non-
U.S. ABS transactions. Not surprisingly, the credit rating is statistically significant at 
the highest level. Further, the number of tranches, the loan size, the transaction size, 
and the type of rate are documented as determinants of the primary market spread. 
Currency risk was the last significant variable that Vink and Thibeault (2008) detected.  
Compared to the results above, this study observes the following yield determinants 
of non-U.S. ABS transactions after the 2007 financial crisis—Credit rating, loan to 
value, time to maturity, retained interest, transaction size, number of lead managers, 
creditor protection and the type of rate—of the primary market spread for ABS 
transaction. All other included variables are statistically insignificant. The subsequent 
sections enable detailed comparisons. 
 Credit Rating 2.4.3.1
In empirical studies for fixed income securities, the credit rating is always 
considered the most dominant determinant for the spread. This study confirms the 
findings in literature and yields to consider credit rating as one of the most critical yield 
determinants. In Vink and Thiebeault’s study (2008) credit rating is introduced as an 
inverse function. The best credit rating is assigned to value 1, the second-best rating is 
assigned to value 2, and so on. The worst credit rating is assigned to value 22. Credit 
rating has a mean value of 4.1 in their high information sample and 3.9 in their full 
sample. It was expected that the coefficient sign of this variable would be positive. 
Therefore, the variable included in this study has been constructed in the same way. The 
mean value of credit rating is 3.9 in the high information sample and 4.5 in the working 
sample. Both studies find a significantly negative relationship for the credit rating with 
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the primary market spread at the highest level. Thus, credit rating may still be viewed 
as a yield determinant of the ABS market. 
 But, if we expand the results from the analysis onto the working sample as 
intended, we observe a significant change for the variable. Leaving the influencing 
character aside, it is clear that the rating agencies have not assigned excellent ratings as 
easily as pre 2007. The mean value of credit rating is significantly higher for the 
working sample in this study compared to that in Vink and Thibeault (2008). This 
implies that post the 2007 financial crisis, investors regarded credit rating more 
critically, such that rating agencies had to adapt the process of assigning a rating. This 
change indicates worse ratings with respect to the mean values. We note that the results 
still indicated that the variable remained the most dominant determinant of the primary 
market spread. However, the financial crisis significantly impacted the pricing of the 
ABS transaction. After the defaults in mortgage-backed securities, the securitization 
market however, experienced a huge breakdown. One of the causes of the crisis was the 
extraordinary credit ratings assigned to the transactions. These conveyed the 
assumptions of a low-risk market. However, the investors were skeptical about the 
excellent ratings during the crisis. In order to regain credibility, rating agencies had to 
adapt their processes of assigning a rating and this led to a recovery in the credibility of 
rating agencies and consequently, a strong significance level for credit rating. 
 Loan to Value 2.4.3.2
The next variable is loan to value. The studies lead to different results for this 
variable, however, it is positively related with the spread in both studies, although both 
papers did expect a negative relationship. With respect to statistical significance, both 
studies have also resulted in different manifestations. Prior to 2007, the variable had an 
insignificant relationship with spread, whereas in this study, the variable loan to value 
is significantly related with the primary market spread, and is therefore a yield 
determinant for ABS issues. This is the first evidence of the fact that investors rely on 
different features when pricing ABS transactions in the post 2007 markets. 
Consequently, the subordination structure of the securities has developed adequately to 
function as an indicator for internal risk protection against payment defaults. 
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 Time to Maturity 2.4.3.3
Time to maturity is an interesting variable for this study. Vink and Thibeault (2008) 
determine that time to maturity is not statistically significant for pricing ABS 
transactions. Our study, on the other hand, observes a significantly negative relationship 
with the primary market spread at the 0.1% level. Therefore, we can highlight the 
second important change in pricing asset-backed securities. Time to maturity, compared 
to the scenario pre 2007, is considered as yield determinant in this study. 
 Retained Interest 2.4.3.4
Retained interest behaves differently in the two studies. This study observes that 
retained interest is as predicted negatively related with the spread. Surprisingly, the 
coefficient sign of the variable in Vink and Thibeault’s study (2008) was positive, 
though they expected it to be negative. Hence, issues that provide retained interest as 
internal credit enhancements are associated with a price discount after the financial 
crisis. Further, the significance levels have been seen to differ as well. This study 
considers the variable as yield determinant for the ABS market, whereas Vink and 
Thibeault (2008) observe an insignificant relation.  
 Loan Size and Lead Managers 2.4.3.5
This paper documents an insignificantly negative relationship for the variable loan size. 
The results differ from those of Vink and Thibeault’s study (2008). Both papers 
predicted the negative results, but Vink and Thibeault (2008) observed a positive 
relationship with the spread. Further, the 2008 study considered the variable as a 
determinant of the primary market spread. This is a further interesting influence of the 
financial crisis. A higher loan size signals secondary market liquidity and is negatively 
related with the risk premium however, it is not a yield determinant anymore. The 
number of lead managers exhibits a negative coefficient sign in both studies. However, 
prior to 2007, the variable is considered insignificant and consequently, not a 
determinant of the spread. This study, based on a 5% significance level, concludes that 
the variable is a yield determinant. As a consequence of the crisis, the size of the 
conglomerate is a dependency of the set of yield determinants. 
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 Transaction Size and Type of Rate 2.4.3.6
The next two variables exhibit the same significance levels in both studies. The 
relationships that transaction size and floating rate have with the primary market 
spread remain significant at the 0.1% level in both studies. The coefficient sign for 
transaction size is negative in both studies though the impact of the type of interest 
differs. This analysis observes a positive relationship for float, although Vink and 
Thibeault’s study (2008) finds a negative relationship. Therefore, investors assign a 
different impact to the variable post 2007. 
 Extern Enhancement and Rating Agencies 2.4.3.7
This paragraph discusses external enhancement and the number of rating agencies. 
The two variables are not considered to be yield determinants in both studies. Extern 
enhancement is still negatively related to issuance spread as expected. On the other 
hand however, we note that the coefficient sign of the variable number of rating 
agencies differs. Vink and Thibeault (2008) determine a negative relationship as 
expected, whereas this study observes a positive relationship. 
 Tranches, Currency Risk 2.4.3.8
These two variables are the only two characteristics, which belong to the set of 
yield determinants prior to the financial crisis but are insignificant post 2007. 
Nevertheless, both empirical studies observe positive relationships for both variables. 
This means, the associations of the impact are the same. The results indicate that 
investors substitute the number of tranches and currency risk with internal credit 
enhancement variables as yield determinants. 
Finally, the last two variables—creditor protection and emerging market—are not 
included in Vink and Thibeault’s study (2008). Therefore, there are no comparison 
results for these variables. 
 Conclusion on the first Research Hypothesis 2.4.4
The first hypothesis addresses the set of yield determinants of the ABS market. 
The results indicate that there is a new set of yield determinants for the post 2007 
period. Loan to value, time to maturity, lead managers, and retained interest are 
considered to be the new determinants for the issuance spread. Further, we observe that 
the credit rating, transaction size, and the type of interest rate are still significantly 
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related with the primary market spread. Despite these similarities, we observe important 
changes in the set of yield determinants in Vink and Thibeault’s study (2008). After the 
financial crisis, the relationships of loan size, the number of tranches and currency risk 
with the spread seem to become insignificant. Further, this paper observes significant 
influence of the crisis on the coefficients of the common pricing characteristics. While 
retained interest and loan size are positively related with the spread in Vink and 
Thibeault’s study (2008), we find negative relationships as expected. The coefficient 
sign for the number of rating agencies differs as well. Vink and Thibeault (2008) 
observe a negative relationship, whereas we find a positive coefficient sign. Finally, we 
observe a positive relationship for float whereas the variable is negatively related with 
the spread in their 2008 study.  
Based on these findings, we accept the first research hypothesis. We conclude 
that the yield determinants were significantly influenced by the financial crisis. 
Although the study does bear some similarity with that of Vink and Thibeault’s (2008), 
significant influence is determined with respect to significance levels and coefficient 
values. Further, many security characteristics seem to have developed owing to recent 
regulations in the non-U.S. ABS market. The new set of yield determinants reflects 
these. Two new spread determinants describe internal credit enhancement. This is the 
most important finding after 2007. As a consequence of the collapse of securitization, 
internal credit enhancement seems to have significantly evolved as per investors’ 
demands. Moreover, time to maturity, as a measure of credit risk default, is now 
considered to be a spread determinant.  
 
 Over-Reliance on Credit Rating 2.5
As proposed in the introduction, an intuitive follow-up of our empirical analysis is 
the investigation into the over-reliance on credit ratings. The widely held view that 
investors should employ their own credit analysis might be reasonable, but may not be 
straightforward for some investment vehicles in the fixed income market. In the case of 
corporate bonds, for instance, there are well-known metrics derived from the financial 
statements of the issuer and the price volatility of the issuer’s stock that can be used to 
measure the issuer’s financial well- being. In contrast, the analysis of asset-backed 
securities is not as simple. The key element for asset-backed security transactions is to 
separate the credit risk of the originator from the SPV that is issuing the ABS (Vink & 
Fabozzi, 2012; Ayotte & Gaon, 2011; Hu & Black, 2008). Consequently, when 
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determining the potential explanatory variables that investors should consider when 
assessing ABS credit risk, we must determine what information—about the structure—
is available and which factors are associated with an ABS credit analysis. The best 
source for factors to consider for assessing credit risk is the ABS rating process of rating 
agencies themselves (Vink & Fabozzi, 2012). For this reason, in the next subchapter we 
discuss what variables, in general, are considered by the rating agencies when assigning 
a rating to ABS transactions. Thereafter, we perform one further regression analysis 
and, in combination with the results of Table 8, this is deployed to test whether 
investors rely solely on credit ratings or if they employ their own credit risk analyses. If 
the results indicate that these variables not only capture the variable credit rating but 
also get considered as yield determinants by investors, then, this study will be able to 
conclude that investors look beyond the credit rating and employ their own credit risk 
analyses as ways to expand the credit rating of rating agencies. Following the above 
approach, we ran a regression on credit rating and on factors, which had already been 
considered by the rating agencies, first. Subsequently, we analyzed the results of Table 
8 in order to investigate the over-reliance hypothesis.  
 Factors Considered By Rating Agencies 2.5.1
This study only includes factors, which are associated with the default risk. 
Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard and Poor’s focus on three areas when assigning ratings: 
(1) asset risks, (2) structural risks, and (3) third-party enhancement. Asset risks address 
the portfolio of assets backing the security. Evaluating their quality entails determining 
losses due to default probabilities. Structural risks describe the risks and the obligations 
of the tranche that the cash flow of the underlying portfolio cannot satisfy during the 
securitization process and the lifetime of the security (Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; La Porta, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; 
Acharya, Bharath, & Srinivasan, 2007; Altman, Brady, & Sironi, 2007). Third-party 
enhancements describe whether or not there are any guarantors involved in the 
transaction. For instance, if there are third-party guarantees by insurance companies, 
these can reduce possible losses of the underlying assets. For the purpose of including 
these areas in our analysis, we constructed a corresponding set of variables in section 
2.3. The variables, which describe credit rating in the following analysis, are external 
credit enhancement, internal credit enhancement, collateral origination, and creditor 
protection. Internal credit enhancement is divided into the variables loan to value and 
retained interest. Collateral origination is divided into currency risk and emerging 
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market of section 2.3. Due to high correlation with this set of variables, the variable 
emerging market has been excluded from the analyses.  
 Methodology  2.5.2
The regression model for this chapter has the same structure as the regression 
models of section 2.4. The high information sample is analyzed to find evidence that 
supports the second hypothesis. The performed regression attempts to determine 
whether the above factors accurately describe the credit rating. This is important for our 
approach and further progress, since we need the variables to capture the credit rating.  
 Regression Results 2.5.3
The regression was run on the variables loan to value, retained interest, extern 
enhancement, currency risk, and creditor protection (independent variables) and the 
credit rating (dependent variable). The results are presented in Table 9. 
Table 9: Regression on Credit Rating 
 
Variable 
Regression on 
Credit Rating 
Intercept 3.8515 **** 
Loan To Value -0.0193 **** 
Retained Interest -0.7830 *** 
Extern Enhancement -1.5808 ** 
Currency Risk 0.8523 *** 
Creditor Protection 1.1023 **** 
Number of Observations 
Adjusted R² 
F-Statistics 
771 
0.08 
< 1.12e-12 
Significance Levels          0 ‘****’ 0.001 ‘ ***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1 
 
The regression of Table 9 focuses on the significance levels and indicates if credit 
rating can be captured through the set of variables used. We note that all variables are 
significantly related to credit rating. This indicates a strong relationship between our set 
of variables and the rating. Loan to value and creditor protection are significant at the 
0.1% level. Retained interest and currency risk are significant at the 1% level. Extern 
enhancement is significant at the 5% level. The multiple R² and the adjusted R² indicate 
satisfactory explanatory power.  
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As a next step, this study analyzes the results of the regression presented in Table 8 
in order to verify the preferences of the investors. We focus on the significance levels of 
the variables already included in the process of assigning a rating. If investors look 
beyond the credit rating and employ their own default risk analysis to adjust the risk 
premium, we observe that some of the variables develop a significant relationship with 
the primary market spread. Table 10 presents the shortened results of the regression of 
Table 8 in section 2.4.  
Table 10: Over-reliance on credit rating 
 
Variable 
Regression on 
Over-Reliance 
Credit Rating 0.2549 **** 
Loan To Value 0.0041 **** 
Retained Interest -0.1739 ** 
Extern Enhancement -0.2021  
Currency Risk 0.0698 
Creditor Protection -0.4361 **** 
Number of Observations 
Adjusted R² 
F-Statistics 
771 
0.57 
< 2.2e-16 
Significance Levels          0 ‘****’ 0.001 ‘ ***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1 
 
The credit rating is significant at the 0.1% level. The results of the five variables 
which should have been reflected by the credit rating are very interesting. Three 
variables are significant determinants of the primary market spread. On the one hand, 
extern enhancement and currency risk are insignificantly related with the spread. On the 
other hand, loan to value, retained interest, and creditor protection have a significant 
relationship with the spread. Loan to value and creditor protection exhibit significance 
levels of 0.1%, whereas retained interest shows a level of 5%. We conclude that three 
out of five variables are yield determinants in the ABS market even though they have 
already been considered by rating agencies. 
 Regression Discussion 2.5.4
Based on the results of Table 9 and Table 10, this study concludes that there has 
been no over-reliance on credit rating by investors in ABS transactions in the post 2007 
period. We observe three variables already considered by rating agencies when 
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assigning a rating. These have significant relationships with the spread. Loan to value, 
retained interest, and creditor protection constitute the set of yield determinants that 
indicate that investors adjust the risk premium with their own default risk analysis 
because the credit rating does not accurately reflect the default risk of ABS. As 
mentioned in section 2.4.3.1, the ratings of the issues were significantly worse after the 
2007 financial crisis. An explanation for the displayed results of the variables retained 
interest and creditor protection could be that rating agencies calculated ratings too 
conservatively as a result of the financial crisis. Consequently, investors look beyond 
credit ratings and employ their own default risk analysis.  This means, investors adjust 
the risk premium and reduce the spread if the issue provides retained interest or creditor 
protection. For high rated tranches which are mostly senior tranches, investors consider 
the assigned rating as too good. Hence, a higher loan to value ratio is associated with an 
additional risk premium. Overall, this is evidence that the financial investors employ 
their own credit default risk analysis and look beyond the credit ratings of rating 
agencies. The findings indicate that there is no longer an over-reliance on the credit 
rating in the ABS market. Hence, based on these findings, this study accepts the second 
research hypothesis. 
 Conclusion  2.6
 This paper empirically investigated the asset-backed security market after the 
2007 financial crisis. Choudhry and Fabozzi (2004) mention that this market can be 
divided into three main categories: ABS, MBS, and CDOs. The research concentrated 
on ABS issues between 2010 and 2014 and examined 771 ABS issues all of which 
offered the information needed for a full analysis. The high information sample was 
worth USD 266 billion.  
This paper investigated the influence of the financial crisis on the non-U.S. ABS 
market. The research path includes the analysis of two research hypothesis. The first 
hypothesis states that the financial crisis influenced the set of pricing determinants of 
the ABS market. Hence, to find evidence that supported this hypothesis, we performed a 
comparison analysis of the ABS yield determinants. First, we investigated how common 
pricing characteristics compared for the two subsamples. We found that many of the 
common pricing factors exhibited significant dissimilarities, with respect to the security 
features.  
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Further, we analyzed the impact of the financial crisis on yield determinants in a 
panel-data fixed-effects regression model. This paper found significant changes in the 
set of yield determinants when pricing ABS transactions. The variables loan to value, 
time to maturity, number of lead managers and retained interest were considered yield 
determinants after the 2007 crisis. Interestingly, two (loan to value and retained 
interest) out of the four variables represented internal credit enhancement instruments. 
This result indicates that investors primarily relied on internal credit enhancement as a 
consequence of the default rates during the financial crisis. Loan size, the number of 
tranches as well as the currency risk were not contained in the list of yield determinants 
of ABS transactions, anymore. Additionally, we observed transitions with respect to the 
impact of pricing features. The relationships of retained interest, loan size, float, and the 
number of rating agencies with the spread behaved differently for the two data samples. 
Post crisis, as expected, retained interest and loan size were seen to be negatively 
related with the spread. One explanation of the coefficient sign of retained interest was 
that the internal credit enhancement instruments were associated with a price discount 
since they reduced the default probability of the corresponding security. The negative 
coefficient sign of loan size meant that larger issues, on average, were associated with 
higher secondary market liquidity. Surprisingly, investors associated a larger 
conglomerate of rating agencies with an additional risk demand.  
A further consequence of that crisis was that floating rate issues, in contrast to 
the scenario before the crisis, were related with an increased risk premium. While this 
study observes that credit rating is the most dominant determinant of the primary 
market spread, this paper considers it as evidence that credit rating agencies learned 
from the crisis and assigned more conservative ratings thereafter. This is supported by 
the significant lower average credit rating in our sample. This finding emphasizes an 
important impact of the financial crisis on the securitization market. It has been held 
that credit rating played a major role in the outbreak of the financial crisis and to avoid 
rating downgrades, the quality of the credit ratings provided was essential. Our findings 
with respect to credit rating suggest an adjustment of the rating assignment processes 
and so, based on the results of the comparison analysis, we accept the first research 
hypothesis. 
As a natural follow-up, this paper also investigated the hypothesis on the over-
reliance on credit ratings. The literature suggests that the credit rating was one cause of 
the breakdown of the securitization market in 2007 (Fabozzi & Vink, 2012; Vink & 
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Fabozzi, 2012; Agarwal, Barret, Cun, & De Nardi, 2010; Financial Stability Forum, 
April 2008; True Sale International, 2008; True Sale International, 2014). However, this 
paper attempts to find out if credit rating is still the most dominant yield determinant. 
There is no evidence to support over-reliance. So, the results indicate that investors had 
to employ their own credit default risk analysis and consider variables beyond credit 
rating to measure the default risk of the securities. This conclusion is supported by 
results regarding pricing factors and this has already been considered during the rating 
process. We find that investors had to look beyond ratings and rely on these pricing 
features in addition to credit rating. Based on these findings, this study accepted the 
second research hypothesis. 
As a result of the empirical studies in this research paper, we conclude that the 
financial crisis significantly influenced the yield as well as the pricing process for non-
U.S. ABS issues. Further, we observed no evidence to support the view regarding over-
reliance on credit rating. This indicates that capital market investors adjusted their 
investment process and employed their own risk default analysis. 
The substantial changes associated with the financial crisis constituted a critical 
contribution to current research and activities in the work field. Further, it was found 
that the estimates concerning the size of each variable’s impact on the spread as well as 
the significance levels, the importance of internal credit enhancement, the adjustments 
in the rating process, and the knowledge that investors employ their own risk analysis, 
could possibly interest investment banks and corporations involved in the securitization 
market. The results could also be used in the process of structuring technical features of 
certain issues. In addition, the findings of this paper have an important implication for 
investors in the fixed income sector. Both private and institutional investors interested 
in optimal asset allocation may be interested in the determinants of the primary market 
spread of asset-backed securities. Portfolio managers, who take positions in the fixed 
income and securitization sector, can take the findings into account when deciding to 
execute buy/sell orders on their portfolios.  
The generality of our analysis is limited to the non-U.S. ABS market. In this 
study however, all U.S. ABS transactions as well as those for MBS and CDOs were 
excluded from the analysis. Further research could be carried out on the MBS and CDO 
markets to understand the changes that were brought about by the financial crisis in the 
U.S. MBS market. Corresponding research will likely lead to a deeper understanding of 
the impact of the financial crisis on the securitization market. Moreover, the empirical 
Non-U.S. Asset-Backed Securities: Yield Determinants and Over-Reliance on Credit Ratings 
56 
model only consists of factors which could be mathematically included in the analysis. 
An in-depth analysis of the current regulations in order to include new practical 
frameworks in the analysis is useful for researchers who are especially interested in the 
development of the securitization market. Further, portfolio managers and investment 
banks may be interested in the connection between theory and practical applications in 
matters of portfolio diversification and issuance advisory, respectively. Finally, future-
oriented research could be carried out on the European Central Bank’s “expanded asset 
purchase programme”. It is of interest if this programme does not only affect the 
secondary market yield of asset-backed securities but also, the issuance spreads of 
European asset-backed security transactions. Additionally, it may be of interest to study 
how the impact on the yield of ABS transactions could affect the economic situation of 
the European Monetary Union. This could be an interesting contribution to the 
European ABS, MBS, and CDO markets.  
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 ABS, Auto-ABS and Auto-CB Comparisons: Evidence From the 3
European ABS Market 
 Introduction 3.1
The European asset-backed security (ABS) market experienced significant 
recovery after suffering a breakdown during the 2007 financial crisis. Since 2010, the 
ABS market had become one of the most important fixed income markets in Europe. An 
increasing number of companies refinanced their sales market and loan services through 
securitization. This paper investigates one specific asset class of the European ABS 
market: Automobile asset-backed securities (Auto-ABS). Auto-ABS significantly 
outperformed the development of every other ABS asset class and proved to be the most 
important driver of the European ABS market. Although other asset classes experienced 
stagnation, Auto-ABS transactions showed a steady growth in the aftermath of the 2007 
financial crisis. They remained major pillars for the recovery of the European ABS 
market since 2010 (Porter, 2015). According to research reports by the rating agency 
Creditreform Financial Research (2015) and Roland Berger Strategy Consultants 
(2016), the average issue amount of automotive ABS quintupled compared to years 
prior to the 2007 financial crisis. While in 2010, the European ABS market was 
considered homogenous with comparable submarkets, the Auto-ABS market grew 
significantly more than other submarkets. As of 2016, the proportion of the automobile 
industry equals more than 43% of the whole issue amount in the European ABS market, 
and equals over 30% overall for the last six year period. Due to this performance, the 
Auto-ABS market advanced to the largest submarket in the European ABS market. 
Hence, this paper investigates the causes of the extraordinary development of the Auto-
ABS market in order to present explanations for this outperformance. The analysis has 
been undertaken in two steps. This study investigates the differences between the 
European automotive ABS market and the European ABS market without automobile 
transactions. Therefore, we analyze the structure of Auto-ABS compared to their non-
Auto ABS counterparts as well as the determinants of the primary market spread. We 
expect to find differences in several pricing and risk factors which indicates a more 
comfortable situation for investors in the automobile market. According to a research 
report by DZ Bank (2015), the Auto-ABS became a more interesting investment vehicle 
for investors after the 2007 financial crisis, compared to other ABS asset classes, due to 
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the low default rate of this market. Although the securitization market is said to be the 
main reason for the financial collapse in 2007 (Covitz, Liang, & Suarez, 2013), 
automobile ABS issues were always secure investments. The defaults in the European 
automobile ABS market amounted to only 1.5% (True Sale International, 2013).  
Second, this paper investigates a phenomenon noticed in the European 
automobile industry after the 2007 financial crisis and describes the second cause for 
the Auto-ABS outperforming other issues in the market. Different refinancing 
instruments were used by the automobile industry to refinance their sales and loan 
services market. The two most popular techniques were corporate bonds and 
securitization that enabled companies to raise money to finance future investments and 
transfer credit risks to the financial markets. Since the first issuance of an automobile 
asset-backed security in the European asset-backed security market in the early 2000s, 
corporate bonds were always mentioned as the preferred refinancing instrument (Roland 
Berger, 2016). After the financial crisis however, the European fixed income market 
experienced a contrasting development. According to research reports by DZ Bank 
(2013) and Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (2016), the automobile ABS market 
grew in importance for automotive companies. Companies wished to become 
independent from the non-backed corporate bonds and tended to use the asset-backed 
financing technique to refinance their sales market for two reasons. First, as a 
consequence of the large proportion of leasing or financed cars in Europe (True Sale 
International, 2013), almost 70% of the purchased cars of European automobile 
companies were leasing or credit-financed cars (Roland Berger, 2016). Thus, there was 
large potential for the use of the asset-backed financing technique in the automobile 
industry (Fiedler, 2016). Second, ABS transactions tended to be issued at a discounted 
price compared to non-backed corporate bonds (True Sale International, 2015). This 
trend was even more glaring in 2015. Hence, this paper attempts to empirically 
investigate if the increase in the Auto-ABS market and the decrease in the Auto-CB 
market with respect to issuance volumes could be explained by technical advantages of 
ABS transactions. The objective is to find the advantages of securitization as compared 
to corporate bonds for the automobile industry as well as investors for this may offer 
evidence that this shift has led to further development in the two markets.   
To fill research gaps, this paper empirically investigates the European ABS 
market and the European automobile market after the 2007 financial crisis. We compare 
the European automobile asset-backed securities with European automobile corporate 
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bonds and the European asset-backed securities market without automobile asset-
backed security transactions. We provide empirical analyses performed on second-hand 
data samples. A total of two univariate and six regression analyses are performed in 
order to address the research hypotheses. 
For the course of the investigation, this paper provides a Literature Review and 
identifies the research gaps in great detail, in chapter 2. In chapter 3, we present the 
Methodology followed by the Data Description. The following section Results presents 
the results of the empirical analyses. After every analysis, the section on Discussion 
highlights contributions to the two major research objectives separately, while the 
conclusion presents the Limitations, Market Implications, and Future Research avenues 
in chapter 6.  
 
 Research Hypotheses 3.2
 Background Information 3.2.1
Blum and DiAngelo (1997) as well as Choudhry and Fabozzi (2004), Jobst (2006), Vink 
and Thibeault (2008), and Fermanian (2011) mention that the European securitization 
market consists of three main security classes: asset-backed securities (ABS), 
mortgages-backed securities (MBS), and collateral debt obligations (CDO). Therefore, 
the term asset-backed security is used to describe both, one of the three classes as well 
as all three classes together. This paper differentiates between these two terms. If the 
term “asset-backed securities” is used, we refer to the single security class. The term 
“securitization” is applied to describe all three classes together. The ABS market 
consists of all securitization issues backed by consumer products, such as car loans or 
credit card loans, among others (Moody's Investors Service, 2002; Choudhry & 
Fabozzi, 2004; Vink & Thibeault, 2008). The ABS class is the main class of interest in 
this study. The MBS market describes securitization issues backed by mortgages. CDOs 
are issues backed by debt obligations (Nomura, 2004; Fitch Ratings, 2004; Choudhry & 
Fabozzi, 2004; Vink & Thibeault, 2008). Within this study, those two classes only serve 
the purpose of distinguishing the term asset-backed security. There is no further 
empirical importance attached to this analysis. In the context of this paper, we 
investigate the development of the European ABS market. The main focus lies on ABS 
issues in the European automobile market after the 2007 financial crisis. The Auto-ABS 
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market outperformed the European ABS market and became the most important 
submarket with a proportion of more than 43%.  
The phenomenon of the Auto-ABS submarket, although it is a very young 
securitization class, and its extraordinary performance compared to the other asset-
backed security classes after the financial crisis is something that can only be observed 
in the European ABS market. This does not appear in other global ABS markets, e.g. in 
the U.S. ABS market and this is attributed to the large and strong automobile industry in 
the European economy—which has a larger proportion in the European ABS market 
than in any other market in the world (True Sale International, 2013; True Sale 
International, 2015; Roland Berger, 2016). 
 Literature Review and Hypotheses 3.2.2
Empirical research on the European asset-backed securities and asset-backed 
securities in the European automobile market is very limited. Vink and Fabozzi (2008) 
investigate the over-reliance hypothesis for European floating rate asset-backed 
securities from 1999 to 2006. Uhde and Farrugio (2015) as well as Uhde, Farrugio, and 
Michalak (2012) analyze securitization in European banking. Further, Atkins (2013) 
discusses investment opportunities in the European securitization market for U.S. 
investors. Schuetz (2011) investigates the securitization market in Europe for reasons as 
to why banks securitize. The paper finds that European banks use securitization as a 
funding tool and one for capital arbitrage and performance improvement.   
O’Connor (2013) investigates the Auto ABS Market in 2012 and analyzes changes 
in regulation, spreads, and performances of the securities. Risi (2013) analyzes the 
stability of rating for asset-backed securities in the automobile market. The paper finds 
that ratings are expected to remain stable. Terrazan (2006) analyzes the term-structure 
of credit spread of Euro denominated corporate bonds and finds that after the risk 
adjustment, the idiosyncratic factors between different rating classes are similar.   
In literature, securitization in the European automobile market is often mentioned 
as a young method of funding (Jobst, 2008; Creditreform Financial Research, 2015). 
Further, there is no in-depth research about securitization in the European automobile 
market. However, securitization in the European automobile market is the main topic of 
several research reports drafted by Creditreform Financial Research (2015), Roland 
Berger Strategy Consultants (2016), and by DZ Bank (2013, 2015). One would expect 
that pricing characteristics of this very young security class would be influenced by 
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older security classes in the European ABS market. Further, one would expect that 
investors would await the initial statistics about a new security class before heavily 
investing in a new fixed income vehicle. However, the research reports observe that 
there is exceptional performance noted in the European Auto-ABS submarket compared 
to their non-Auto-ABS counterparts and therefore, raise the question—to what extent 
can the outperformance of the automobile market compared to the remaining European 
ABS market be explained by differences in the characteristics as well as different spread 
determinants between these asset classes? (True Sale International, 2013; True Sale 
International, 2015; Roland Berger, 2016; Creditreform Financial Research, 2015). 
Further, the research reports by Creditreform Financial Research (2015), Roland Berger 
Strategy Consultant (2016), and DZ Bank (2013, 2015) raise the question—what are the 
determinants responsible for the exceptional performance of the Auto-ABS market? 
Hence, this paper proposes the overall research question: “What are the determinants of 
the outperformance of the Auto-ABS market?” We divide this question into two 
research hypotheses. Based on the results of the research reports by Creditreform 
Financial Research (2015), Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (2016), and DZ Bank 
(2013, 2015), we propose the first research hypothesis: “Auto-ABS transactions provide 
advantages for investors and originators in comparison to their non-Auto-ABS 
counterparts.” To find evidence that supports the first research hypothesis, we 
investigate the European ABS market with respect to differences between the risk 
profiles of the asset classes in order to find advantages of Auto-ABS transactions. 
Thereafter, we evaluate whether investors rely on different pricing factors for the two 
asset classes. This means, we test for different yield determinants and whether these 
determinants highlight advantages for the Auto-ABS class.  
Additionally, the reports claim that European automobile companies try to replace 
CB issues with ABS issues in order to refinance their sales and loan services market 
(Roland Berger, 2016). Thus, this study performs an in-depth analysis of the European 
automobile market. This paper analyzes the differences of the two most popular funding 
methods in the automobile market: corporate bonds and asset-backed securities. We 
provide empirical research to compare European Auto-ABS and European Auto-CB for 
the purpose of explaining the replacement of issues in the CB market with issues in the 
ABS market. Although corporate bonds and asset-backed securities are both refinancing 
instruments for companies in the fixed income market and show similarities in structure, 
credit factors, and issuance processes, we also observe significant differences between 
ABS, Auto-ABS and Auto-CB Comparisons: Evidence From the European ABS Market 
62 
the two security classes. The main difference lies in the risk profile of the security 
classes. ABS transactions tend to be a lower risk investment vehicle compared to 
corporate bonds, since their payments are independent of the originator’s credit quality 
and only depend on the assets’ quality (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). In order to describe 
the different risk profiles of the two security classes, we have to divide the common 
security characteristics into two sets of variables: The first set of variables contains the 
common pricing characteristics of European Auto-ABS. The set is chosen based on the 
empirical research performed by Vink and Thibeault (2008), Vink and Fabozzi (2012), 
Fabozzi and Vink (2012), as well as Maris and Segal (2002) and Childs, Ott, and 
Riddiough (1996). The second set contains the common pricing features of European 
Auto-CB and is chosen based on the empirical research regarding corporate bonds 
performed by Gabbi and Sironi (2005), Van Landshoot (2008), Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001), Hyman, Dor, 
Dynkin, and Horowitz (2015) as well as Huang, Huang, and Oxman (2015), Lin, Liu, 
and Wu (2011), Jacoby and Shiller (2010), Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004), and 
Bhanot (2003). On the one hand, there are many pricing variables, which are valid for 
both security classes, such as credit rating (Longstaff, Mithal, & Neis, 2005; 
Kozhemiakin, 2007; Vink & Thibeault, 2008). Credit rating agencies assign ratings to 
both corporate bonds and asset-backed security to describe the probability of default of 
the corresponding security. On the other hand, we include variables that are only 
applicable to asset-backed securities, for instance the number of tranches, the level of 
subordination or credit enhancement. These variables are essential for describing the 
risk profile of asset-backed securities and indicate possible advantages of securitization 
compared to corporate bonds transactions.    
Based on the development Auto-ABS in the European automobile industry and the 
findings of the study of Ayotte and Gaon (2005) together with the observations of 
research reports by Roland Berger Strategy Consultant (2016), Creditreform Financial 
Research (2014), as well as DZ Bank (2015), who find that ABS provides significant 
advantages compared to their CB counterparts, we propose the following second 
research hypothesis: “Investors as well as automobile companies rely on advantages of 
securitization compared to corporate bonds.” The second research hypothesis suggests 
that the increased popularity of the securities may be explained by the special structure 
of ABS transactions compared to corporate bonds. To find evidence that supports the 
second research hypothesis, we first resolve the questions on whether differences in the 
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security characteristics highlight advantages of the securitization compared to corporate 
bonds or not. Thereafter, we determine the reliance of investors on common pricing 
characteristics. This means, we investigate whether the advantages of ABS transactions 
are reflected by the different yield determinants.  
This study explores these hypotheses by performing statistical tests on quantitative 
data samples. For both research hypotheses, a univariate analysis is performed to 
determine differences in the attributes of the securities and regression analyses are 
performed to observe whether there exist different yield determinants.  
In the next section, we pursue our research path by discussing the common pricing 
characteristics and their expected impact on the primary market spread, in greater detail.  
 Research Methodology 3.3
The empirical analysis presented in this study is restricted to European asset-backed 
security issues and European automobile bond issues–for which data on common 
pricing characteristics and spreads were available or computable–completed by 
European companies during 2010-2015. The period was chosen since the European 
ABS market underwent slow recovery from the financial crisis since the beginning of 
2010 yet the European Auto-ABS market faced some uncertainty with respect to the 
VW Diesel crisis in October 2015 (True Sale International, 2013; True Sale 
International, 2015). The issuance spreads over the corresponding maturity benchmark 
reflected investors’ perceptions of the risk of loss of security. Moreover, the spread also 
represented liquidity conditions of the corresponding security (Gabbi & Sironi, 2005). 
As such, they were a function of the common pricing characteristics. These can be 
divided into three main categories: Default and recovery risk characteristics, 
marketability characteristics, and systemic risk characteristics (Gabbi & Sironi, 2005; 
Vink & Thibeault, 2008; Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, & Mann, 2001; Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein, & Martin, 2001). Common pricing characteristics describe the structure of 
the analyzed securities. Within the univariate analyses, the common security 
characteristics describe the risk profile. Within the panel-data fixed-effects model, the 
common pricing features form the set of independent variables. Following this 
reasoning, our empirical analyses involve regressions of the following form: ܴܵܲܧܣܦ𝑖 = ܦܧܨܣܷܮ ?ܶ? + ܴܧܥܱܸܧܴ ?ܻ? + ܯܣܴܭܧܶܣܤ𝐼ܮ𝐼ܶ ?ܻ? + ܻܵܵܶܧܯ𝐼ܥ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
where: 
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SPREADi   = the difference between yield to maturity at issuance of the 
security and the yield of maturity at auction of a corresponding 
currency benchmark; 
DEFAULTi   = the default risk of the issue i; 
RECOVERYi  = the expected recovery rate in case of default of issue i; 
MARKETABILITYi = the expected secondary marketability, e.g. liquidity for issue i; 
SYSTEMICi  = the systemic risk for the issue i; 
Note that this study is based on the primary market spreads of the issues. The 
reason we use issuance spreads is because of the difficulty in obtaining reliable 
secondary market spreads, which are typically derived from pricing matrices or driven 
by analysts’ expectations as well as brokers’ “indicative prices” (Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; 
Vink & Thibeault, 2008; Gabbi & Sironi, 2005). Hence, primary market spreads 
provide a more accurate measure of the actual pricing of a security and the actual risk 
premium demanded by investors than secondary market spreads (Vink & Thibeault, 
2008; Gabbi & Sironi, 2005; Vink & Fabozzi, 2012). The primary market spread, also 
called loan spread, represents the risk premium. On the basis of information at the time 
of issue, the risk premium is the price for the risk associated with the security. This 
study defines the primary market spread as the offered yield to maturity of the security 
at issuance above the yield to maturity at auction of a corresponding treasury 
benchmark (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin, 2001). 
Vink and Thibeault (2008), Vink and Fabozzi (2012), Gabbi and Sironi (2005), as well 
as Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) suggest the following procedure to 
obtain a suitable treasury benchmark: First, the benchmark is obligated to provide the 
same currency, second, the benchmark is obligated to be issued at a comparable auction 
date, and third, the benchmark has to offer a comparable time to maturity. 
Following the above approach, the independent variables for the empirical 
analyses are introduced and discussed in the following Tables (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; 
Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; Gabbi & Sironi, 2005; Merton, 1974; Liu & Thakor, 1984).  
Table 11: Default and Recovery Risk Characteristics 
Variable Description Expected Impact Source 
Rating Average value of assigned ratings Positive relationship Liu & Thakor (1984)
17
 
Maturity  Measured in years Positive relationship Merton (1974)
18
 
                                               
17
 Further sources: Vink & Thibeault (2008), Vink & Fabozzi (2012), Buscaino, Caselli, Corielli, & Gatti 
(2012), Chen, Lesmond, & Wei (2007), Kavussanos & Tsouknidis (2014), Amira (2004), Ammer & 
Clinton (2004) 
18
 Further sources: Gabbi & Sironi (2005), Vink & Thibeualt (2008), Amira (2004), Grandes & Peter 
(2004), Shin & Kim (2013) 
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Extern Equal 1 if extern enhancement is provided Negative relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008)
19
 
Loan to Value Subordination level of tranche in % Positive relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008)
20
 
The considered rating agencies are Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch. The rating values 1, …, 15 
correspond to the ratings Aaa/AAA, …, B2/B. Ratings lower than B2/B do not appear in our data 
samples. 
Table 11 exhibits the default and recovery risk characteristics (Buscaino, Caselli, 
Corielli, & Gatti, 2012; Chen, Lesmond, & Wei, 2007; Kavussanos & Tsouknidis, 
2014; Amira, 2004; Grandes & Peter, 2004; Shin & Kim, 2013; Campbell & Cocco, 
2015; Wong, Fung, & Fong, 2004; Ammer & Clinton, 2004). The first column names 
the introduced variable. The second column describes the structure of the corresponding 
variable. The third column provides the expected impact of this variable on the primary 
market spread in the regression analyses (Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund, 2009; Bajari, 
Chenghuan, & Minjung, 2008; Deng & Quingley, 2012; Fabozzi & Roever, 2003; 
Schwartz & Torous, 1993). The last column provides an overview of literature, in which 
the variables were introduced. 
Table 12: Marketability Characteristics 
Variable Description Expected Impact Source 
Size Natural log of the tranche’s or bonds’ amount Negative relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)21 
Amount Natural log of the ABS transactions’ amount Negative relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008) 
Tranches Number of tranches Negative relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012)
22
 
Managers Number of lead managers Negative relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)
22
 
Agencies Number of rating agencies Negative relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012)
22
 
Float 1 if type of interest is floating rate Negative relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)
22
 
Retained 1 if retained interest appears in transaction Negative relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008)
23
 
Size and Amount describe the Euro equivalent amount at issuance. If the coupon of a transaction is 
floating rated, the coupon payments can vary over time and are linked to a floating interest rate, such as 
the 3-month EURIBOR. Retained interest is an internal credit enhancement measure, which describes if 
the originator retains interest in order to overcome first losses of the underlying assets. 
Table 12 introduces the marketability characteristics (Qi & Yang, 2009; Calem 
& Lacour-Little, 2004; Pennington-Cross, 2003). We expect all marketability 
characteristics to be negatively related with the primary market spread. All variables 
should, ceteris paribus, increase the secondary marketability for the concerned 
transaction. 
                                               
19
 Further sources: Fabozzi & Roever (2003) 
20
 Further sources: Wong, Fung, Fong, & Sze (2004), Campbell & Cocco (2011), Deng & Quigley 
(2004), Schwartz & Torous (1993), Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund (2009), Bajari, Chenghuan, & Minjung 
(2008) 
21
 Further sources: Qi & Yang (2009), Calem & Lacour-Little (2004), Pennington-Cross (2003) 
22
 Further sources: Vink & Thibeault (2008) 
23
 Further Sources: An, Deng, Nichols, & Sanders (2014), Ashcraft & Schuermann (2008), Childs, Ott, & 
Riddiough (1996) 
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Table 13: Systemic Risk Characteristics 
Variable Description Expected Impact Source 
Currency Risk 1 if tranche faces currency risk Positive relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)
22 
Creditor 1 if creditor protection is provided Negative relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012) 
Emerging 1 if transaction is issued in an emerging market Positive relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012) 
Currency Risk describes a dummy variable that equals one if the cash flow of the coupon rate is 
denominated in a different currency than the cash flows derived from the underlying assets. Creditor 
Protection describes a dummy variable that equals one if the country in which the transaction is issued 
provides creditor protection in the form of “no automatic stay on the assets” and zero otherwise. 
Emerging Markets describes a variable that equals one if the transaction is issued in an MSCI classified 
Emerging Market. 
Table 13 presents the systemic risk characteristics (An, Deng, Nichols, & 
Sanders, 2014; Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008; Childs, Ott, & Riddiough, 1996). 
Further, we include control variables in our statistical analyses. The first control 
variable is called “year i”. Year i describes the dummy variables for each year. Each 
dummy variable is equal to 1 if issue i has been completed during the corresponding 
year, and zero, otherwise. These variables should capture the variations in fixed income 
market conditions (Gabbi & Sironi, 2005). Due to the highest correlation with the 
common pricing features, the year dummy for 2013 is excluded from the analyses to 
avoid over sensitivity. The second set of control variables are currency dummies that are 
equal to 1 if security i is issued in the corresponding currency, and zero, otherwise. 
These variables should capture both liquidity and credit standing (Vink & Fabozzi, 
2012; Vink & Thibeault, 2008). Due to the smallest subsets of our ABS sample as well 
as our CB sample, the currency dummy for Swiss Franc is excluded from the analyses 
to avoid over sensitivity. 
The empirical analyses presented in this study consists of the univariate as well 
as the regression analyses. For the regression analyses of this paper, the issuance spread 
is used as the dependent variable. The common security characteristics mentioned above 
form the set of independent variables. Given the time from issuance is equal to zero for 
all issues, the factors mentioned above must be considered at the time of issuance. In 
order to provide comparability for all issues in this study, it does not consider probable 
changes in the variables over the time period 2010-2015.  
The set of independent variables consists of both discrete and dummy variables. 
The discrete variables are credit rating, maturity, amount, size, as well as loan to value, 
#tranches, #lead managers, and #rating agencies. The set of dummy variables consists 
of extern enhancement, retained interest, float, currency risk, and creditor protection. In 
the univariate analysis, all variables are analyzed and tested separately. The regressions 
determine the effects of all independent variables on the primary market spread.    
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 Data Description 3.4
This chapter introduces the data samples of this study. It is concerned with the 
European ABS market as well as the European automobile market. For the samples 
describing the European automobile market, we only include transactions of one of the 
six largest automobile companies in Europe. Hence, we include transactions of 
Volkswagen, PSA, Renault, BMW, Fiat, and Daimler. The smaller companies have not 
issued enough transactions to be considered significant for the automobile ABS or 
automobile CB market. 
 Data Samples 3.4.1
The principal data sources of this study are DZ Bank and Thomson Reuters. For the 
European corporate bonds issued between 2010 and 2015, the appropriate source was 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. For European ABS issues, the Asset Backed Watcher, 
published by the DZ Bank, was chosen as the appropriate data source. Both Thomson 
Reuters and the DZ Bank are known leading publishers of European CB and ABS 
issues.  
 European ABS Market 3.4.1.1
The first database contains detailed information on European ABS from January 1, 
2010, through September 30, 2015. This paper refers to this sample as the “ABS full 
sample”. The ABS full sample contains information on 633 European asset-backed 
security tranches issued in 285 transactions with a total value of EUR 256 billion. 
Although the full sample is comprehensive for the purpose of this study, there is one 
limitation. For comparison, we need the transactions to provide information on default 
and recovery risk characteristics, marketability characteristics, and systemic risk 
characteristics. Tranches, for which detailed information about these variables is not 
available, are deleted from the sample. The reduced sample is called the “ABS high 
information sample”. The ABS high information sample contains 468 asset-backed 
security tranches issued in 255 transactions with a total value of EUR 187 billion.  
The ABS high information sample is divided into two further samples for the 
purpose of this study. First, we need data samples describing the European automobile 
ABS market. The “Auto-ABS sample” consists of 122 tranches issued in 68 transactions 
with a total value of EUR 52.3 billion.  
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Table 14: Comparison of the ABS samples 
Variable of interest ABS full sample ABS high information sample Survival rate 
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev  
Coupon rate (bp) 663 155 143 468 147 133 70.73% 
Risk premium (bp)
7
 468 99 122 468 107 110 100% 
Credit rating (1-21 weak) 663 3.78 3.66 468 3.45 3.18 70.73% 
Loan to value (%)
7
 468 21.52 29.67 468 19.34 25.33 100% 
Time to maturity (years) 663 11.80 9.85 468 11.28 7.49 70.73% 
Issues with extern enhancement 523 4.5% - 468 4.7% - 89.68% 
Loan tranche size (EUR mio.) 555 354 479 468 386 501 45.68% 
Transaction size (EUR mio.) 285 783 651 255 771 661 89.47% 
Number of tranches 285 2.96 1.31 255 2.87 1.19 89.47% 
Number of lead managers 598 2.05 0.99 468 2.29 0.97 78.43% 
Number of credit rating agencies 663 1.59 0.51 468 1.72 0.53 70.73% 
Loans with retained interest
24
 468 65.8% - 468 62.18% - 100% 
Loans with fixed rate 663 21% - 468 24% - 70.73% 
Loans with floating rate 663 79% - 468 76% - 70.73% 
Loans with currency risk 663 11.3% - 468 8.11% - 70.73% 
Loans in emerging markets
7
 468 1.25% - 468 1.06% - 100% 
Loans with creditor ürotection
7
 468 63.89% - 468 64.74% - 100% 
Column 1 represents the common pricing variables. Column 2 presents the number, the mean, and the 
standard deviation of each variable in the working sample. Column 3 describes the number, the mean, and 
the standard deviation of each variable associated with the high information sample. Column 4 describes 
the survival rate for each variable. This rate is calculated by dividing the number of issues of each 
variable of the high information sample by the number of issues of each variable of the working sample.  
Second, we need a data sample containing information on European ABS excluding 
the automobile market. The total value of the “ABS ex. Auto sample” is EUR 127 
billion and the total number of tranches is 346 issued in 187 transactions. Table 14 
reports a comparison of the ABS working sample and the ABS high information 
sample. Due to the high survival rates, high information issues are not dissimilar from 
their counterparts in the full sample. Thus, we assume that any empirical results derived 
from the high information sample can be generalized to the larger population including 
all issues. 
 European Automobile Corporate Bond Market 3.4.1.2
The second database contains detailed information on the issuance of European 
Automobile corporate bonds between January 1, 2010 and September 30, 2015. 
Hereafter, we refer to this sample as the “CB full sample”. 
                                               
24 The variable was only calculated for the high information sample. 
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The CB full sample of this study contains detailed information on 544 corporate 
bond transactions in the European automobile market, which are worth a total of EUR 
183 billion. As in the ABS data samples, we need the transactions in the CB full sample 
to provide information on common pricing characteristics (Collin-Dufresne & 
Goldstein, 2001). Thus, we need the transactions to provide information on the 
following set of variables: Credit rating, extern enhancement, time to maturity, size of 
the transaction, number of lead managers, number of involved rating agencies, 
currency risk, creditor protection and type of interest rate (Campbell & Taksler, 2003; 
Cantor & Packer, 1996; Chen, Lesmond, & Wei, 2007; Gabbi & Sironi, 2005; Grandes 
& Peter, 2004; Kavussanos & Tsouknidis, 2014; Reilly, Wright, & Gentry, 2010; Elton, 
Gruber, Agrawal, & Mann, 2001; Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin, The 
Determinants of Credit Spread Changes, 2001). Internal credit enhancement is not 
provided by such corporate bonds. Emerging markets are also not applicable to this 
special case, since the corporate bonds of the six largest automobile companies are only 
issued in developed markets. The variable extern enhancement is not available in the 
CB full sample. For the purpose of comparison then, we have to reduce the sample by 
referring to transactions which do not provide all the requisite information. The “CB 
high information sample” consists of 414 transactions with a total value of EUR 138 
billion.  
Table 15: Comparison of the CB samples 
Variable of interest CB full sample CB high information sample Survival rate 
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev  
Coupon rate (bp) 544 268 184 413 256 159 76.10% 
Risk premium
25
 (bp) 413 126 133 413 126 158 100% 
Credit rating (1-21 weak) 507 8.1 2.18 413 7.68 1.84 81.66% 
Time to maturity (years) 532 3.48 1.98 413 3.57 2.32 77.82% 
Transaction size (EUR mio.) 544 318 333 413 334 323 76.10% 
Number of lead managers 534 2.05 1.37 413 2.07 1.20 77.53% 
Number of credit rating agencies 507 1.78 0.51 413 1.99 0.35 81.66% 
Loans with fixed rate 536 72% - 413 67% - 77.24% 
Loans with floating rate 536 28% - 413 33% - 77.24% 
Loans with currency risk 544 47% - 413 43% - 76.10% 
Loans with creditor protection
5
 413 28% - 413 28% - 100% 
Column 1 represents the common pricing variables. Column 2 presents the number, the mean, and the 
standard deviation of each variable in the working sample. Column 3 describes the number, the mean, and 
the standard deviation of each variable associated with the high information sample. Column 4 describes 
                                               
25
 The variable was only calculated for the high information sample. 
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the survival rate for each variable. This rate is calculated by dividing the number of issues of each 
variable of the high information sample by the number of issues of each variable of the working sample.  
A comparison between the common variables in the full sample and the high 
information sample in Table 15 reveals that due to the high survival rates, high 
information issues are not dissimilar from their counterparts in the full sample. Thus, we 
assume that any empirical results derived from the high information sample can be 
generalized to the larger population including all issues.  
 Empirical Results 3.5
This chapter provides evidence that supports the two research hypotheses. To be 
more specific, an in-depth comparison analysis of Auto-ABS, Auto-CB, and European 
non-Auto-ABS is performed. The comparison analysis consists of two parts: First, a 
comparison analysis of Auto-ABS and European ABS transactions excluding Auto-
ABS is provided. Thereafter, Auto-ABS are compared to their Auto-CB counterparts. 
The comparisons are based on a univariate analysis and panel-data fixed-effects 
regressions. The univariate statistics analyze differences in risk profiles of the two asset 
classes in each case. Thereafter, as a natural follow-up, we investigate investors’ 
reliance on the common pricing factors. The regression model evaluates the set of yield 
determinants of each security class. The analyses aim to provide evidence that explains 
the exceptional performance of the Auto-ABS submarket. We expect to observe 
important dissimilarities, which emphasize the advantages of Auto-ABS compared to 
their non-Auto-ABS and Auto-CB counterparts.  
 European Asset-Backed Security Market 3.5.1
This subsection performs an in-depth comparison analysis in the European ABS 
market. First, the common pricing security characteristics are evaluated separately. 
Thereafter, as a natural follow-up, they form the set of variables in a panel-data fixed-
effects regression model. 
 Descriptive Analysis 3.5.1.1
The objective of this subchapter is to evaluate the extent to which the risk profile of 
Auto-ABS differs from the non-Auto-ABS in the European ABS market. European 
Auto-ABS grew into the most important submarket in the European ABS market. Its 
proportion in the primary market increased to over 43% in 2015. Further, the Auto-ABS 
market became the only submarket to show steady growth in the context of issuance 
volumes since 2010. Hence, the question arises—what are the factors that explain the 
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exceptional performance of the automobile industry compared to the remaining ABS 
market? Table 16 analyzes the security characteristics of the ABS subsamples, 
separately. The Auto-ABS sample is labelled “Auto-ABS”, whereas the non-Auto-ABS 
sample is labelled “European ABS”. 
Table 16: Univariate Comparison of the Characteristics of the European ABS Market 
(1) Variable of interest (2) Security 
Class 
(3) Variable of interest (4) Security 
Class 
 High Information 
Sample 
 High Information 
Sample 
 European 
ABS 
Auto-
ABS 
European 
ABS 
Auto-
ABS 
Primary Market Spread (bp) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
346 
121.9 
90.0 
-143.0 
900.0 
118.24 
 
122 
63.91 
51.85 
-37.60 
495.0 
66.27 
Retained Interest (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
346 
0.55 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
122 
0.77 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Loan to Value (%)  
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
346 
23.27% 
14.95% 
0.0% 
100.0% 
25.97% 
 
 
122 
8.82% 
3.39% 
0.0% 
100.0% 
19.69% 
Number of Tranches 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
346 
3.12 
3.0 
1.0 
6.0 
1.25 
 
122 
2.18 
2.0 
1.0 
5.0 
0.66 
Time to Maturity (years) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
346 
12.60 
9.94 
1.04 
50.03 
8.25 
 
122 
7.55 
6.88 
5.69 
12.49 
1.93 
Number of Lead Managers 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
346 
2.30 
2.0 
1.0 
3.0 
0.85 
 
122 
2.25 
2.0 
1.0 
5.0 
1.28 
Loan Tranche Size (€ millions) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
346 
371.16 
252.19 
0.1 
3963.0 
371.16 
 
122 
428.53 
452.0 
13.0 
2785.03 
444.50 
Number of Rating Agencies 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
346 
1.73 
2.0 
1.0 
3.0 
0.53 
 
122 
1.69 
2.0 
1.0 
3.0 
0.50 
Transaction Size (€ millions) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
                      Std. Dev. 
 
 
187 
835.92 
600 
14.37 
5831.92 
873.52 
 
68 
787.92 
800.0 
49.80 
3242.85 
409.52 
Creditor Protection (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
346 
0.60 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
122 
0.89 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Credit Rating (1-15 weak) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
 
346 
3.86 
2.0 
1.0 
20.0 
3.69 
 
122 
2.80 
1.0 
1.0 
8.0 
2.01 
Floating Rate Issue (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
 
346 
0.77 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
122 
0.74 
- 
- 
- 
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Std. Dev. Std. Dev. - 
Extern Enhancement (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
346 
0.02 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
122 
0.10 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Currency Risk (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
                             Std. Dev. 
 
346 
0.11 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
The sample European ABS describes the characteristics of the European ABS market excluding the 
automobile market. The sample Auto-ABS describes the characteristics of European automobile ABS. 
The variables SPREAD and LTV are measured in percentage points. MATURITY has the unit years. The 
variables SIZE and AMOUNT have the unit million Euros. The variable RATING is measured in a scale 
from 1 to 21. The variables TRANCHES, LEAD MANAGERS, and RATING AGENCIES describe the 
number of the tranches and the number of corresponding conglomerate, respectively. The variables 
EXTERN ENHANCEMENT, RETAINED INTEREST, FLOAT, CURRENCY RISK, and CREDITOR 
PROTECTION are dummy variables.  
Note that the lowest primary market spread of the European ABS sample equals -
1.43%, which is a relatively wide negative spread compared to all the other tranches. 
This enormous negative spread is the result of time to maturity equaling 29 years and an 
offered yield at auction of 2% with a fixed coupon rate. This is a very low yield at 
auction for an almost 30 year asset-backed security in the year 2011. Compared to this 
low yield at auction, the corresponding currency treasury 30 year benchmark was 
offered with a yield at 3.43%, which was a usual yield for a 30 year European treasury 
bond in 2011. Thus, due to a “triple A” rating and a very extensive internal credit 
enhancement, the originator was able to offer a yield at auction 143 basis points lower 
than the corresponding currency treasury benchmark. We still consider the chosen 
benchmark as suitable, since the time to maturity is 30 years (which means that treasury 
benchmarks offer a higher yield at auction) and the lower yield of the security can be 
explained by the low risk of default and the extensive internal credit enhancement of the 
originator.  
The following section discusses the main findings of Table 16.  The relative pricing 
of asset securitization issues shows that the average (median) spreads are significantly 
lower for Auto-ABS, with 63.91 basis points (51.85 bps) than they are for non-Auto-
ABS, with 121.9 basis points (90 bps). This means that Auto-ABS are associated with 
only half the risk premium than their non-Auto-ABS counterparts. Auto-ABS exhibit 
the larger average (median) loan tranche size, amounting to EUR 428.5 million (EUR 
452 million) – an average EUR 57 million more than the average tranche size of non-
Auto-ABS tranches. The median value for non-Auto tranches is only EUR 252.2 
million. Thus, non-Auto-ABS tranche sizes tend to be substantially smaller than for 
Auto-ABS transactions. This is reinforced by the observation that a typical non-Auto-
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ABS transaction in our sample is divided, on average, into more tranches. We discuss 
this later in this chapter in more detail. Further, the European ABS market, as indicated 
by the standard deviation, exhibits significant heterogeneity with respect to the loan 
tranche size.  
Figure 5 above, shows the Lorenz Curve for the European Auto-ABS market. It has 
the following characteristics: The smallest half of the issues is worth less than 10% of 
the total issue amount, the smallest 60% shares 19% of the total issue amount, and the 
largest 20% of the issues share 50% of the total issue amount. Compared to these 
results, the Lorenz Curve for the remaining ABS market in Figure 6 exhibits that the 
smallest 50% of the issues are worth approximately 10% of the total amount. Moreover, 
the smallest 60% shares 18% of the total issue amount in the remaining market and the 
smallest 80% shares approximately 41% of the total amount. This means that the largest 
20% of the issues are worth approximately 59% of the total amount in the market. Thus, 
Figure 6: Lorenz Curve of Size for the ABS ex. Auto Sample 
Figure 5: Lorenz Curve of Size for the Auto-ABS Sample 
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while the smaller issues have a similar relative amount in the market compared to 
automobile industry, we indicate a difference for the largest 20% of the issues. For the 
automobile industry, the largest 20% were worth 50% of the total amount, whereas the 
in the remaining market, 59% of the total amount was shared by the largest 20% of the 
issues. As opposed to the loan tranche size, the non-Auto-ABS transactions exhibit the 
larger average transaction size (amount) with EUR 836 million. On the other hand, the 
Auto-ABS exhibits an average transaction size of EUR 788 million. Surprisingly, we 
find different results for the mean value and the median. The Auto-ABS exhibits the 
larger median transaction size of EUR 800 million, whereas the non-Auto-ABS only 
exhibits a median transaction size of EUR 600 million. 
The risk spreads suggest that the Auto-ABS in our sample, on average, tend to 
be less risky than their non-Auto-ABS counterparts. This is also confirmed by variable 
rating. Since credit rating and spread tend to have an inverse relationship, it is obvious 
that the average credit rating for Auto-ABS tranches (2.80) is significantly lower than 
the credit ratings for non-Auto-ABS tranches (3.86). 
This is a main indicator that issues in the automobile market provide a lower risk 
profile than issues in the remaining market. This can be explained by the pool of 
underlying assets. The automobile companies pool high quality automobile loans and 
leasing credits for the ABS market, which has a very low expected default risk. Further, 
the weighted average life of the underlying assets tends to be lower than the time to 
maturity of the security and hence, results in a lower default risk.  
Further, Auto-ABS are far more likely to provide credit enhancement than non-
Auto-ABS tranches. Both variables extern enhancement and retained interest describe a 
form of credit enhancement instrument, which, ceteris paribus, lead to lower default risk 
and therefore, to a lower risk profile. The Auto-ABS tranches are more likely to have 
internal (external) credit enhancement than the non-Auto-ABS tranches. A total of 
77.1% (9.8%) of all the Auto tranches provides credit enhancement compared to only 
54.9% (2.3%) of the non-Auto tranches.  
As mentioned before, a typical non-Auto-ABS transaction in our sample is split 
into an average number (median) of 3.1 (3.0) tranches per transaction, which is higher 
than the average number (median) for Auto-ABS transactions in our sample, with 2.18 
(2.0) tranches per transaction. With spread levels and credit ratings, this study 
introduced risk measures that acted as evidence of the riskiness of an ABS transaction. 
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In addition, the number of lead managers involved in the transactions also provided 
indirect evidence of the riskiness of the loan—or at least indicated the difficulty the 
underwriters had to face during the issue (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). The average 
number (median) of participating lead managers for the automobile ABS was 2.25 (2.0) 
and was almost identical with the average number of participating lead managers for 
the remaining market, which equaled 2.3 (2.0). This meant that there was no additional 
difficulty in underwriting a non-Auto transactions and that the European ABS market 
exhibited significant homogeneity with respect to the number of lead managers. 
Auto-ABS issues have an average of 1.689 rating agencies involved compared 
to the similar average of 1.73 rating agencies for non-Auto-ABS. As for the number of 
lead manager, the European ABS market exhibits significant homogeneity with respect 
to the number of rating agencies. 
Non-Auto-ABS tranches are more likely to be floating rate issues than Auto-
ABS tranches. We observe that 77% of the non-Auto tranches are offered with floating 
coupon rates, while only 74% of the Auto tranches are offered as floating rate issues. 
The results are not surprising, since floating rate issues tend to offer greater flexibility. 
On the other hand, fixed rate securities eliminate a major source of cash flow 
uncertainty, but in general, lead to a longer maturity which, ceteris paribus, increases 
the risk profile and the probability of default. 
Observations for currency risk only occur in the non-Auto ABS sample. We find 
that an average of 11% of the issues face currency risk. The findings suggest that non-
Auto-ABS—more frequently—contain a mismatch between the originators’ home 
country currencies and the currency of loan repayment. 
Finally, this study finds that Auto-ABS tranches are far more likely to be issued 
in a country, which provides creditor protection than non-Auto-ABS tranches (88.5% 
versus 60%). In general, a ‘no automatic stay’ provision is viewed favorably by 
investors and explains the lower spreads for the automobile industry. The difference can 
be explained by the fact that European Auto ABS are issued in smaller sets of countries 
than the non-Auto transactions.  
The results of the univariate analysis over the whole time period merit a greater 
in-depth analysis in order to understand the variations over time. Thus, in this chapter, 
we provide a univariate analysis for each year in our data sample, to determine the 
development of the differences between the Auto-ABS and the non-Auto-ABS tranches 
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in the European ABS market. The variables loan to value, extern enhancement, number 
of tranches, number of lead managers, number of rating agencies, currency risk, type of 
interest rate, and creditor protection do not exhibit changes over time. Thus, the 
following analysis is carried out on the variables primary market spread, credit rating, 
time to maturity, loan size, transaction size, and retained interest. 
Table 17: Univariate Comparison of the Characteristics of the European ABS Market 2010-2012 
(1) Variable of interest (2) Year and security class 
 2010 2011 2012 
 European 
ABS 
Auto-
ABS 
European 
ABS 
Auto-
ABS 
European 
ABS 
Auto-
ABS 
Primary Market Spread (bp) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
23 
134.5 
110.0 
30.0 
350.0 
92.67 
 
9 
110.9 
123.9 
41.9 
221.7 
59.24 
 
82 
156.3 
129.8 
-143.0 
900.0 
143.5 
 
21 
117.9 
104.4 
35.9 
495.0 
101.3 
 
67 
126.2 
91.0 
-39.0 
387.2 
104.4 
 
20 
58.53 
33.5 
-14.1 
185.0 
51.96 
Credit Rating (1-15 weak) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
                             Std. Dev. 
 
23 
3.91 
1.0 
1.0 
17.0 
4.47 
 
9 
2.89 
1.0 
1.0 
6.0 
2.26 
 
82 
3.79 
1.0 
1.0 
17.0 
4.27 
 
21 
2.81 
1.0 
1.0 
5.0 
1.97 
 
67 
3.07 
1.0 
1.0 
11.0 
3.08 
 
20 
2.35 
1.0 
1.0 
5.0 
1.76 
Time to Maturity (years) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
23 
12.43 
12.40 
1.26 
32.73 
7.22 
 
9 
6.88 
7.13 
5.74 
8.11 
0.94 
 
82 
15.59 
12.06 
3.52 
42.58 
10.65 
 
21 
7.55 
6.09 
5.81 
12.49 
2.52 
 
67 
9.77 
7.89 
1.04 
29.10 
6.21 
 
20 
7.99 
6.06 
5.84 
12.46 
2.10 
Loan Tranche Size (Euro millions) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
23 
330.2 
275.0 
22.4 
900.0 
267.7 
 
9 
331.5 
474.5 
19.1 
905.0 
317.8 
 
82 
393.2 
231.3 
9.0 
3502.5 
5842 
 
21 
413.9 
476.6 
23.0 
956.0 
390.7 
 
67 
460.3 
314.4 
6.14 
3963.0 
700.3 
 
20 
408.1 
308.1 
28.0 
1000 
389.0 
Transaction Size (Euro millions) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
                   Std. Dev. 
 
16 
543.3 
553.5 
100.0 
900.0 
236.1 
 
5 
602.0 
519.1 
500.0 
942.5 
190.6 
 
 
44 
1022.0 
617.0 
21.55 
5832.0 
1257.6 
 
11 
809.4 
815.6 
535.5 
1050.0 
165.7 
 
 
39 
869.9 
668.4 
133.7 
5073.0 
997.5 
 
14 
616.4 
800.0 
49.8 
1030.1 
378.5 
Retained Interest (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
23 
0.61 
1.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
9 
0.78 
1.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
82 
0.48 
0.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
21 
0.57 
1.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
67 
0.51 
1.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
20 
0.6 
1.0 
- 
- 
- 
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The sample European ABS describes the characteristics of the European ABS market excluding the 
automobile market. The sample Auto-ABS describes the characteristics of European automobile ABS. 
The variable SPREAD is measured in percentage points. MATURITY has the unit years. The variables 
LOAN SIZE and TRANSACTION SIZE have the unit million Euros. The variable RATING is measured 
in a scale from 1 to 21. RETAINED INTEREST is a dummy variable. 
Table 18: Univariate Comparison of the Characteristics of the European ABS Market 2013-2015 
(1) Variable of interest (2) Year and security class 
 2013 2014 2015 
 European 
ABS 
Auto-
ABS 
European 
ABS 
Auto-
ABS 
European 
ABS 
Auto-
ABS 
Primary Market Spread (bp) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
74 
81.34 
59.48 
-98.8 
595.0 
115.8 
 
29 
42.22 
46.7 
-37.6 
141.4 
36.68 
 
78 
117.4 
88.0 
-10.1 
426.0 
102.1 
 
21 
30.81 
29.0 
-10.5 
84.0 
25.84 
 
22 
119.9 
84.29 
20.60 
443.8 
107.5 
 
22 
58.27 
47.71 
13.0 
275.0 
60.43 
Credit Rating (1-15 weak) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
                             Std. Dev. 
 
74 
3.43 
1.5 
1.0 
12.0 
3.00 
 
29 
2.91 
1.0 
1.0 
6.0 
2.11 
 
78 
4.76 
4.0 
1.0 
20.0 
3.78 
 
21 
2.76 
1.0 
1.0 
5.0 
1.94 
 
22 
4.66 
3.5 
1.0 
13.5 
3.58 
 
22 
3.02 
2.0 
1.0 
8.0 
2.24 
Time to Maturity (years) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
74 
11.07 
8.03 
3.04 
29.98 
6.99 
 
29 
7.68 
7.07 
5.84 
11.07 
1.83 
 
78 
13.41 
13.16 
3.96 
50.03 
7.19 
 
21 
6.70 
5.99 
5.69 
11.12 
1.36 
 
22 
12.48 
8.52 
3.91 
28.50 
8.65 
 
22 
8.05 
7.54 
5.83 
11.26 
1.85 
Loan Tranche Size (Euro millions) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
74 
392.4 
303.5 
3.25 
2960.0 
518.6 
 
29 
466.5 
450.0 
16.2 
2785.0 
564.8 
 
78 
283.1 
186.0 
0.10 
1984.1 
339.7 
 
21 
498.6 
500.0 
16.3 
1250.0 
465.8 
 
22 
301.2 
227.2 
5.50 
888.0 
297.3 
 
22 
383.8 
206.1 
13.0 
1286.3 
414.7 
Transaction Size (Euro millions) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
                Std. Dev. 
 
40 
807.6 
564.2 
52.3 
3500.0 
732.8 
 
16 
868.2 
719.2 
244.5 
3242.8 
669.4 
 
36 
751.1 
598.2 
180.0 
2339.0 
507.1 
 
11 
958.8 
952.5 
516.3 
1291.3 
222.7 
 
11 
851.6 
720.9 
335.4 
2000.0 
467.5 
 
11 
781.7 
717.0 
400.0 
1339.4 
296.7 
Retained Interest (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
74 
0.58 
1.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
29 
0.72 
1.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
78 
0.60 
1.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
21 
0.95 
1.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
22 
0.59 
1.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
22 
1.0 
1.0 
- 
- 
- 
The sample European ABS describes the characteristics of the European ABS market excluding the 
automobile market. The sample Auto-ABS describes the characteristics of European automobile ABS. 
The variable SPREAD is measured in percentage points. MATURITY has the unit years. The variables 
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LOAN SIZE and TRANSACTION SIZE have the unit million Euros. The variable RATING is measured 
in a scale from 1 to 21. RETAINED INTEREST is a dummy variable. 
Table 17 presents the results for the years 2010-2012, while Table 18 exhibits 
the results for the years 2013-2015. The results for the primary market spread support 
the hypothesis that Auto-ABS has become more interesting over time compared to their 
non-Auto-ABS counterparts. The difference between the spreads of the two security 
classes is significantly higher for the last three years than it is for the first three years of 
the data sample. We note that the median value of the risk premium was higher for 
Auto-ABS in 2010 but eventually, Auto-ABS were associated with a price discount 
during 2011-2015. The credit ratings of Auto-ABS were significantly better during that 
time. Further, we note that the rating of Auto-ABS, on average, exhibited greater 
homogeneity than that of non-Auto-ABS. The time to maturity varied over time for non-
Auto-ABS, while exhibiting constant results for Auto-ABS. This further supported the 
hypothesis that Auto-ABS provided a significantly lower risk profile than their non-
Auto-ABS counterparts. 
Loan tranche size and transaction size behaved inconsistently over time for both 
these security classes. We noted reductions in the mean (median) value of the loan 
tranche size and the transaction size as well as a rise in values for the mean (median) for 
both security classes. Finally, retained interest behaved differently for the two security 
classes. While on the one hand, we did note a constant mean (median) value for non-
Auto-ABS issues, the variable exhibited a steady growth for Auto-ABS transactions. 
Thus, relatively more Auto-ABS issues provided internal credit enhancement, which 
was an additional indicator for the lower risk profile.  
Before proceeding to the next section, in which we analyze yield determinants, 
we should briefly summarize the results of our univariate comparison. This paper 
investigates how common pricing factors compare for the European ABS samples. This 
means, we analyzed common security characteristics for Auto-ABS transactions and 
non-Auto-ABS transactions. The purpose was to provide insights into the common 
pricing characteristics associated with the European ABS market and to elaborate on 
any substantial differences between the two asset classes, which could explain the 
exceptional performance of the Auto-ABS market. We found that most of the common 
pricing features between the two asset classes in fact differed significantly, especially 
characteristics that described the risk profile. Therefore, we noted that the risk profiles 
of the two asset classes differed. We understood one of the causes of the performance of 
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the Auto-ABS issues. In addition, we observed that the European ABS market exhibited 
both significant homogeneity and difference in the context of the common security 
characteristics. We documented, for instance, that: 
1. Auto-ABS tend, on average, to be less risky than their non-Auto 
counterparts. Auto-ABS have a significantly lower spread, a 
significantly higher credit rating, and a significantly lower currency risk 
in comparison with non-Auto tranches; 
2. Non-Auto-ABS transactions show a significantly larger transaction size, 
whereas Auto-ABS tranches show a significantly larger loan tranche 
size. This is explained by a significantly larger number of tranches for 
non-Auto-ABS; 
3. Non-Auto-ABS tranches have significantly longer maturity levels than 
Auto-ABS tranches; 
4. Non-Auto-ABS tranches have a significantly higher cumulative level of 
subordination, while Auto-ABS are far more likely to provide additional 
credit enhancement; 
5. Similarities are documented for the number of lead manager, the number 
of rating agencies, and the type of interest rate. 
6. Over time, the characteristics of Auto-ABS developed in favor compared 
to their non-Auto-ABS counterparts. As a result, we observe that the 
difference of the average spreads increases over time. 
We document a significantly lower risk profile for Auto-ABS tranches, which 
explains the significantly lower primary market spread. This may interest investors as 
well as originators. Investors benefit from the lower risk profile in terms of a lower 
default probability. The automotive industry benefits from the lower risk premia in 
terms of lower costs. Therefore, the risk profile explains a significant part of the 
superior performance of the Auto-ABS market. A natural follow-up of this study would 
be an investigation into the extent to which the asset classes are priced by the common 
factors. Thus in the next section, we investigate the yield determinants of the European 
ABS market.  
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 Regression Analysis 3.5.1.2
This section investigates the extent to which the two asset classes are priced by 
common characteristics. Its purpose is to analyze the impact of the common security 
features on the primary market spread. We anticipated that the primary market spreads 
associated with the two asset classes were influenced differently and this could be 
another cause for the superior performance of the Auto-ABS market. To further 
investigate the first research hypothesis, six regression analyses were run on the 
common variables and the spread. We performed the Breusch-Pagan tests on every 
regression with the result of homoscedasticity, using the methodology proposed by 
Breusch and Pagan (1979). The regressions followed the model, presented in the 
methodology chapter.  
Table 19 presents the regressions performed on the common pricing 
characteristics (independent variables) and the primary market spread (dependent 
variable) for the Auto-ABS sample and the European ABS sample. Regressions 1 and 2 
are the main regressions for this chapter, while regressions 3 to 6 are performed to 
determine whether corporate characteristics, such as the number of lead manager, the 
number of rating agencies, retained interest, and type of interest have a greater 
explanatory power than variables associated with the underlying assets, such as credit 
rating, time to maturity, loan size, and number of tranches.  
 
 Table 19: Determinants of the Primary Market Spread of the European ABS Market 
 
Variable 
European 
ABS 
Reg. #1 
Auto-ABS  
Reg. #2 
European 
ABS 
Reg. #3 
Auto-ABS 
Reg. #4 
European 
ABS 
Reg. #5 
Auto-ABS 
Reg. #6 
Constant 0.238 0.101 0.501  -0.537 2.25 **** 1.62 **** 
Credit Rating 0.203 **** 0.190 **** 0.183 **** 0.180 **** - - 
Loan To Value 0.001 0.001 - - - - 
Time To Maturity -0.012 * 0.008 -0.006 0.029 - - 
Extern Enhancement 0.154 0.150 - - - - 
Loan Size -0.078 ** 0.053 -0.088 ** 0.016 - - 
Transaction Size -0.231 **** 0.045 - - - - 
# Tranches 0.081 ** 0.210 ** 0.064 0.170 ** - - 
# Lead Managers -0.188 *** -0.021 - - -0.211 *** 0.007 
# Rating Agencies 0.122 -0.015 - - -0.479 **** 0.060 
Retained Interest 0.263 ** -0.361 *** - - 0.269 ** -0.545 **** 
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Float 0.423 **** -0.150 - - 0.00006  -0.389 ** 
Currency Risk 0.045     - - - -  
Creditor Protection -0.391 *** -0.109 - - -  
Emerging Market 0.247     - - - -  
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 
Adjusted R² 
F-Statistics 
346 
0.56 
< 2.2e-16 
122 
0.55 
< 1.81e-14 
346 
0.53 
< 2.2e-16 
122 
0.53 
7.38e-16 
346 
0.16 
1.34e-09 
122 
0.30 
4.37e-07 
Significance Levels                                      0 ‘****’ 0.001 ‘ ***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1 
The control variables Yeari and Currencyi were included in the analysis but are not presented in the above 
table. The results for the variables Transaction Size and Loan to Value were arrived by separate 
regressions for the Auto-ABS sample due to high correlation of these variables. The results for the 
variables Transaction Size and Loan Size were arrived by separate regressions for the European ABS 
sample due to high correlation of these variables. 
 
Table 19 reports the following results for the first two regressions. The F-
statistics on whether coefficients are jointly different from zero as well as adjusted R² 
are reported at the bottom of the Tables. Overall, the model performs relatively well for 
the two asset classes. The adjusted R² is around 0.55 for the Auto-ABS sample, and 
over 0.56 for the ABS ex. Auto sample. This is comparable to results of studies 
regarding the ABS market by Vink and Fabozzi (2012) and Vink and Thibeault (2008). 
This indicates that the model explains a significant proportion of the spread over the 
sample period. Table 19 shows that the credit rating is significant at the 0.1% level for 
both samples. The pattern of the credit rating variable indicates that spreads rise when 
ratings worsen. This result is as predicted and makes intuitive sense. Further, we report 
similar coefficients of credit rating between the asset classes. Clearly, investors of the 
European ABS market consider credit rating as dominant yield determinants for the 
whole ABS market.  
We included two types of credit enhancements in our regression analyses: 
external by a third company, for instance an insurance company, and internal through a 
retained interest by the originator. The external credit enhancement dummy variable is 
insignificant and positive for both asset classes, which is a surprising result. On the 
contrary, we observe a significant, negative relationship at the 1% level between 
retained interest and the spread for the Auto-ABS sample and a significant, positive 
relationship at the 5% level for the non-Auto-ABS tranches. This is a surprising result, 
since we predicted a negative relationship. However, investors associate an additional 
average risk premium of 26 basis points with non-Auto tranches if the transaction 
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provides internal credit enhancement. For Auto-ABS, we reported an average price 
discount of 36 basis points.  
The variable maturity is insignificantly and positively related with the spread for 
Auto-ABS tranches and significantly and negatively related with the spread at the 10% 
level for non-Auto-ABS. The second result is surprising, since we expected the maturity 
to be positively related with the spread. Apparently, yield spreads generally decrease 
with longer maturity for non-Auto ABS. Nevertheless, these findings also merit greater 
in-depth analysis of the nature of the assets than what we can provide here. Loan and 
transaction sizes behave differently in our samples. They are insignificantly and 
positively related to the primary market spread for Auto-ABS, while exhibiting a 
significant and negative relationship with the spread for non-Auto-ABS at the 5% and 
0.1% levels, respectively. However, for Auto-ABS issues, this evidence may support 
illiquidity in the form of a downward-sloping demand curve. The negative relationship 
of loan and transaction sizes with the spread for non-Auto-ABS transactions indicates 
that, on average, larger issues are associated with a price discount.  
We observe a significant and positive relationship with spreads for number of 
tranches across the whole European ABS market with significance levels at 5%. 
Apparently, a higher number of tranches is associated with an additional risk premium. 
It may be argued that tranches have a positive relationship with default. This means that 
the originator especially, in a situation of a higher degree of information asymmetry 
between himself and the investors with regard to the underlying collaterals, would 
benefit from a higher number of tranches per transaction. On the other hand, investors 
could associate an increase in the number of tranches with an additional increase in the 
risk, which would require an extra risk premium (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). This finding 
is in accordance with the results of the number of tranches in the univariate analysis. 
For Auto-ABS, we reported an average increase of spreads by 21 basis points for every 
additional tranche, while for non-Auto-ABS, we reported an average increase of the 
spread by 8 basis points. The dummy variables number of lead managers and number of 
rating agencies were seen to behave differently for Auto-ABS and non-Auto-ABS 
tranches. While the spread and number of lead managers were insignificantly and 
negatively related for Auto-ABS, they exhibited a significant negative relationship for 
non-Auto-ABS. While the coefficient sign is the same, investors have been thought to 
consider the number of lead managers as yield determinant only for the non-Auto-ABS 
market. We documented an insignificant and positive relationship for the number of 
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rating agencies for Auto-ABS, while the variable was insignificantly and positively 
related with spreads for the ABS ex. Auto sample. Nevertheless, the coefficient sign for 
the non-Auto-ABS was surprising, since we predicted a negative relationship. A greater 
number of rating agencies should achieve, ceteris paribus, a more accurate rating. 
 Float is insignificantly related with spreads for the Auto-ABS market, while we 
observe a strong significant and positive relationship with the primary market spread 
for non-Auto-ABS at the 0.1% level. This indicates that for Auto-ABS tranches, the 
spread is associated with, on average, a price discount of 15 basis points for floating 
rate issues. On the other hand, the average increase of spreads for the non-Auto sample 
equals 42 basis points. The positive relationship can be explained by the default risk for 
longer maturity issues with a floating interest rate. Since the interest rate on a fixed rate 
issue does not fluctuate during the lifetime of the security, the securities are typically 
protected to avoid the risk of rising interest rates (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). This is a 
further explanation for the higher risk premia of the univariate analysis, since 77% of 
the issues contained in the non-Auto sample are floating rate issues. Creditor protection 
exhibits different results for the European ABS market. While spreads and creditor 
protection are insignificantly and negatively related for Auto-ABS, they show a 
significant and positive relationship for non-Auto-ABS at the 1% level. Spreads reduce 
on average by 11 basis points for automobile issues when creditor protection is 
available and 39 basis points for non-Auto ABS. Thus, investors consider the 
availability of creditor protection as a determinant of the primary market spread for the 
non-Auto sample. 
The last two variables of our regression model, currency risk, and emerging 
market, only occur in the ABS ex. Auto sample. Both variables are insignificantly and 
positively related with spreads. The results of the coefficients signs are as expected and 
make intuitive sense. Currency risk as well as emerging market risk are associated with 
a higher default risk. 
In the following paragraph, we discuss the results of the regressions 3 to 6. We 
split the common pricing characteristics into two smaller groups. The first group 
contains variables that can be associated with the underlying assets. The second group 
contains variables that can be associated with the originating corporation and its choices 
for the issuance process. The regressions are performed in order to analyze the group 
which contributes the greater part to the explanatory power of the first two regressions. 
Table 19 shows that the variables associated with the underlying assets, contribute the 
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greater part to the explanatory power of the first regression model for both security 
classes. However, the analysis finds differences in the results for the variables. While 
credit rating behaves in the exact same manner for both security classes, we document 
significant differences for loan size and the number of tranches. Loan size has a 
negative and significant relationship with the spreads for the non-Auto-ABS sample, 
while the variable is positively and insignificantly related with the spread for the Auto-
ABS sample. On the other hand, the number of tranches exhibits a positive and 
insignificant relationship with the risk premium for the non-Auto ABS issues, whereas 
the variable is positively and significantly related with the primary market spread at the 
5% level for Auto-ABS. Time to maturity is insignificantly related with the spread for 
both security classes. However, we document differences in the coefficient signs for this 
variable. Time to maturity exhibits a negative relationship with the risk premium for 
non-Auto-ABS while having a positive relationship with the spread for Auto-ABS 
issues. The second group of variables contributes the lower part to the explanatory 
power of the first model for both security classes. First, we note that the adjusted R² is 
almost twice the value of the non-Auto-ABS sample for the Auto-ABS sample, which 
indicates that variables, which are associated with the originator, are more significant to 
investors of Auto-ABS than to investors of their non-Auto-ABS counterparts. Second, 
we find differences in the results for the variables of the second group. The number of 
lead managers as well as the number of rating agencies are negatively and significantly 
related with the spread for non-Auto-ABS while having a positive and insignificant 
relationship with the spread for Auto-ABS issues. Retained interest is positively and 
significantly related with the spread at the 5% level for non-Auto-ABS and has a 
negative and significant relationship at the 0.1% level for Auto-ABS. Finally, the type of 
interest rate has a negative and significant relationship with the risk premium at the 5% 
level for Auto-ABS and is insignificantly and positively related with the spread of non-
Auto-ABS. 
This subsection investigates the extent to which the two asset classes are priced 
by common factors. Our purpose was to analyze the impact of common pricing 
characteristics on primary market spreads. We expected that investors rely on different 
pricing factors for the two samples. The findings provide evidence that indicates that 
Auto-ABS are priced differently compared to their non-Auto-ABS counterparts. We 
documented, for example, that: 
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1. Credit rating, retained interest, and the number of tranches are yield 
determinants for Auto-ABS, while non-Auto-ABS issues are additionally 
priced by loan and transaction size, the number of lead managers, the 
type of interest, and creditor protection; 
2. Lenders tend to offer a discount for Auto-ABS issues with retained 
interest and surprisingly demand an additional risk premium for non-
Auto-ABS issues; 
3. Credit rating, loan to value, maturity, extern enhancement, the number 
of tranches, the number of lead managers, and creditor protection 
exhibit the same coefficient signs; 
4. Retained interest, loan size, transaction size, the number of rating 
agencies, and the type of interest exhibit different coefficient signs; 
5. Variables, which are associated with the underlying assets, contribute a 
greater part of the explanatory power for both security classes. However, 
those variables behave differently for the two security classes; 
In the next section, we discuss the results of the two previous subsections and 
summarize the results of the first comparison analysis between Auto-ABS issues and 
non-Auto-ABS issues. 
 Discussion 3.5.1.3
This subsection discusses the results of the previous comparison analysis. Based 
on the results of the previous two subchapters, we accept the first hypothesis. The 
results provide evidence that supports the hypothesis that the Auto-ABS market 
provides advantages with respect to security risk profiles compared to the non-Auto-
ABS market. Further, we find that investors rely on pricing advantages of Auto-ABS 
transactions. We documented that Auto-ABS have a significantly lower risk profile than 
non-Auto-ABS, which leads to a significantly lower average primary market spread for 
the Auto-ABS issues. The average primary market spread for this asset class equals 64 
basis points, whereas non-Auto-ABS have to pay a risk premium of, on average, 122 
basis points.  
As a natural follow-up, we analyzed the extent to which spreads of the two asset 
classes were priced by the common security characteristics. We observed that more than 
half of the pricing factors exhibited dissimilar results with respect to significance levels, 
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coefficient signs, or impact. This was in accordance with the findings of the univariate 
analysis. Especially, the results for dominant variables like retained interest, the number 
of tranches, and the type of interest which illustrated the significant differences between 
the two samples. Retained interest is a determinant of the spread for both samples, but 
is negatively related with the spread for Auto-ABS, while having a positive relationship 
with spreads for non-Auto-ABS. The number of tranches has a significant and positive 
relationship with the primary market spread for both asset classes. Hence, investors 
associate a higher number of tranches with an additional risk premium. Auto-ABS 
floating rate issues are associated with a price discount, while non-Auto-ABS floating 
rate issues are associated with an additional risk premium. These findings further 
support the conclusion with respect to lower risk profile of Auto-ABS and contribute to 
the significantly lower spreads. 
As a result of the comparison analysis, we are able to accept the first research 
hypothesis and conclude that dissimilarities between the Auto-ABS submarket and the 
non-Auto-ABS submarket explain a significant part of the exceptional performance of 
automobile issues. The analysis revealed that there were strong and significant 
differences between the two submarkets. The advantages of Auto-ABS indicate that the 
development of the European Auto ABS market into the most dominant submarket is 
the result of different risk profiles as well as different yield determinants. If the 
European automobile ABS market also continues its development during new 
circumstances, for instance quantitative easing in the European Monetary Union, the 
findings of this study will merit greater in-depth analysis. It will be of interest especially 
to scholars who study the European securitization market. 
The next section undertakes a comparison analysis between the Auto-ABS and 
the Auto corporate bonds with the purpose of explaining the shift of issuance volumes 
between the two markets. Research reports by Creditreform Financial Research (2015) 
and the DZ Bank (2013, 2015) consider the shift as additional cause driving the superior 
performance of the Auto-ABS submarket. 
 European Automobile Market 3.5.2
This section analyzes the differences between corporate bonds and asset-backed 
securities in the European automobile market. Both techniques are mentioned to be 
most important refinancing instruments for market sales and loan services in the 
European automobile market (True Sale International, 2013; Creditreform Financial 
Research, 2015). A European automobile ABS is backed by automobile or leasing 
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credits of the automobile company. For the purpose of securitization, the automobile 
company (parent company) transfers the portfolio of assets to a bankruptcy-remote 
special purpose vehicle (SPV). The SPV is a legal entity, which is legally separate from 
the seller. This means that the security is independent of the originator’s credit quality. 
The repayment of investors depends primarily on the assets and their generated cash 
flows and not on the financial situation of the parent company (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; 
Jobst, 2008; Pelletier, 2003; Segoviano, Jones, Lindner, & Blankenheim, 2013; 
Fermanian, 2013; Riddiough, 2011). Asset-backed security transactions are associated 
with a lower risk profile than corporate bonds, since they are independent of the 
originator’s credit quality. Further advantages are that ABS issues generate the interest 
payments solely from the underlying car or leasing credits, and are independent of the 
earnings of the originator. The advantage of corporate bonds is the independence from 
an underlying asset portfolio. Corporate bonds can be issued without the existence of 
coverage in the originator’s asset portfolio, since repayments are solely generated from 
the earnings of the originator. Research reports by Creditreform Rating Agency (2015) 
and the DZ Bank (2015) mention that the automobile industry shifts refinancing 
activities from the corporate bond market into the asset-backed security market. This 
paper analyzes if the structure, the risk profile as well as pricing factors explain this 
shift and hence, provide a second cause for the exceptional performance of the Auto-
ABS submarket. 
 
 Descriptive Analysis 3.5.2.1
This subsection performs a univariate analysis for the European automobile market. 
The objective is to analyze to what extent do Auto-ABS differ from Auto-CB. The 
European Auto-ABS grew into the most important submarket in the European ABS 
market. Its proportion in the primary market increased to over 43% in 2015. This 
development is hypothesized to be explained partly through dissimilarities between 
automobile ABS and automobile CB, which leads to a shift of issuance activities by the 
automotive industry. Table 20 presents a comparison of the discrete as well as dummy 
characteristics for the European automobile market. The Auto-ABS sample is labelled 
“Auto-ABS” in the subsequent Tables, whereas the CB high information sample is 
labelled “Auto-CB”. For purposes of comparison, we only consider common pricing 
characteristics provided by both samples in this analysis. 
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Table 20: Comparison of the Characteristics of the European Automobile Market 
(1) Variable of interest (2) Security 
Class 
(3) Variable of interest (4) Security 
Class 
 High Information 
Sample 
 High Information 
Sample 
 Auto-
ABS 
Auto-
CB 
Auto-
ABS 
Auto-
CB 
Primary Market Spread (bp) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
122 
63.91 
51.85 
-37.50 
495.0 
66.27 
 
413 
127.8 
79.60 
-47.00 
743.40 
140.69 
Number of Rating Agencies 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
122 
1.69 
2.0 
1.0 
3.0 
0.50 
 
413 
1.99 
2.0 
1.0 
3.0 
0.35 
Time to Maturity (years) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
122 
7.55 
6.88 
5.69 
12.49 
1.93 
 
413 
3.57 
3.03 
1.01 
25.04 
2.33 
Creditor Protection (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
122 
0.89 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
413 
0.28 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Loan Tranche Size (€ 
millions) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
 
122 
428.53 
452.0 
13.0 
2785.03 
444.50 
 
 
413 
334.06 
200 
20.13 
1500 
324.19 
Floating Rate Issue (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
122 
0.74 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
413 
0.33 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Credit Rating (1-15 weak) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
122 
2.80 
1.0 
1.0 
8.0 
2.01 
 
413 
7.67 
7.0 
5.0 
15.0 
1.84 
Currency Risk (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
                             Std. Dev. 
 
0 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
413 
0.43 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Number of Lead Managers 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
122 
2.25 
2.0 
1.0 
5.0 
1.28 
 
413 
2.07 
2.0 
1.0 
6.0 
1.21 
   
The sample Auto-ABS describes the characteristics of European automobile. The sample Auto-CB 
describes the characteristics of European automobile CB. The variable SPREAD is measured in 
percentage points. MATURITY has the unit years. The variable SIZE has the unit million Euros. The 
variable RATING is measured in a scale from 1 to 21. The variables LEAD MANAGERS and RATING 
AGENCIES describe the number of the tranches and the number of corresponding conglomerate, 
respectively. The variables EXTERN ENHANCEMENT, FLOAT, CURRENCY RISK, and CREDITOR 
PROTECTION are dummy variables.  
The relative pricing of the two samples shows that average (median) spreads are 
statistically and significantly lower for Auto-ABS, with 64 basis points (52 bps) than 
they are for Auto-Bonds, with 127.8 basis points (79.6 bps). We document that the 
primary market spread for Auto-ABS is, on average, half the primary market spread for 
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Auto-Bonds. Hence, investors associate Auto-Bonds with a significantly higher risk 
profile than Auto-ABS. An ABS tranche matures, on average, after 7.5 years, compared 
to an average of 3.56 years for CB. Both security classes, as indicated by the standard 
deviation, exhibit significant homogeneity with respect to maturity. One surprising 
finding is that the minimal value of the ABS sample is larger than the third quantile 
value of the CB sample. This means 75% of all corporate bonds have a lower maturity 
than the ABS issue with the lowest maturity. The difference can be explained by the fact 
that a longer time to maturity is associated with a higher default risk for Auto-CB, since 
they do not provide any additional credit enhancement. In contrast, the Auto-ABS issues 
provide credit enhancement and thus are protected against the first losses of the 
underlying portfolios. 
Auto-ABS exhibit a larger average (median) loan size of EUR 428.5 million (EUR 
452 million) than Auto-Bonds with EUR 334.06 million (EUR 200 million). Both 
samples exhibit, as indicated by standard deviation, significant heterogeneity with 
respect to loan size. For instance, the average standard deviation for loan size of Auto-
ABS is EUR 444.5 million while for Auto-Bonds, it is EUR 324.2 million.  
Auto-ABS, on average, tend to be less risky than their Auto-Bonds counterparts. 
This is also confirmed by the credit rating. Since credit rating and spread tend to have 
an inverse relationship, it is obvious that the average credit rating for Auto-ABS is 
significantly lower, with 2.80, than for Auto-Bonds, with 7.70. The findings are in 
accordance with the expectation that the structure of ABS transactions reflect lower 
perceived risk than the structure of corporate bonds, because loan repayments of ABS 
transactions are backed by large amounts of car or leasing credits that are relatively 
liquid and make the issue less risky. Further, the independence of the originator and the 
provided credit enhancement lower the default risk and lead to a lower risk profile for 
Auto-ABS. Nevertheless, the relatively strong average credit rating for Auto-ABS 
indicates that the underlying asset portfolios are of high quality. On the one hand, 
spread levels and credit rating provide direct evidence of the riskiness of these two 
financing techniques .The number of rating agencies and the number of lead managers 
on the other hand also provide indirect evidence of the riskiness of the transaction—or 
at least serve as an indicator of the difficulty of underwriting the issue. The average 
number (median) of participating lead managers for Auto-ABS is 2.25 (2.0) and this is 
insignificantly larger than the average of 2.1 (2.0) for Auto-Bonds. The similarities 
between the findings for this variable are additionally documented in the standard 
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deviation. The average standard deviation with respect to the number of lead managers 
for Auto-Bonds is 1.21, which is only insignificantly lower than the average of 1.28 for 
Auto-Bonds. Though similar to the number of lead managers, we find only slight 
differences for the number of rating agencies. Auto-Bonds have an average of 1.99 
(median 2.0) rating agencies involved, which is insignificantly higher than the 1.7 (2.0) 
rating agencies for Auto-ABS. Thus, both security classes tend to be equally difficult to 
rate, and the same number of rating agencies needs to be involved to convince investors 
to participate in the transactions. 
Auto-ABS tranches are more than twice as likely to be floating rate issues 
compared to Auto-Bonds. In particular, one would expect Auto-ABS to have a 
relatively higher percentage of fixed rate issues because Auto-ABS report the higher 
average maturity (7.5 years) and the issuance of fixed rate securities would eliminate a 
major source of cash flow uncertainty inherent to a longer maturity. However, the 
findings indicate that floating rate issues tend to offer more flexibility for the 
automobile industry.   
Moreover, Auto-ABS are three times as likely to be issued in a country that 
provides creditor protection, than their Auto-CB counterparts. Almost 90% of all Auto-
ABS securities are issued in countries with no automatic stay on the assets, while only 
every third Auto-CB transaction provides creditor protection. Finally, the last variable 
of interest is currency risk. This variable is only calculated for the Auto-CB sample 
since the Auto-ABS sample does not contain issues that face currency risk. Almost half 
the Auto-CB issues face currency risk (43.34%). This finding suggests that Auto-Bonds 
contain a mismatch between the originators’ home country currencies and the currency 
used for loan repayment. One obvious interpretation is that the corporate bond market is 
almost 3.5 times as big as the asset-backed security market with respect to the number 
of issues (413 versus 122). Further, the corporate bond market extends to more 
countries than the Auto-ABS market. Therefore, corporate bonds are issued in more 
currencies than Auto-ABS. Hence, it is more likely that an Auto-Bond will face 
significant currency risk than Auto-ABS issues.  
The results of the univariate analysis over the whole time period merit a greater 
in-depth analysis in order to analyze variations over time. Therefore, this section 
provides a univariate analysis for each year in our data sample. This aims to determine 
development of the differences between the Auto-ABS and Auto-CB. The variables 
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number of lead managers, number of rating agencies, currency risk, type of interest 
rate, and creditor protection do not exhibit changes over time. Thus, the following 
analysis is carried out on the variables primary market spread, credit rating, time to 
maturity, and loan size. 
Table 21: Comparison of the Characteristics of the European Automobile Market 2010-2012 
(1) Variable of interest (2) Year and security class 
 2010 2011 2012 
 Auto-
ABS 
Auto-CB Auto-
ABS 
Auto-CB Auto-
ABS 
Auto-CB 
Primary Market Spread (bp) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
9 
110.9 
123.9 
41.9 
221.7 
59.24 
 
26 
208.2 
201.0 
1.40 
436.4 
135.36 
 
21 
117.9 
104.4 
35.9 
495.0 
101.3 
 
99 
112.2 
73.3 
-47.0 
576.3 
122.99 
 
20 
58.53 
33.5 
-14.1 
185.0 
51.96 
 
93 
141.0 
178.7 
-9.4 
743.4 
160.2 
Credit Rating (1-15 weak) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
                             Std. Dev. 
 
9 
2.89 
1.0 
1.0 
6.0 
2.26 
 
26 
8.71 
9.25 
6.5 
11.5 
1.71 
 
21 
2.81 
1.0 
1.0 
5.0 
1.97 
 
99 
7.61 
7.0 
6.0 
11.33 
1.23 
 
20 
2.35 
1.0 
1.0 
5.0 
1.76 
 
93 
7.7 
7.0 
6.0 
13.0 
1.67 
Time to Maturity (years) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
9 
6.88 
7.13 
5.74 
8.11 
0.94 
 
26 
3.87 
3.08 
1.02 
10.03 
1.91 
 
21 
7.55 
6.09 
5.81 
12.49 
2.52 
 
99 
2.98 
3.02 
1.02 
7.02 
1.43 
 
20 
7.99 
6.06 
5.84 
12.46 
2.10 
 
99 
3.51 
3.03 
1.02 
10.03 
1.7 
Loan Tranche Size (Euro millions) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
9 
331.5 
474.5 
19.1 
905.0 
317.8 
 
26 
491.7 
500.0 
30.0 
1000.0 
298.7 
 
21 
413.9 
476.6 
23.0 
956.0 
390.7 
 
99 
256.2 
110.7 
25.0 
1250.0 
296.1 
 
20 
408.1 
308.1 
28.0 
1000 
389.0 
 
99 
346.0 
167.1 
20.1 
1500.0 
356.1 
The sample Auto-ABS describes the characteristics of European Automobile ABS. The sample Auto-CB 
describes the characteristics of European automobile CB. The variable SPREAD is measured in 
percentage points. MATURITY has the unit years. The variable SIZE has the unit million Euros. The 
variable RATING is measured in a scale from 1 to 21.  
Table 22: Comparison of the Characteristics of the European Automobile Market 2013-2015 
(1) Variable of interest (2) Year and security class 
 2013 2014 2015 
 Auto-
ABS 
Auto-CB Auto-
ABS 
Auto-CB Auto-
ABS 
Auto-CB 
Primary Market Spread (bp) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
 
29 
42.22 
46.7 
-37.6 
141.4 
 
85 
127.1 
61.8 
-5.0 
649.1 
 
21 
30.81 
29.0 
-10.5 
84.0 
 
68 
78.14 
50.65 
-7.4 
411.0 
 
22 
58.27 
47.71 
13.0 
275.0 
 
42 
84.41 
61.05 
1.7 
332.5 
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Std. Dev. 36.68 168.3 25.84 90.96 60.43 76.79 
Credit Rating (1-15 weak) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
                             Std. Dev. 
 
29 
2.91 
1.0 
1.0 
6.0 
2.11 
 
85 
7.71 
7.0 
6.0 
15.0 
2.12 
 
21 
2.76 
1.0 
1.0 
5.0 
1.94 
 
68 
7.48 
7.0 
5.5 
14.0 
2.13 
 
22 
3.02 
2.0 
1.0 
8.0 
2.24 
 
42 
7.42 
7.0 
5.0 
13.67 
2.18 
Time to Maturity (years) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
29 
7.68 
7.07 
5.84 
11.07 
1.83 
 
85 
3.73 
3.04 
1.01 
20.03 
2.67 
 
21 
6.70 
5.99 
5.69 
11.12 
1.36 
 
68 
3.89 
3.03 
1.02 
25.04 
3.32 
 
22 
8.05 
7.54 
5.83 
11.26 
1.85 
 
42 
4.04 
3.27 
1.28 
15.03 
2.58 
Loan Tranche Size (Euro millions) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
29 
466.5 
450.0 
16.2 
2785.0 
564.8 
 
85 
316.7 
190.0 
29.5 
1250.0 
309.3 
 
21 
498.6 
500.0 
16.3 
1250.0 
465.8 
 
68 
334.8 
250.0 
30.0 
508.6 
287.9 
 
22 
383.8 
206.1 
13.0 
1286.3 
414.7 
 
42 
427.8 
321.6 
40.0 
1344.1 
368.7 
The sample Auto-ABS describes the characteristics of European Automobile ABS. The sample Auto-CB 
describes the characteristics of European automobile CB. The variable SPREAD is measured in 
percentage points. MATURITY has the unit years. The variable SIZE has the unit million Euros. The 
variable RATING is measured in a scale from 1 to 21.  
Table 21 provides the results for the years 2010-2012, whereas Table 22 
provides the results for the years 2013-2015. The results for the primary market spread 
support the hypothesis that Auto-ABS become more interesting as an investment 
vehicle compared to their Auto-CB counterparts. The spreads of Auto-CB exhibit a 
higher average during every year of the sample, which indicates that investors prefer 
Auto-ABS compared to Auto-CB as lower spreads signal a higher demand for these 
securities. We also note that the risk premium for Auto-ABS exhibits greater 
homogeneity every year, as indicated by the standard deviation with respect to it. The 
credit ratings of Auto-ABS are significantly lower for the whole period of time than the 
ratings of their Auto-CB counterparts. The results for credit rating support the 
hypothesis that Auto-ABS, post the 2007 financial crisis, have lower risk profiles 
compared to their Auto-CB counterparts and therefore, are more important for the 
European automobile industry in order to refinance their sales and loan services. Time to 
maturity is found to significantly vary over time for Auto-CB, while exhibiting constant 
results for Auto-ABS during the six year period. This finding further indicates that 
Auto-ABS provide a significantly lower risk profile than Auto-CB issues. 
Loan size exhibits very interesting results for this study. We document that since 
2012 the Auto-CB sector has been suffering a continuous decline in issuance sizes in 
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total, even though the average value did rise in 2015. A combination of declining 
numbers of issues and declining average loan sizes seems to have led to a drop by 
almost 50% in the total issuance sizes since 2012. For Auto-ABS, on the other hand, 
Tables 21 and 22 exhibit a larger issuance size in total in 2013, 2014, and 2015 
compared to the total issuance size in 2012. Further, neither a decline in the issuance 
number nor a decline in the average loan size since 2012 has been observed. This 
supports the hypothesis that Auto-ABS have become more important for European 
automobile corporations in order to refinance their sales and loan services market. 
Moreover, the results indicate that issuance volumes have shifted from the Auto-CB 
market into the Auto-ABS market. 
Before proceeding to the next section, in which we analyze the impact of the 
common pricing characteristics on the primary market spread by security class, we 
should briefly summarize the results of the univariate comparison. This section 
investigates how common pricing factors compare for the European automobile market 
with respect to the two most important financing instruments for that industry. The 
purpose is to provide insights into the common pricing characteristics associated with 
the automobile market and elaborate any substantial differences as may exist between 
the financing techniques, which could explain the shift of issuance into the ABS market. 
We find that most of the common pricing characteristics between the two security 
classes in fact differ significantly, especially factors that describe the risk profile of the 
securities. In addition, we observe that the European automobile market exhibits 
significant homogeneity for some of the common pricing characteristics. We document, 
for instance, that: 
1. Auto-ABS, on average, tend to be less risky than their Auto-Bonds 
counterpart. Auto-ABS have a significantly lower spread, a significantly 
better credit rating, and a significantly lower currency risk in 
comparison with Auto-Bonds; 
2. Auto-ABS are far more likely to be floating rate securities than Auto-
Bonds;  
3. Auto-ABS show a significantly larger transaction size compared to 
Auto-Bonds; 
4. Auto-ABS have significantly longer maturity levels; 
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5. Similarities are documented for the number of lead manager and the 
number of rating agencies. 
6. Since 2012, a shift has been observed in the volume of issuance from the 
Auto-CB market to the Auto-ABS market. 
We document a significantly lower risk profile for Auto-ABS tranches for every 
year of the sample, which explains the significantly lower primary market spread. This 
is very interesting for investors as well as for the originators. Investors benefit from the 
lower risk profile in terms of a lower probability of default, whereas the automotive 
industry benefits from the lower risk premia in terms of lower costs. Therefore, the risk 
profile indicates that the automobile industry as well as investors rely on the advantages 
of securitization, which explains the shift in volumes of issuance to the European Auto-
ABS market. A natural follow-up of this study would be an investigation into the extent 
to which the asset classes are priced by common factors. Therefore, the next section 
further addresses the second research hypothesis. 
 Regression Analysis 3.5.2.2
This subsection examines the determinants of primary market spreads using an 
ordinary least squares fixed panel-data framework, with primary market spread as the 
dependent variable and the common pricing variables as the independent variables. In 
order to find additional support for hypothesis 2, we evaluate the results for the 
regressions for the European automotive industry. We anticipate that the primary 
market spreads associated with the two security classes are influenced differently by 
common security characteristics. Thus, the regressions of this subsection are run on the 
primary market spread (dependent variable), the common pricing characteristics 
(independent variables) of the CB high information sample, and the Auto-ABS high 
information sample. Regressions 1 and 2 are the main regressions here, while 
regressions 3 to 6 are performed to determine whether corporate characteristics, such as 
the number of lead managers, the number of rating agencies, and type of interest have 
greater explanatory power than variables, which are associated with the underlying 
assets, such as credit rating, time to maturity, and loan size. The results are presented in 
Table 23. 
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  Table 23: Determinants of the Primary Market Spread of the European Automobile Market 
                                 
Variable 
Auto-ABS  
Reg. #1 
Auto-CB  
Reg. #2 
Auto-ABS  
Reg. #3 
Auto-CB  
Reg. #4 
Auto-ABS  
Reg. #5 
Auto-CB  
Reg. #6 
Constant 0.101 -2.020 
**** 
-0.537 -3.53 **** 1.62 **** 1.683 *** 
Credit Rating 0.190 **** 0.490 **** 0.180 **** 0.522 **** - - 
Time To Maturity 0.008 0.029  0.029 0.081 **** - - 
Loan Size 0.053 0.076  0.016 0.183 **** - - 
# Lead Managers -0.021 0.100 ** - - 0.007 0.258 **** 
# Rating Agencies -0.015 -0.137  - - 0.060 0.145 
Float -0.150 -0.826 
**** 
- - -0.389 ** -1.264 
**** 
Currency Risk     - -0.216 - - - - 
Creditor 
Protection 
-0.109 -0.007 - - - - 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 
Adjusted R² 
F-Statistics 
122 
0.55 
< 2.5e-13 
413 
0.72 
< 2.2e-16 
122 
0.53 
< 7.38e-16 
413 
0.69 
< 2.2e-16 
122 
0.30 
< 4.37e-07 
413 
0.40 
< 2.2e-16 
Significance Levels                                      0 ‘****’ 0.001 ‘ ***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1 
The control variables Yeari and Currencyi were included in the analysis but are not presented in the above 
table. The results for the variables Transaction Size and Loan to Value were arrived by separate 
regressions for the Auto-ABS sample due to high correlation of these variables. The results for the 
variables #Lead Managers and Loan Size were arrived by separate regressions for the Auto-CB sample 
due to high correlation of these variables. 
 
Table 23 reports the following results for the first two regressions. The F-
statistics on whether coefficients are jointly different from zero as well as adjusted R² 
are reported at the bottom of the Tables. Overall, the model performs relatively well for 
the two asset classes. The adjusted R² is around 0.55 for the Auto-ABS sample, and 
over 0.72 for the Auto-CB sample. This is comparable with the results of studies 
regarding the ABS market by Vink and Fabozzi (2012) and Vink and Thibeault (2008), 
and studies regarding the CB market by Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001), and 
Huang, Huang, and Oxman (2015). Table 23 shows that credit rating is statistically 
significant for both Auto-Bonds and Auto-ABS at the 0.1% level. Further, the findings 
show that credit rating is positively related with the spreads for both samples. However, 
the impact of credit rating on the spread differs substantially for the two classes. For 
instance, spreads rise 49 basis points for Auto-Bonds when ratings worsen, which is 
significantly higher than for Auto-ABS. Thereby, spreads rise, on average, 19 basis 
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points when credit ratings worsen one level. One interpretation of the higher extra risk 
demand could be that investors dramatically lose faith in Auto-CB if ratings lower. 
Maturity has an insignificant and positive relationship with spread for CB issues, and is 
insignificantly and negatively related with spread for Auto-ABS. This is one 
explanation for the significantly lower maturity for Auto-CB as seen in subsection 
3.5.2.1. Apparently, spreads generally decrease with shorter maturity. This encourages 
automobile companies to assign, on average, relatively short maturities to their 
corporate bonds.  
Loan size behaves similarly for both security samples. The variable exhibits a 
positive and insignificant relationship with the primary market spread. In addition, we 
observe a higher coefficient value for the Auto-CB sample. Thus, larger issues of both 
samples are, on average, associated with a price increase. The number of lead managers 
is significantly and positively related with the spread for Auto-Bonds at the 5% level 
and has an insignificant negative relationship with spreads for Auto-ABS tranches. One 
explanation could be found in the differences between the evaluation criteria used by 
investors and capital markets for corporate bonds in comparison with Auto-ABS. On the 
other hand, the number of rating agencies is insignificantly and negatively related with 
spreads for both classes. Currency risk, which only appears in the CB high information 
sample, is insignificantly and negatively related with spread. This finding is a little 
surprising and makes no intuitive sense, since issues, which face currency risk, are 
intuitively associated with a higher risk. Hence, currency risk should, ceteris paribus, be 
associated with an additional risk premium. The variable creditor protection exhibits 
similar results for both samples. We observe an insignificant and negative relationship 
with spreads. 
Finally, float has a strong negative relationship with spreads for Auto-CB at the 
0.1% level, and an insignificant negative relationship with spreads for Auto-ABS. This 
indicates that Auto-ABS borrowers, on average, have to pay an extra risk premium of 
15 basis points through fixed-price issues in comparison with floating-price issues. 
Fixed-rate Auto-CB, on average, are associated with a large extra risk premium of 
almost 83 basis points. This can easily be explained by interest rates that do not 
fluctuate on these securities and that the securities are typically protected to avoid the 
risk of rising interest rates (Vink & Thibeault, 2008).  
In the following paragraph, we discuss the results of the regressions 3 to 6. We 
split the common pricing characteristics into two smaller groups. The first group 
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contains variables that can be associated with the underlying assets that should be 
securitized. The second group consists of variables which can be associated with the 
originating corporation and their choices for the issuance process. The regressions are 
performed in order to analyze which group contributes the greater part to the 
explanatory power of the first two regressions. Table 13 exhibits that the variables, 
which are associated with the underlying assets, and contribute the greater part to the 
explanatory power of the first regression model for both security classes. However, the 
analysis observes the differences regarding the significance levels with respect to the 
variables. The factors of the first group exhibit the same coefficient signs for both 
security classes. While credit rating exhibits the same significant level for both security 
classes, we observe different levels for time to maturity and loan size. Both variables are 
positively and significantly related with the primary market spread for Auto-CB, while 
having a positive and insignificant relationship with the risk premium for the Auto-ABS 
sample. Further, we observe significant differences in the coefficients for all variables 
of this group. Variations of these variables have a significantly greater influence on the 
spread of Auto-CB than they have on the spread for their Auto-ABS counterparts. The 
second group of variables contributes the lower part to the explanatory power of the first 
model for both security classes. We determine significant differences for the two 
security samples. First, we note that the adjusted R² is almost half the value for both 
security classes compared with the adjusted R² values of the first group, which indicates 
that variables, which are associated with the originator, are less significant to investors. 
Second, we find differences in the results for the variables of the second group. The 
number of lead managers is positively and significantly related with the spread for 
Auto-CB, while having a positive and insignificant relationship with the spread for 
Auto-ABS issues. The number of rating agencies is positively and insignificantly 
related with the spread for Auto-ABS, but has a negative and insignificant relationship 
for Auto-CB. Finally, the type of interest rate has a negative and significant relationship 
with the risk premium at the 5% level for Auto-ABS. It is significantly and negatively 
related with the spread of Auto-CB at the 0.1% level. 
This subsection investigates the extent to which the two security classes are 
priced by common factors. Our purpose was to analyze the impact of common pricing 
characteristics on primary market spreads for the two security classes. We anticipated 
that investors relied on different pricing features for each sample. The results provided 
evidence that the two security classes did indeed exhibit different yield determinants.  
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We documented, for example, that: 
1. Credit rating, retained interest, and the number of tranches are yield 
determinants for Auto-ABS, while the yield determinants for Auto-
Bonds consist of credit rating, the number of lead managers, and the 
type of interest; 
2. This study noted that, except for credit rating, the yield determinants of 
Auto-ABS solely consisted of common ABS pricing; 
3. The variables with the same coefficient signs for both samples were: 
credit rating, time to maturity loan size, the number of rating agencies, 
the type of interest, and creditor protection; 
4. The number of lead managers was the only variable that exhibited a 
different coefficient sign; 
5. Variables, which were associated with the underlying assets, contributed 
a greater part of the explanatory power for both security classes. 
However, those variables behaved differently between the two security 
classes. 
In the next section, we discuss the results of the previous two subsections and 
summarize the results of the second comparison analysis between the Auto-ABS issues 
and Auto-Bond issues. 
 
 Discussion 3.5.2.3
This subsection discusses the results of the previous comparison analysis. Based 
on the results of the comparison analysis for the European automobile sector, we accept 
the second research hypothesis. The results provide evidence that supports the 
hypothesis that the Auto-ABS market provides advantages with respect to security risk 
profiles compared to the CB market. Further, we find that investors rely on pricing 
advantages of ABS transactions. We documented that Auto-ABS had a significantly 
lower risk profile than Auto-Bonds. Moreover, this led to a significantly lower average 
primary market spread for Auto-ABS issues. The average primary market spread for 
this asset class is 64 basis points. In contrast, Auto-Bonds exhibit an average risk 
premium of 128 basis points.  
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As a first step of the comparison analyses, we analyzed differences in common 
security characteristics for the two classes. This paper observed that the structure of 
asset-backed security transactions led to advantages for the automobile industry and the 
capital market investors. The structure with an underlying asset portfolio of car or 
leasing credits also created significantly better credit ratings, with an average credit 
rating of 2.80, which equaled a rating between Aa1/AA+ and Aa2/AA. Auto-Bonds, on 
the other hand, exhibited an average credit rating of 7.67, which equaled a rating 
between A3/A- and Baa1/BBB+. Further, this finding indicated that investors 
appreciated the credit enhancement instruments provided in ABS transactions. Overall, 
we found that Auto-ABS are far less expensive
26
 and have far better risk profiles than 
their Auto-Bond counterparts. Thus, the univariate analysis implies why the automobile 
industry intensified their appearance in the European ABS market. 
Second, we investigated the extent to which spreads of the two asset classes 
were priced by common pricing characteristics. We observed that credit rating was the 
only mutual determinant of the primary market spread. Surprisingly, investors of Auto-
ABS relied solely on common pricing features, which only appeared for the 
securitization transaction, such as number of tranches and retained interest. Except for 
credit ratings, investors of Auto-ABS did not rely on any common security factors, 
which also described the pricing of corporate bond issues. This supported the results of 
the univariate analysis. The advantages of the ABS structure are dominant determinants 
that caused the shift of issuance volumes into the ABS market.  
As a result of the comparison analysis, we were able to accept the second 
research hypothesis and conclude that differences in the Auto-ABS market and the 
Auto-Bond market explained a significant part of the exceptional performance of Auto 
ABS issues. The analysis revealed that the dissimilarities and the development of the 
European Auto ABS market into the most dominant submarket were a result of the 
presence of diverse risk profiles and distinct pricing factors. Based on significant 
advantages for securitization issues to refinance car or leasing credits, the automobile 
industry expanded their activities in the Auto-ABS market, which increased the 
outperformance of Auto-ABS in the European ABS market. 
 
                                               
26
 With respect to Risk Premium. 
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 Conclusion 3.6
Research reports by Creditreform Financial Research (2015), Roland Berger 
Strategy Consultant (2016), and DZ Bank (2013, 2015) investigated that the European 
Auto-ABS market developed into the most dominant European ABS submarket since 
the recovery of ABS in the year 2010. Based on these research reports, this paper 
investigated the European ABS market after the 2007 financial crisis, in greater detail. 
The aim was to bring in new insights that could explain the outperformance of Auto-
ABS transactions in Europe. After the financial crisis in 2007, the European automobile 
ABS market became the largest ABS submarket in Europe. We anticipated two main 
causes for this: The first hypothesis was that the European Auto-ABS transactions 
provided greater advantages compared to their non-Auto-ABS counterparts and hence, 
were more suitable for ABS investors.  Section 5.2 addressed the second research 
hypothesis. We hypothesized that securitization provided advantages for the automobile 
sector as an instrument for refinancing compared to corporate bonds. A research report 
by DZ Bank (2013) found that automotive companies superseded corporate bonds with 
securitization as refinancing instruments. After 2010, the European capital market 
experienced an ascending trend for this phenomenon.  
Thus, to find evidence that supported the first research hypothesis, we performed 
a comparison analyses for the European ABS market. We analyzed common security 
characteristics of the European ABS market issues over 2010-2015. This procedure 
aimed to provide an in-depth analysis of the risk profiles for the different ABS security 
classes. Within the univariate analysis, we observed that half the common pricing 
characteristics exhibited distinct results. The dissimilarities were especially found for 
characteristics, which described the security’s risk profile, for example the credit rating, 
maturity, and internal credit enhancement. Similarities were found, for example, for the 
number of lead managers, the number of rating agencies, and loan as well as 
transaction size. Thereafter, as a natural follow-up, we performed regressions on the 
primary market spread and the common pricing characteristics for the two ABS 
samples of this study to evaluate the extent to which the yield determinants for the 
European Auto-ABS market and the European non-Auto-ABS market differed. This 
indicated the preferences of the European ABS investors and offered evidence that 
explained the exceptional performance of Auto-ABS transactions. The regressions 
revealed that nine common pricing factors exhibited different results for the European 
Auto-ABS market and the non-Auto-ABS market. Different results were defined in the 
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manner of: different impacts (coefficient value), different coefficient signs, or different 
significance levels. Three of the nine factors exhibited different results for both, the 
significance level and the coefficient sign. Based on these findings, this paper concluded 
that, despite the similarities found in the analysis, the European Auto-ABS market did 
provide significant advantages in comparison to their non-Auto-ABS counterparts. 
Thus, Auto-ABS was preferred by investors, which explains their performance.  
In order to find evidence that supports the second research hypothesis, we 
investigated the European automobile industry in greater detail. We analyzed common 
security characteristics of the most dominant refinancing instruments (ABS, CB) to 
determine the risk profiles of the security classes. We found that capital market 
investors associated corporate bonds with a bad risk profile. For instance, the average 
credit rating of the CB market in our sample equaled almost 8, while the average rating 
of the ABS market in our sample was between 2 and 3. The risk profile resulted in an 
average primary market spread of corporate bonds that was twice the spread for asset-
backed securities. Therefore, the structure of ABS was associated with advantages not 
only for the originator but also for the capital market investors. The findings supported 
the hypothesis that the European automobile market considered securitization more 
attractive as an instrument for refinancing 75% of their market sales comprising chiefly 
of car or leasing credits.  
 
As a natural follow-up, we determined the yield determinants for both security 
classes to evaluate the extent to which investors relied on different pricing factors and 
whether dissimilarities could explain the shift in issuance volumes into the Auto-ABS 
market. We found that there were significant dissimilarities in list of yield determinants 
of the ABS and CB in the automobile industry. Surprisingly but interestingly, we found 
that, except for credit rating, no yield determinant of the CB market was simultaneously 
a yield determinant for Auto-ABS. Further, this study observed that investors in the 
European automobile ABS relied solely on common pricing characteristics, which 
described the instrument of securitization. As a result, this study concluded that Auto-
ABS provided significant advantages for the purposes of automobile corporations and 
fixed income investors. Moreover, the findings did indicate that a significant part of the 
outperformance of the European Auto-ABS submarket could be explained by these 
advantages. Both, the better risk profile for Auto-ABS and the different sets of yield 
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determinants could indicate reasons for the shift in issuance volumes into the ABS 
market.  
The comparison analyses highlighted evidence that answered the overall 
research question regarding the causes of the outperformance of Auto-ABS in the 
European ABS market. Based on the findings with respect to the two research 
hypotheses, we can therefore, conclude the overall research question and maintain that 
the advantages of Auto-ABS compared to non-Auto-ABS as well as to Auto-CB are the 
main causes of the outperformance of the Auto-ABS submarket. 
The results of this study significantly contribute to the current research and to 
activities in the work field. Further, the results of the univariate analysis as well as the 
estimates of the regressions concerning the size of each variable’s impact on the 
primary market spread may interest investment banks and corporations involved in the 
European securitization market. Additionally, the findings of this paper have important 
implications for investors of the automobile ABS market as well as for investors of the 
European fixed income sector. Portfolio managers, who take positions in the European 
fixed income and securitization sector, can consider these results when deciding to build 
optimal portfolios. 
This study provides statistical analyses aiming to enrich the current 
understanding of the European ABS market and develop a framework of the market for 
further research. The quantitative research design was appropriate for gaining an in-
depth understanding of the research objectives. The quantitative research design and its 
appropriateness for our purpose notwithstanding, the results are limited to the 
underlying mathematical models and analyses. Different models and different structures 
of variables will likely lead to an additional insight into the development of the 
European ABS market. 
Moreover, the study is limited to the chosen period of time for the data sample. 
Further research may be carried out on the development of the European automobile 
ABS market after the VW-crisis in the U.S. and European automobile market. It is of 
interest if the market can expand the growth trajectory despite the negative impact on 
the European and especially, the German automobile companies (Padbidri, 2016). 
Further, an empirical contribution to current events could provide an analysis of spread 
changes, price changes, and changes in credit ratings for the European automobile ABS 
sector. In addition, future researchers could possibly contribute by investigating the 
impact of the European Central Bank’s “expanded asset purchase programme”. It is of 
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interest whether this programme did affect the primary as well as the secondary market 
yields of European asset-backed securities.  
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 Has Quantitative Easing affected the European Asset-backed 4
Security Market? An Empirical Analysis  
 Introduction 4.1
In the wake of the 2007 financial crisis, asset-backed securities (ABS) became one 
of the most popular financing instruments in the European fixed income market. In terms 
of quantitative easing (QE), the fixed income market became perhaps the most influential 
capital submarket. Central banks, such as the European Central Bank (ECB), used 
quantitative easing to stabilize the financial markets after that crisis (Arestis & Karakitsis, 
2014; Melvin, 2016; Aggarwal, Paul, & Aggarwal, 2016; Joyce, Liu, & Tonks, 2014). 
While in most cases, QE was reduced between the years 2011 and 2015 (Mahajan, 2015; 
Joyce, McLaren, & Young, 2012), the ECB expanded it in 2014. Historically, the ECB 
started the largest QE programme in the European Monetary Union ever. In addition to 
interest rate changes, the ECB started an asset-purchase programme—the “Expanded 
Asset-Purchase Programme (APP)”—in November 2014 with a total volume of EUR 1.1 
trillion until September 2016 (Priftis & Vogel, 2016). As of December 2016, the ECB not 
only expanded the duration of the programme until at least December 2017, but also 
expanded the volume to more than EUR 2.2 trillion (van Lerven, 2016; Priftis & Vogel, 
2016).  
The activities of the ECB are not limited to asset purchases in the secondary market 
but also include purchases in the primary market. Within the APP, the ECB is expected to 
expand its total assets from EUR 2.038 trillion in September 2014 to almost EUR 4.5 
trillion in December 2017. This, on achievement, will be the largest balance sheet total in 
the history of the European Monetary Union. This paper investigates one specific part of 
the APP. The study focuses on the influence of the “Asset-Backed Security Purchase 
Programme (ABSPP)” on the European asset-backed security market. The European ABS 
market experienced a continuous recovery after its breakdown during the crisis. In 2015, 
the total value of the European primary ABS market equaled EUR 213 billion, which was 
an increase of almost 20% compared to 2014. Research reports by AXA (2015) and DZ 
Bank (2015) investigated the impact of the ABSPP on the securitization market and 
evaluated the necessity of implementing the QE of the ECB. Further, research reports by 
Pimco (2015) and Allianz (2015) determined whether the APP had the expected impact on 
the financial markets, such as the European securitization market. Further, research reports 
by DZ Bank (2015, 2016) investigated the impact of the ABSPP on the secondary market 
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and the changes brought about as a result. They observed the development of secondary 
market prices compared to prices prior to the implementation of the APP in 2015 and 
discussed possible impact on the development of the secondary ABS market in 2016, 
respectively.  
These research reports, then, not only evaluate the development in prices as brought 
about by these asset-backed securities, which are suitable for the APP, but also note the 
price development in the European ABS market in total. Moreover, a research report by 
Helaba (2016) investigates the changes in the APP after the ECB press conference in 
March 2016, where the ECB announced the further expansion of the QE programme of 
2014. The progress of the QE programme is discussed until March 2016 while the impact 
of the expansion on the fixed income market in the European Monetary Union is given 
equal importance.  
As of June 2016, the ECB purchased asset-backed securities worth more than 
EUR 20 billion. Thus, in addition to current research, this paper empirically investigates 
the impact of QE on the European primary ABS market. This study analyzes the effects 
of QE on common security characteristics of the primary ABS market as well as on the 
primary market spread. Further, we examine if QE was also directly influencing the 
yield of Euro-denominated ABS.   
To fill research gaps, this paper empirically investigates the European ABS 
market. This study addresses the quantitative easing programme of the European 
Central Bank. To be more specific, it analyzes the impact of the “Asset-Backed Security 
Purchase Programme” on the European ABS market. The paper compares European 
asset-backed securities before and during the period of quantitative easing. This paper 
provides empirical analyses performed on second-hand data samples. A total of one 
univariate, three student t-tests, one Chow-test, and five regression analyses are 
performed with the aim of finding evidence that supports the research hypotheses. 
Through the course of the investigation, this paper is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides a Literature Review, identifying the research gaps in great detail. 
This is followed by the Methodology, Data Description, and Results which comprises 
the results of the empirical analyses. After every analysis, is a section that discusses the 
contributions to the two major research objectives, separately. The conclusion presents 
the Limitations, Market Implications, and Future Research. 
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 Literature Review and Hypotheses 4.2
According to Blum and DiAngelo (1997) as well as Choudhry and Fabozzi 
(2004), Fermanian (2011), and Vink and Thibeault (2008), the European securitization 
market consists of three main security classes: Asset-backed securities (ABS), 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDO). Often, 
the term “asset-backed securities” is used to describe all three security classes, together. 
To avoid confusion, if this paper refers to asset-backed securities, it indicates the asset 
class “asset-backed securities”. 
Research regarding quantitative easing around the world concerns itself with 
many different effects of the quantitative easing programmes. Mann and Klachkin 
(2015) investigate how quantitative easing of the Federal Reserve Bank has affected the 
U.S. Treasury Auction Market. They find that the relationships of the influential factors 
with the yield of the treasury bonds change with QE. Further, they find that correlations 
develop differently with QE and that QE exercises a downward pressure on bond yields. 
Lo Duca, Nicoletti, and Martínez (2016) investigate the role of U.S. quantitative easing 
on the global corporate bond issuance. They find that U.S. QE strongly impacts the 
gross corporate bond issuance not only in advanced but also, in emerging economies. 
Especially, asset holdings and purchases initiate investors to move to other asset classes, 
leading to stronger corporate bond issuance across the globe. Olsen (2014) analyzes the 
impact of the quantitative easing programmes of the Federal Reserve Bank on equity 
prices in the U.S. The paper finds that due to asset purchases through the U.S. Federal 
Reserve in the fixed income market, investors have been able to drive stock prices in the 
U.S. equity market.  
Gern, Jannsen, and Kooths (2015) discuss transmission channels and risks 
across quantitative easing in the European Monetary Union. They find that QE in the 
European Monetary Union comes with various risks and leads to unintended 
consequences in the European economies. Steeley (2015) investigates the side effects of 
QE in the U.K. bond market. He finds that QE leads to a sustained reduction in the costs 
of trading as well as elimination of return regularities. 
Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) investigate the response of interest rates on 
the U.S. and the U.K. quantitative easing programmes. They observe different results 
for these regions. Declines in the U.S. yields mainly reflect lower expectations of future 
short-term interest rates, while on the other hand, declines in the U.K. yields are 
explained through reduced term premiums. Mortimer-Lee (2012) analyses the effects 
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and risks of the global monetary policy. He finds different risks taken from different 
central banks. Das (2014) describes the expectations and hopes of the negative interest 
rate policy of the ECB.  
In literature, there is scarce research on the asset purchase programme of the 
European Central Bank. Research reports by the DZ Bank (2015, 2016), Helaba (2016), 
and AXA (2015) investigate the impact of the programme on the European 
securitization market. The analyses are thereby, limited to the secondary market. They 
find that yields of ABS, MBS, and CDO vary during the time of QE. The spreads over 
the three asset classes tighten with an increasing number of asset purchases in the 
European securitization market. In fact, in 2015, the spread tightened almost 50% 
compared to spread levels of 2014. Moreover, credit rating changes become 
significantly more positive during QE than before the implementation of the APP. The 
increase in volume as well as the longer duration of the APP are expected to influence 
the secondary market even more. On the other hand, the research reports find that due to 
the negative interest levels, investors avoid European securitization transactions in 
search for high yields and high returns. Low interest levels drive investors into markets 
with higher returns, such as high-yield bonds, corporate bonds, or equity markets. 
Asset-backed securities tend to have lower premiums as a result of lower risk profiles 
and may not be interesting enough for investors after the March 2016 decline in interest 
rates. 
Nevertheless, the research reports raise the question, whether the “Asset-Backed 
Security Purchase Programme” not only influences the secondary market but also, the 
primary market. Hence, this paper proposes the overall research question: “Has 
quantitative easing affected the primary European asset-backed security market?” We 
divide this question into three research hypotheses. Based on the results of Mann and 
Klachkin (2015), Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) as well as the observations of the 
effects of the ABSPP on the secondary market in the research reports by AXA (2015) 
and DZ Bank (2015), we hypothesize that QE has affected the primary European ABS 
market and that common pricing variables differ significantly in value between the 
issues before and after November 2014. Hence, the first research hypothesis states: 
“Quantitative easing has affected the security characteristics of European ABS issues”. 
Further, based on the findings of Gern, Jannsen, and Kooths (2015) and the observations 
regarding the secondary market in research reports by DZ Bank (2016) and Helaba 
(2016), we expect differences in the pricing factors of asset-backed securities in the 
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European market due to quantitative easing, and propose the second research 
hypothesis, which states: “ABS investors rely on different yield determinants in the time 
of QE”. Lastly, based on the results of Lo Duca, Nicoletti, and Martínez (2016), Das 
(2014), and Steeley (2015) and the observations of the research reports by DZ Bank 
(2015, 2016), we expect QE to provide evidence on the influence of the primary market 
spread on ABS issues. Hence, we propose the third research hypothesis: “Quantitative 
easing affected the primary yield of ABS issues”.  
The first hypothesis addresses the market regarding issuance, yield, and market 
structure. The second hypothesis investigates whether QE has led to a structural change 
with respect to the yield determinants of European ABS. Within the third research 
hypothesis, we analyze the extent to which QE has affected the primary market spread 
for European ABS issues.  
Overall, we hypothesize that the European ABS primary market is influenced by 
QE. A univariate analysis is performed to evaluate differences in the security 
characteristics of the data sample to find support for the first hypothesis. A Chow test 
analyzes the second research hypothesis. The Chow test, also defined as an econometric 
test, is a special test for structural change, which determines whether the estimates in a 
regression analysis are equal in the subsamples of the original data sample. Chow 
(1960) states that “the standard F-test for the equality of two sets of coefficients in 
linear regression models” be termed a Chow test (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). Since we 
have documented the extent to which the pricing factors for different subsets of the 
European ABS market show significant differences, we conclude our empirical analyses 
by examining the factors that impact the primary market spread of our securities. A 
panel-data fixed-effects model is used to investigate the relationships between the 
common pricing characteristics and the primary market spread. Should hypothesis 2 be 
accepted, we will perform ordinary least square regressions on different subsamples of 
the European ABS market. The third hypothesis investigates whether QE is a yield 
determinant, and thus provides direct evidence for the impact on the yield of the 
European ABS market during the ABSPP. This analysis investigates whether 
quantitative easing is associated with a direct influence on the primary market spread. In 
this manner, quantitative easing, as a quantitative variable, is included in the panel-data 
fixed-effects model. 
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 Research Methodology 4.3
The empirical analysis presented in this study is restricted to European asset-backed 
security issues—for which data on common pricing characteristics and spreads were 
available or computable—denominated in Euro during 2010-2016. The issuance 
spreads over the corresponding maturity benchmark reflect investors’ perceptions 
regarding the risks of loss. Moreover, the spread also represents liquidity conditions for 
the corresponding security (Gabbi & Sironi, 2005). As such, they are a function of the 
common pricing characteristics (Liu, Shi, Wang, & Wu, 2009), which can be divided 
into three main categories: Default and recovery risk characteristics, marketability 
characteristics, and systemic risk characteristics (Gabbi & Sironi, 2005; Vink & 
Thibeault, 2008; Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, & Mann, 2001; Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & 
Martin, 2001).  
Following this reasoning, our empirical analyses involves regressions, univariate 
analyses, and several statistical methods in order to find support for the research 
hypotheses and determine the impact of the ABSPP on the European primary asset-
backed security market. 
Note that, as a result of the analysis of the European primary asset-backed 
security market, this study is based on the primary market spreads of the issues. In 
order to analyze the yield of ABS transactions at issuance, this study has to model a 
variable that represents the yield of the transactions and, include the variations over the 
time period. The primary market spread, also called loan spread, represents the risk 
premium. On the basis of information available at the time of issue, the risk premium is 
the price for the risk associated with the security. This study defines the primary market 
spread as the offered yield to maturity of the security at issuance above the yield to 
maturity at auction of a corresponding treasury benchmark (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin, 2001). Vink and Thibeault (2008), Vink and 
Fabozzi (2012), Gabbi and Sironi (2005), and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin 
(2001) suggest the following procedure to obtain a suitable treasury benchmark: First, 
the benchmark is obligated to be Euro-denominated; second, the benchmark is obligated 
to be issued at a comparable auction date; and third, the benchmark has to offer a 
comparable time to maturity. 
Within the next paragraph, to find support for the research hypotheses, we 
discuss the common pricing characteristics and their expected impact on the primary 
Has Quantitative Easing affected the European Asset-backed Security Market? An Empirical 
Analysis 
110 
market spread. Since the spreads are a function of common pricing characteristics, we 
need variables that describe our set of securities. The list of common pricing 
characteristics is introduced in the Tables 24, 25, and 26 below (Vink & Thibeault, 
2008; Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; Gabbi & Sironi, 2005; Merton, 1974; Liu & Thakor, 
1984). Table 24 reports the default and recovery risk characteristics (Buscaino, Caselli, 
Corielli, & Gatti, 2012; Chen, Lesmond, & Wei, 2007; Kavussanos & Tsouknidis, 
2014; Amira, 2004; Grandes & Peter, 2004; Shin & Kim, 2013; Campbell & Cocco, 
2015; Wong, Fung, & Fong, 2004; Ammer & Clinton, 2004). The first column names 
the introduced variable. The second column describes the structure of the variable in 
this study. 
Table 24: Default and Recovery Risk Characteristics 
Variable Description Expected Impact Source 
Rating Average value of assigned ratings Positive relationship Liu & Thakor (1984)
27
 
Maturity  Measured in years Positive relationship Merton (1974)
28
 
Extern Equal 1 if extern enhancement is provided Negative relationship Vink & Thibeault 
Loan to Value Subordination level of tranche in % Positive relationship Vink & Thibeault 
The considered rating agencies are Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch. The rating values 1, …, 10 
correspond to the ratings Aaa/AAA, …, Baa3/BBB-. Ratings lower than Baa3/BBB- are not purchased by 
the ECB and hence do not appear in our data samples. 
The third column provides the expected impact of this variable on the primary 
market spread in the regression analyses (Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund, 2009; Bajari, 
Chenghuan, & Minjung, 2008; Deng & Quingley, 2012; Fabozzi & Roever, 2003; 
Schwartz & Torous, 1993). The last column provides an overview of literature, in which 
the variables were introduced. 
Table 25: Marketability Characteristics 
Variable Description Expected Impact Source 
Loan Size Natural log of the tranche’s amount Negative relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)31 
Transaction Size Natural log of the ABS transactions’ amount Negative relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008) 
Tranches Number of tranches Negative relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012)
32
 
Managers Number of lead managers Negative relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)
32
 
Agencies Number of rating agencies Negative relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012)
32
 
Float 1 if type of interest is floating rate Negative relationship Gabbi & Sironi (2005)
32
 
                                               
27
 Further sources: Vink & Thibeault (2008), Vink & Fabozzi (2012), Buscaino, Caselli, Corielli, & Gatti 
(2012), Chen, Lesmond, & Wei (2007), Kavussanos & Tsouknidis (2014), Amira (2004), Ammer & 
Clinton (2004) 
28
 Further sources: Gabbi & Sironi (2005), Vink & Thibeualt (2008), Amira (2004), Grandes & Peter 
(2004), Shin & Kim (2013) 
29
 Further sources: Fabozzi & Roever (2003) 
30
 Further sources: Wong, Fung, Fong, & Sze (2004), Campbell & Cocco (2011), Deng & Quigley 
(2004), Schwartz & Torous (1993), Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund (2009), and Bajari, Chenghuan, & 
Minjung (2008) 
31
 Further sources: Qi & Yang (2009), Calem & Lacour-Little (2004), Pennington-Cross (2003) 
32
 Further sources: Vink & Thibeault (2008) 
Has Quantitative Easing affected the European Asset-backed Security Market? An Empirical 
Analysis 
111 
Retained Interest 1 if retained interest appears in transaction Negative relationship Vink & Thibeault (2008)
33
 
Size and Amount describe the Euro equivalent amount at issuance. If the coupon of a transaction is 
floating rated, the coupon payments can vary over time and are linked to a floating interest rate, such as 
the 3-month EURIBOR. Retained interest is an internal credit enhancement measure, which describes if 
the originator retains interest in order to overcome first losses of the underlying assets. 
Table 25 introduces the marketability characteristics (Qi & Yang, 2009; Calem 
& Lacour-Little, 2004; Pennington-Cross, 2003). We expect all marketability 
characteristics to be negatively related with the primary market spread. All variables 
should, ceteris paribus, increase the secondary marketability for the regarding 
transaction. 
Table 26: Systemic Risk Characteristics 
Variable Description Expected Impact Source 
Creditor Protection 1 if creditor protection is provided Negative relationship Vink & Fabozzi (2012) 
Quantitative Easing 1 if tranche was issued during QE period Negative relationship  
Creditor Protection describes a dummy variable that equals one if the country in which the transaction is 
issued provides creditor protection in the form of “no automatic stay on the assets” and zero otherwise.  
QE describes a dummy variable, which is equal to one if a tranche was issued during the QE period, and 
zero otherwise. 
Table 26 presents the systemic risk characteristics (An, Deng, Nichols, & 
Sanders, 2014; Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008; Childs, Ott, & Riddiough, 1996). 
Further, we include one control variable in our statistical analyses. The control variable 
is called “year i”. Year i describes the year dummies. Each dummy variable is equal to 1 
if issue i has been completed during the corresponding year, and zero, otherwise. These 
variables should capture the variations in fixed income market conditions (Gabbi & 
Sironi, 2005). Due to the highest correlation with the common pricing characteristics, 
the year dummy for 2012 is excluded from the regression model to avoid over 
sensitivity. 
In the empirical analyses of this study, the common pricing characteristics are 
used as variables of interest with the purpose of determining structural differences as 
well as effects of QE on the set of European ABS issues. In the univariate analyses as 
well as in the statistical tests, the pricing factors combined with the primary market 
spread are compared among themselves. In the regression analyses, the primary market 
spread is used as a dependent variable. Following the above approach, the set of 
independent variables in this paper consists of the common security features. Since time 
from issuance is equal to zero for all issues, the factors mentioned above are considered 
                                               
33
 Further Sources: An, Deng, Nichols, & Sanders (2014), Ashcraft & Schuermann (2008), Childs, Ott, & 
Riddiough (1996) 
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at the time of issuance. In order to provide comparability for all issues in this study, the 
probable changes in the variables over the time period are not considered here.  
The set of independent variables consists both of discrete and dummy variables. 
The discrete variables are credit rating, maturity, transactions size, loan size, as well as 
loan to value, #tranches, #lead managers, and #rating agencies. The set of dummy 
variables consists of extern enhancement, retained interest, float, currency risk, 
quantitative easing, and creditor protection. In the univariate analysis, all variables are 
analyzed and tested, separately. The regressions measure the effects of all independent 
variables on the primary market spread. 
 Data Description 4.4
This chapter introduces the data sample and presents and discusses important 
factors for the following analyses. The data sample describes the European asset-backed 
security market and provides details about the properties of the transactions.  
 Data Samples 4.4.1
The principal data source for this segment is the Asset Backed Watcher, published 
by DZ Bank. The DZ Bank is a leading publisher of European ABS issues. We 
construct a unique dataset of various metrics, which contains detailed information on 
securitization of European securities from January 1, 2010, through June 30, 2016. The 
period indicates the time when the European ABS market experienced a recovery from 
the 2007 financial crisis until some uncertainty faced by the European ABS market after 
June 2016 with regard to the “Brexit” vote in the U.K. (True Sale International, 2016). 
In the following sections, we refer to this sample as the “full sample”. 
The full sample contains information on 591 European asset-backed security 
tranches issued in 231 transactions with a total value of EUR 186 billion. Although the 
full sample is comprehensive, for the purpose of this study, we note that it has one 
limitation. For comparison, we need the transactions to provide information on default 
and recovery risk characteristics, marketability characteristics, and systemic risk 
characteristics. The following variables are classified as default and recovery 
characteristics: Credit rating, time to maturity, extern enhancement, and loan to value. 
The group of marketability characteristics consists of: Size of the tranche, number of 
tranches, size of the whole transaction, number of lead managers, number of involved 
credit rating agencies, type of interest rate, and whether the issue has retained interest 
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or not. The systemic risk characteristic is creditor protection (Vink & Thibeault, 2008; 
Vink & Fabozzi, 2012). Tranches, for which detailed information about the above 
variables are not available, are deleted from the full sample. Further, we restrict the full 
sample to the limitations of the ABSPP. The main reason for reduction is the restriction 
on transactions—those that have been issued by an originator based in the European 
Monetary Union and those, which have been denominated in Euro. Further reasons for 
reduction are the credit rating limit, credit enhancement targets, and the structure of the 
underlying asset portfolio. The reduced sample is called the “high information sample”. 
The high information sample contains 369 asset-backed security tranches issued in 209 
transactions with a total value of EUR 152 billion.  
Table 27: Comparison of the ABS samples 
Variable of interest ABS full sample ABS high information sample Survival 
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev rate 
Coupon rate (bp) 591 148 133 368 134 103 62.27% 
Risk premium (bp)
7
 368 89 87 368 89 87 100% 
Credit rating (1-21 weak) 591 3.68 2.77 368 3.45 2.68 62.27% 
Loan to value (%)
7
 368 16.83 21.56 368 16.83 21.56 100% 
Time to maturity (years) 591 12.62 9.13 368 13.27 8.04 62.27% 
Issues with extern enhancement 523 4.8% - 368 5.2% - 70.36% 
Loan tranche size (EUR mio.) 555 399 426 368 413 522 66.31% 
Transaction size (EUR mio.) 231 855 705 209 871 803 90.48% 
Number of tranches 231 2.76 1.15 209 2.57 0.98 90.48% 
Number of lead managers 574 2.08 0.93 368 2.17 0.74 64.11% 
Number of credit rating agencies 591 1.49 0.59 368 1.60 0.54 62.27% 
Loans with retained interest
34
 368 61.41% - 368 61.41% - 100% 
Loans with fixed rate 591 27% - 368 30.98% - 62.27% 
Loans with floating rate 591 73% - 368 69.02% - 62.27% 
Loans with creditor protection
7
 368 56.79% - 368 56.79% - 100% 
Column 1 represents the common pricing variables. Column 2 presents the number, the mean, and the 
standard deviation of each variable in the working sample. Column 3 describes the number, the mean, and 
the standard deviation of each variable associated with the high information sample. Column 4 describes 
the survival rate for each variable. This rate is calculated by dividing the number of issues of each 
variable of the high information sample by the number of issues of each variable of the working sample.  
A comparison between the common pricing variables in the high information 
sample and the full sample in Table 27 reveals that issues of both samples are not 
dissimilar to their counterparts. Hence, we assume that any empirical results derived 
                                               
34 The variable was only calculated for the high information sample. 
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from the issues of the high information sample can be generalized to the larger 
population in the full sample.  
 Empirical Results 4.5
This section investigates how common pricing characteristics compared for the 
European ABS market before and after the implementation of quantitative easing 
through the European Central Bank in November 2014. The aim here is to provide 
extensive insights into the common pricing factors associated with the European ABS 
market, and elaborate on any substantial differences between the transactions issued 
before the APP and transactions issued during the QE. We hypothesized that the 
common pricing characteristics between the two subsamples differed significantly in 
value, and therefore, an effect of quantitative easing on the European ABS market was 
measurable. Moreover, we compared two further subsamples of the high information 
sample included in this paper. Research reports by the DZ Bank (2014, 2015, 2016) 
indicated that the influence of the asset-purchase programme was significantly higher 
on high-quality credit rating issues and issues that provided higher levels of 
subordination, e.g. senior tranches. This was a result of restrictions of the European 
Central Bank purchases, which primarily focused on tranches of asset-backed securities 
with the above characteristics. High-quality credit rating issues were filtered with the 
variable credit rating. The following breaking point has been used in the empirical 
analyses: credit rating has to be better or equal to four (Aa3/AA-). The senior tranche of 
each transaction is chosen to describe issues with higher subordination levels. In the 
following, the tranches issued before the implementation of the asset-purchase 
programme by ECB are called “ABS”. Tranches issued during quantitative easing are 
called “QE”. 
 Univariate Analysis 4.5.1
This section investigates how common pricing characteristics compare for the 
securities before and after the implementation of the ECB quantitative easing 
programme. First, we determine the differences between the subsamples for the purpose 
of providing insight into the effects of quantitative easing on the European ABS market. 
Second, we use a parametric test—Student’s t-test—to compare whether the distribution 
of the values reported for the securities of the high information sample are significantly 
different when the implementation of the ABSPP is used as a breaking point. Table 28 
contains the summary statistics of the discrete variables for the common pricing factors. 
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Each security class is categorized by two sets of observations. The first set relates all the 
asset-backed security information for the subsample containing only tranches that are 
issued before the implementation of quantitative easing in the European securitization 
market. The second set is associated with all the asset-backed security information for 
the subsample and contains only tranches that are issued during the period of 
quantitative easing by the ECB.   
Table 28: Univariate Comparison of the Discrete Characteristics for European ABS 
(1) Variable of interest (2) Security class 
 High Information 
Sample 
High Rating Issues Senior Tranche 
Issues 
 ABS QE ABS        QE ABS QE 
Primary Market Spread (bp) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
262 
92.94 
73.55 
-143.0 
595.0 
92.58 
 
106 
77.52 
64.50 
-47.0 
306.0 
69.43 
 
168 
67.43 
59.50 
-143.0 
263.0 
70.06 
 
57 
46.64 
45.80 
-47.0 
126.0 
35.53 
 
152 
68.29 
55.65 
-98.80 
379.2 
74.73 
 
57 
48.59 
42.80 
-47.00 
255.0 
47.97 
Credit Rating (1-15 weak) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
                             Std. Dev. 
 
262 
3.24 
2.0 
1.0 
10.0 
2.66 
 
106 
3.98 
3.0 
1.0 
10.0 
2.67 
 
168 
1.49 
1.0 
1.0 
4.0 
0.96 
 
57 
1.83 
1.0 
1.0 
4.0 
0.95 
 
152 
1.87 
1.0 
1.0 
9.5 
1.94 
 
57 
2.54 
1.0 
1.0 
9.0 
2.07 
Loan to Value (%)  
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
262 
16.94% 
7.95% 
0.00% 
100.00% 
23.41% 
 
106 
16.55% 
10.81% 
0.00% 
72.50% 
16.21% 
 
168 
21.69% 
11.72% 
0.0% 
100.0% 
25.43% 
 
57 
19.4% 
11.0% 
0.00% 
72.5% 
18.75% 
 
152 
21.93% 
12.36% 
0.00% 
100.0% 
24.60% 
 
57 
19.13% 
13.02% 
0.58% 
72.50% 
17.64% 
Time to Maturity (years) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
262 
12.35 
9.51 
3.52 
50.0 
7.95 
 
106 
15.55 
14.98 
3.91 
43.86 
7.86 
 
168 
12.91 
9.61 
3.52 
42.58 
8.29 
 
57 
14.70 
13.02 
5.82 
43.86 
7.81 
 
152 
13.11 
10.40 
3.52 
50.03 
8.34 
 
57 
15.01 
14.41 
3.91 
43.86 
8.30 
Loan Tranche Size (Euro 
millions) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
 
262 
411.2 
296.9 
0.1 
3502.5 
520.96 
 
 
106 
417.9 
277.1 
1.0 
3015.0 
525.68 
 
 
168 
543.9 
475.8 
9.0 
3502.5 
540.78 
 
 
57 
557.9 
500.0 
1.0 
2590.0 
437.36 
 
 
152 
668.6 
549.0 
21.6 
3502.5 
551.71 
 
 
57 
723.9 
633.5 
100.0 
3015.0 
554.87 
Transaction Size (Euro 
millions) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
 
 
152 
850.1 
683.1 
52.3 
5832.0 
 
 
57 
921.1 
796.9 
144.2 
4077.0 
 
 
132 
793.8 
630.0 
49.8 
5832.0 
 
 
45 
849.6 
796.9 
144.2 
3000.0 
 
 
152 
850.1 
683.1 
52.3 
5832.0 
 
 
57 
921.1 
796.9 
144.2 
4077.0 
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Std. Dev. 835.98 710.84 848.52 495.21 835.98 710.84 
Number of Tranches 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
262 
2.61 
2.0 
1.0 
5.0 
0.85 
 
106 
3.32 
3.0 
2.0 
6.0 
1.23 
 
168 
2.53 
2.0 
1.0 
5.0 
0.82 
 
57 
3.12 
2.0 
2.0 
6.0 
1.31 
 
152 
2.45 
2.0 
1.0 
5.0 
0.85 
 
57 
2.88 
2.0 
2.0 
6.0 
1.23 
Number of Lead Managers 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
262 
2.19 
2.0 
1.0 
5.0 
0.70 
 
106 
2.11 
2.0 
1.0 
4.0 
0.82 
 
168 
2.27 
2.0 
1.0 
5.0 
0.72 
 
57 
2.19 
2.0 
1.0 
4.0 
0.81 
 
152 
2.19 
2.0 
1.0 
5.0 
0.69 
 
57 
2.04 
2.0 
1.0 
4.0 
0.84 
Number of Rating Agencies 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
262 
1.65 
2.0 
1.0 
3.0 
0.53 
 
106 
1.48 
1.0 
1.0 
3.0 
0.56 
 
168 
1.75 
2.0 
1.0 
3.0 
0.50 
 
57 
1.53 
1.0 
1.0 
3.0 
0.57 
 
152 
1.66 
2.0 
1.0 
3.0 
0.54 
 
57 
1.49 
1.5 
1.0 
3.0 
0.57 
Table 28 provides a univariate analysis of the discrete variables of the high information sample, the high 
rating sample, and the high subordination sample categorized with the implementation of QE as breaking 
point. Column 1 represents the common pricing characteristics. Column 2 presents the values associated 
with each variable. 
Note that the lowest primary market spread of the European ABS market equals          
-1.43%, which is a relatively wide negative spread compared to all other tranches. This 
enormous negative spread is a result of a time to maturity equal to 29 years and an 
offered yield at auction of 2% with a fixed coupon rate. This has been seen as a very 
low yield at auction for an almost 30 year asset-backed security in the year 2011. 
Compared to this low yield at auction, the corresponding currency treasury 30 year 
benchmark was offered with a yield at 3.43%, which was a usual yield for a 30 year 
European treasury bond in 2011. Thus, due to a “triple A” rating and a very extensive 
internal credit enhancement, the originator was able to offer a yield at auction 143 basis 
points lower than the corresponding currency treasury benchmark. We still consider the 
chosen benchmark as suitable, since the time to maturity is 30 years (which means that 
treasury benchmarks offer a higher yield at auction) and the lower yield of the security 
can be explained by the low risk of default and the extensive internal credit 
enhancement of the originator.  
Table 29 contains the summary statistics classified by the dummy variables of the 
common pricing factors. 
 
Has Quantitative Easing affected the European Asset-backed Security Market? An Empirical 
Analysis 
117 
Table 29: Univariate Comparison of the Dummy Characteristics for European ABS 
(1) Variable of interest (2) Security class 
 High Information 
Sample 
High Rating Issues Senior Tranche Issues 
 ABS QE ABS QE ABS  QE 
Extern Enhancement (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
262 
0.07 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
106 
0 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
168 
0.10 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
57 
0 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
152 
0.11 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
57 
0 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Retained Interest (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
262 
0.60 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
106 
0.66 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
168 
0.65 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
57 
0.74 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
152 
0.61 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
57 
0.72 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Creditor Protection (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
262 
0.63 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
106 
0.43 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
168 
0.61 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
57 
0.42 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
152 
0.57 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
57 
0.46 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Floating Rate Issue (dummy) 
Number 
Mean 
Median 
Min. 
Max 
Std. Dev. 
 
262 
0.70 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
106 
0.66 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
168 
0.77 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
57 
0.84 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
152 
0.74 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
57 
0.70 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Table 29 provides a univariate analysis for the dummy variables of the high information sample, the high 
rating sample, and the high subordination sample categorized with the implementation of QE as breaking 
point. Column 1 represents the common pricing characteristics. Column 2 presents the values associated 
with each variable. 
Table 30 shows the results for the parametric Student’s t-test for all three security 
classes classified by the common pricing characteristics.  
Table 30: Two-Sample t-Tests Assuming Unequal Variances for European ABS 
(1) Variable of interest (2) Security class 
 High Information Sample High Rating Issues Senior Tranche Issues 
 ABS versus QE ABS versus QE ABS versus QE 
Primary Market Spread (bp) 
Credit Rating (1-15 weak) 
Loan to Value (%) 
Time to Maturity (years) 
Loan Tranche Size (Euro millions) 
Transaction Size (Euro millions) 
-1.74 * 
 2.39 ** 
 -0.18 
 3.52 **** 
0.11 
0.61 
-2.90 *** 
2.34 ** 
-0.73  
1.47 
0.20 
0.28 
-2.24 ** 
2.13 ** 
-0.91 
1.47 
0.64 
0.61 
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Extern Enhancement (0/1) 
Retained Interest (0/1) 
Number of Tranches 
Number of Lead Managers 
Number of Rating Agencies 
Creditor Protection (0/1) 
Floating Rate Issue (0/1) 
-4.52 **** 
1.18 
4.84 **** 
-0.81 
-2.72 *** 
-3.55 **** 
-0.77 
-4.19 **** 
1.27 
3.06 *** 
-0.67 
-2.57 ** 
-2.45 ** 
1.17 
-4.22 **** 
1.65 * 
2.40 ** 
-1.25 
-1.91 * 
-1.41  
-0.50  
Significance Levels                                      0 ‘****’ 0.001 ‘ ***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1  
Table 30 represents significance tests for the differences in values between the European ABS issued 
before and after the implementation of QE by ECB. * indicates the significance level of the difference of 
the common pricing characteristics of the two corresponding subsets. All other common pricing do not 
differ significantly between the two subsets at the 10% significance level. 
 Univariate Results 4.5.1.1
This subsection discusses the findings reported in Tables 28, 29, and 30. The results 
of the univariate analysis are simultaneously discussed with the results of the parametric 
tests. High rating issues have to provide a rating better than or equal to 4 while high 
subordinated issues have to be the senior tranche of their transaction. The values 
reported in Table 30 are t-statistics. This paper observes that many of the pair-wise 
comparisons for the high information sample, the high rating sample, and the senior 
tranche sample indicate statistically significant differences between the common pricing 
characteristics associated with the different subsamples of the high information sample 
of European ABS.  
The relative pricing of asset-backed security issues shows that the average (median) 
spreads are statistically and significantly lower for QE issues for the high information 
sample, the high quality rating issues, with 77.52 basis points (64.50 basis points) and 
46.64 basis points (45.80 basis points), and the senior tranches, with 48.59 basis points 
(442.80 basis points), than they are for the ABS issues, with 92.94 basis points (73.55 
basis points), 67.43 basis points (59.50 basis points), and 68.29 basis points (55.65 basis 
points). Hence, ABS issues, on average, tend to be less risky than their QE counterparts. 
This is also confirmed by the credit rating. Since credit rating and spread tend to have 
an inverse relationship, it is very surprising that the average credit rating of ABS, with 
3.24, 1.49 , and 1.87, is significantly lower than the credit rating for QE issues, with 
3.98, 1.83, and 2.54, for the three analyzed subsamples. Most observers would have 
predicted that QE loans have lower credit ratings, since the risk premia are lower on 
average. Hence, the results indicate the first impact of the ECB. The ECB, as a new 
participant, is heavily investing in the primary market, which leads to lower spreads for 
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QE issues, even though they tend to have worse risk profile. On the one hand, spread 
level and credit rating, in general, provide direct evidence of the riskiness of an ABS 
transaction, but on the other hand, the number of rating agencies and the number of lead 
managers involved in the rating process also provide (indirect) evidence of the riskiness 
of a loan (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). The average number (median) of participating lead 
managers is around 2.20 (2.0) for both security classes and all subsamples. ABS issues 
have an average of 1.65 (median 2.0) rating agencies involved for all subsamples, 
which is significantly higher than the average of 1.53 (median 1.0) credit rating 
agencies involved for QE issues. Thus, the difficulty to underwrite the issues, indicated 
by the number of lead managers, has not changed during the ABSPP. It is difficult to 
explain why QE issues have a significantly lower number of rating agencies involved in 
the rating process though one possible factor could be that the ECB is not restricting its 
activities in the ABS market to a number of rating agencies higher than one. The ECB 
officially announced that issues, which are considered for purchase, only need to 
provide one credit rating better than 10 (Baa3/BBB-). Thus, this announcement could 
lead to the significantly lower number of rating agencies, in consideration that 
originators could issue the transaction at lower costs when involving a smaller 
conglomerate of rating agencies. 
Statistically, the loan tranche size and the transaction size are not significantly 
different for the subsamples of the ABS and QE issues. However, ABS issues exhibit 
the lower average (median) loan tranche size with EUR 411.2 million (EUR 296.9 
million) for the high information sample, EUR 543.9 million (EUR 475.8 million) for 
high rating issues, and EUR 668.6 million (EUR 549 million) for the senior tranches 
compared to EUR 417.9 million (EUR 277.1 million), EUR 557.9 million (EUR 500.0 
million), and EUR 723.9 million (EUR 633.5 million), respectively, for QE issues. Not 
surprisingly, QE issues exhibit the larger, on average (median) transaction size for the 
high information sample, the high rating sample, and the senior tranche sample, 
amounting to EUR 921.1 million (EUR 796.9 million), EUR 849.6 million (EUR 796.9 
million), and EUR 921.1 million (EUR 144.2 million) compared to EUR 850.1 million 
(EUR 683.1 million), EUR 793.8 million (EUR 630.0 million), and EUR 850.1 million 
(EUR 683.1 million) for the ABS sample. Although the issuance volume increased 
considerably during quantitative easing, the APP has not significantly affected the 
European ABS market with respect to loan or transaction size. The two variables 
exhibit similar results in the t-statistics for all subsamples. This is reinforced by the 
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observation that a typical ABS transaction in our sample is divided into more tranches. 
Moreover, they participate differently in the asset cash flows, and thus, reduce the size 
of each loan tranche in the transactions (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). In a typical QE 
transaction of our data sample, for example, the average number (median) of tranches 
per transaction is 3.32 (3.0): significantly higher than the average number (median) of 
2.61 (2.0) tranches for the ABS issues. This finding can also be observed for the high 
rating sample with 3.12 (2.0) tranches for QE issues compared to 2.53 (2.0) tranches for 
ABS transactions, and for the senior tranches with 2.88 (2.0) for QE issues versus 2.45 
(2.0) tranches for ABS issues, respectively. Further, the cumulative subordination level, 
measured by the variable loan to value in each transaction is layered, so that each 
position benefits from all the positions subordinated to it in terms of credit protection 
and default risk. We find that ABS issues have the higher average loan to value level for 
all three subsamples with 16.94% for the high information sample, 21.69% for the high 
rating issues, and 21.93% for the senior tranches. The counter values for the QE issues 
are 16.55%, 19.4%, and 19.13%, respectively. Further, we find that the QE issues have 
the higher median loan to value ratio for the high information sample with 10.81% 
compared to 7.95%. For senior tranches, it is 13.02% compared to 12.36%, while ABS 
issues provide the higher median loan to value level for high rating, with 11.72% 
compared to 11.0%. The results show that the average of the cumulative subordination 
level is higher compared with the median across all classes and subsamples. This 
indicates that tranching is more comprehensive at the senior levels of an asset-backed 
security structure. However, the measured differences in the samples of this study are 
not significant. 
A QE tranche of average size matures 15.55 years after issuance for the high 
information sample, which is significantly longer than the 12.35 years for ABS issues. 
Moreover, a QE tranche matures after 14.70 years for the high rating sample, and after 
15.01 years for the high subordinated sample, which is longer than 12.91 years and 
13.11 years for the ABS issues, respectively. Still, the data samples, as indicated by the 
standard deviation, exhibit significant heterogeneity with respect to maturity. For 
example, average standard deviation for maturity is 7.95 years for the European ABS 
issues, and 7.86 years for QE issues.  
Extern enhancement only appears for the ABS samples in our study. An average of 
7% of the tranches of the high information sample are protected by a third-party credit 
guarantee. Additionally, we find an average of 10% and 11% of tranches that provide 
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external credit enhancement for the high rating issues and senior tranches, respectively. 
QE issues over all three subsamples are significantly more likely to provide internal 
credit enhancement through retained interest than ABS issues (66% versus 60%, 74% 
versus 65%, and 72% versus 61%). On the other hand, ABS issues are significantly 
more likely to be issued in a country that provides creditor protection than QE issues. 
This study finds that 63%, 62%, and 57% of the ABS tranches are issued in countries 
with creditor protection, while only 43%, 42%, and 46% of the QE tranches are issued 
in those countries, respectively. Thus, we find that since the implementation of the APP, 
companies from, for example, France or Italy expanded their activities in the European 
ABS market. Hence, the results suggest that the ECB provides further incentives for 
companies in the European Monetary Union to participate in the securitization market. 
Finally, ABS issues tend more likely to be floating rate credits than QE issues with 
70% compared to 66% for the high information sample and 74% compared to 70% for 
the senior tranches, while on the other hand, high rating QE issues are more likely to be 
floating rate credits than high rating ABS issues with 84% versus 77%, respectively. 
Thus, with respect to the coupon rate, which can be a dominant risk factor in 
consideration of a changing interest rate environment, the European ABS market shows 
significant homogeneity through all subsamples. This is also indicated by the standard 
deviation with respect to the type of interest rate. The standard deviations of the two 
asset classes exhibit similar results throughout all subsamples. 
 Univariate Results: Conclusion 4.5.1.2
Before proceeding to the next section of this paper, in which we analyze the impact 
of the common pricing factors on the primary market spread, we briefly summarize the 
result of the univariate analysis. The main purpose of this section is to investigate how 
the common pricing features are influenced through quantitative easing. This study 
provides insight into the common characteristics associated with the European ABS 
market before and after the implementation of the ABSPP. This paper finds that most of 
the common pricing characteristics between ABS and QE issues in fact differ 
significantly. Based on these results, we accept the first hypothesis that states that 
quantitative easing significantly affects the characteristics of European ABS issues. In 
the first analysis of this study, we observe that there are important univariate differences 
to consider. We document, for example, that: 
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1. QE issues, on average, tend to be less expensive for the originators than 
their ABS counterparts, even though they tend to have, on average, a worse 
risk profile than ABS issues. This is indicated by a significantly lower 
spread and a significantly higher credit rating throughout all subsamples; 
2. QE issues have significantly longer maturity levels than ABS issues; 
3.  ABS issues are significantly more likely to receive extern credit 
enhancement than their QE issue counterparts, while on the other hand QE 
issues provide higher internal credit enhancement than their ABS 
counterparts. This can be explained by restrictions for asset-backed security 
transactions in order to qualify for the ABSPP; 
4. QE issues are divided into significantly more tranches per transactions 
compared to ABS issues; 
5. QE issues have a significant lower average number of rating agencies 
involved. 
After the first analysis, this study concludes that the ECB, through quantitative 
easing, is significantly influencing the primary asset-backed security market. The 
univariate differences show the enormous effect of asset purchasing in a fixed income 
market. The payoff profile of asset-backed securities changed during quantitative easing 
with a definite gain for the originators. This was indicated by the significantly lower 
prices, described by primary market spreads. Interestingly, the appearance of the ECB 
as a participant in the European ABS market has led to worse risk profiles for the 
securities. This supports the fact that originators increasingly share the risks of the 
underlying assets with the capital markets. However, despite the higher risk profiles, 
originators are able to issue their transactions at lower costs. Hence, we conclude that 
the ECB effectively realizes the goal of simplifying the money supply for European 
corporations. Additionally, quantitative easing influences the economic structure as well 
as economic coherence and expectations. This is indicated by the higher risk profiles of 
QE issues, which lead, against all economic expectations, to lower risk premia and 
record issuance volume. A natural follow-up of this study would be the investigation 
regarding the extent to which the two security classes are priced by the common pricing 
features.    
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 Regression Analysis 4.5.2
 Methodology 4.5.2.1
 This section investigates the effect of quantitative easing on pricing factors of 
the European ABS market. Further, this study analyzes the extent to which the primary 
market spreads of the high information sample, high rating issues, and high 
subordinated issues are influenced by the European Central Bank. We anticipated that 
the primary market spreads associated with the two subsamples of the European ABS 
market would be influenced differently by the common pricing characteristics. In order 
to find support for hypothesis 2, we performed the Chow test and evaluated the Chow 
statistics. The subsequent sections provide a brief explanation of the further steps of our 
analyses. First, an ordinary least squares regression was run on the primary market 
spread (dependent variable) and the common pricing characteristics (independent 
variables) under the assumption that quantitative easing had no effect on the European 
ABS market and both samples had the same explanatory variables. Second, we obtain 
coefficients from separate regressions for both subsamples, and thus, run two further 
regressions: one for the European ABS before QE and one for European ABS after the 
implementation of QE in the European Monetary Union. In a next step, this paper, 
based on the residual sum of changes of each regression, computed an F-test of 
structural change—the Chow test. If the computed F-value exceeds the critical level, 
hypothesis 2 is to be accepted. We reject hypothesis 2 if the computed F-value remains 
smaller than its critical level. If hypothesis 2 is accepted, we will perform two 
regressions in order to determine the impact of the pricing variables on the primary 
market spread for the two subsets separately for comparison. Therefore, we evaluate the 
influence of QE on the impact of the yield determinants. Should hypothesis 2 be 
rejected, only one regression will be run to examine the relationships between the 
common pricing variables and the primary market spread. Lastly, the impact of QE as 
dummy variable for the high information sample is determined. The impact of QE for 
the high rating sample and the high subordinated sample are determined in separate 
regressions at the end of this chapter.  
All regressions are based on the same panel-data fixed-effects model, which is: 
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SPREAD𝑖 =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵCREDIT RATING𝑖 + 𝛽ଶMATURITY𝑖+ 𝛽ଷEXTERN ENHANCEMENT𝑖 + 𝛽ସLOAN TO VALUE𝑖+ 𝛽ହLOAN SIZE𝑖  +  𝛽଺TRANSACTION SIZE𝑖 + 𝛽଻# TRANCHES𝑖+ 𝛽଼# LEAD MANAGERS𝑖 + 𝛽ଽ# RATING AGENCIES𝑖+ 𝛽ଵ଴RETAINED𝑖 + 𝛽ଵଵTYPE OF INTEREST RATE𝑖+ 𝛽ଵଶCREDITOR PROTECTION𝑖 + 𝛽ଵଷQE𝑖 + 𝛽ଵସYEAR OF ISSUE𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖 
In this panel-data fixed-effects model, the control variables YEAR OF ISSUE 
have been included as additional independent variables. We constructed seven dummy 
variables based on the year of issue. YEAR=1, YEAR=2, YEAR=3, YEAR=4, 
YEAR=5, YEAR=6, and YEAR=7 that correspond to 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015, and 2016. Their value was 1 if the corresponding tranche was issued in the 
corresponding years, and zero, otherwise. These variables would capture the variations 
in asset-backed security market conditions (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). Due to the highest 
correlation with the common pricing characteristics, the year dummy for 2012 was 
excluded from the regression model to avoid over sensitivity. For the regressions with 
respect to issues within the period of QE, the year dummy for 2014 was excluded due to 
the highest correlation with the common pricing features to avoid over sensitivity. 
For the separate regressions, the dummy variable QE was excluded since the 
variable did not change for either one of the two subsets and made sense to be included 
only when both subsets were run jointly in a regression. 
 Chow Test 4.5.2.2
A Chow test is performed to investigate whether the primary market spreads 
associated with the two subsets of the European ABS market are influenced differently 
by common pricing factors when the implementation of QE by the ECB is chosen as the 
breaking point. The Chow test is a particular test for structural change, also defined as 
an econometric test, to determine whether the coefficients in a regression model are the 
same in separate subsamples with a prior determined breaking point (Vink & Thibeault, 
2008). The following Chow test shows the extent to which asset-backed securities in the 
Euro Monetary Union are priced by common pricing variables. Hereby, we analyze 
whether or not to reject hypothesis 2, which states that the estimates of the common 
pricing factors are statistically and significantly different for both subsamples. 
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The p-value of the Chow test equals 0.001, which means it remains smaller than 
its critical level. Based on this result, we accept hypothesis 2. Hence, the primary 
market spreads associated with the two subsamples are influenced differently by the 
common pricing characteristics. Following our analyses, we may conclude that our 
results confirm current market views. In accordance with current research reports, we 
conclude that the ABSPP of the ECB does significantly influence the fixed income 
market in the European Monetary Union. In conformity with research reports regarding 
secondary market spreads of ABS issues, we observe similar results for the primary 
market: namely, that the European Central Bank influences the set of yield determinants 
of European asset-backed securities through quantitative easing. In the following 
section, we discuss the relationship between the pricing variables and primary market 
spreads for each subsample of the European ABS market separately, for comparison.      
 Regression Results 4.5.2.3
 This subsection examines the yield determinants of the two subsamples using 
ordinary least squares regressions, with spread as the dependent variable and the 
common pricing characteristics as independent variables. Based on the results from the 
Chow test, we run two regressions for each subset of the European ABS market, 
separately, to determine differences in the value of the coefficients as well as the 
significant levels. After the comparison of the results for the two regressions, we 
perform three further regressions to analyze whether quantitative easing provides direct 
evidence to influence the yield of the European ABS issues. Table 31 reports the results 
for the first two regressions of the panel-data fixed-effects model. The regressions were 
run on the spread (dependent variable) and the common security features (independent 
variables). 
Table 31: Determinants of European asset-backed securities – Before and During QE compared 
 
Variable 
ABS issues 
Reg. #1 
QE issues 
Reg. #2 
Constant 0.92 1.426 * 
Credit Rating 0.177 **** 0.146 **** 
Loan To Value -0.0004 -0.002 
Time To Maturity 0.001 -0.009 
Extern Enhancement -0.06     - 
Loan Size -0.021  -0.082 *  
Transaction Size -0.173 *** -0.110  
# Tranches 0.183 **** -0.007 
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# Lead Managers -0.204 *** 0.139 ** 
# Rating Agencies -0.072 -0.137 
Retained Interest 0.199 * -0.302 ** 
Float 0.457 **** 0.061 
Creditor Protection -0.093 -0.099 
Number of Observations 
Adjusted R² 
F-Statistics 
262 
0.44 
< 2.2e-16 
106 
0.52 
1.218e-12 
Significance Levels                                      0 ‘****’ 0.001 ‘ ***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1  
The dependent variable is defined as the margin yielded by the security at issue above a corresponding 
benchmark. The dependent variable is measured in basis points. The independent variables are as follows: 
A credit rating variable: CR=1, CR=2, CR=3, …, CR=15, correspond to credit ratings: Aaa/AAA, 
Aa1/AA+, Aa2/AA, …, B2/B; Loan to Value is the subordination level expressed as a percentage of the 
transaction’s initial principal balance; Maturity is the time to maturity from issuance measured in years; 
Extern Enhancement as dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the issue has an extern enhancement; Loan 
Size is the natural log of the tranche amount in millions of Euros; Transaction Size is the natural log of 
the issue amount of the transactions in million Euros; #Tranches is the number tranches per transactions; 
#Lead Managers is the number lead managers participating in the issuance of the transaction; #Rating 
Agencies is the number of rating agencies involved in the rating process of the tranches at the time of 
issuance; Float has a dummy of 1 if the tranche has a floating rate coupon and zero if the rate is fixed for 
the life of the loan; Retained Interest is a dummy variable that takes 1 if retained subordinated interest as 
beneficial interest in a securitization transaction is provided by the originator. Creditor Protection is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the transaction is issued in a country, which provides no 
automatic stay in the assets; Year dummy variables are included but not reported in the table. Due to 
correlation, time to maturity was excluded in the regression. The presented result for time to maturity was 
arrived by a separate regression in a second step. 
Overall, the model performed relatively well. The adjusted R² is just over 0.44 for 
the ABS sample and 0.52 for the QE sample, respectively. The results are comparable 
with the results of studies on the ABS market by Vink and Fabozzi (2012) as well as 
Vink and Thibeault (2008). This indicates that the model does explain a significant 
proportion of the spreads over the sample’s periods.  
Table 31 reports that the credit rating variable is statistically the most significant 
characteristic at the 0.1% level. Yield spreads generally increase (decrease) for high 
(low) rated asset-backed securities in both samples. The impact of this variable is almost 
equal for both samples: a bad rating is associated with a price extra of 17 basis points 
respectively 15 basis points. This is an expected result, since the primary market spread 
and credit rating tend to have an inverse relationship. Loan to value is insignificantly 
and negatively related with the primary market spread for both samples. This observed 
result is as predicted, because issues that provide a higher loan to value ratio are 
additionally secured through subordination. Moreover, in general, senior tranches have 
a better loan to value ratio and are expected to be issued at lower risk spreads than the 
subordinated loans. One explanation for the negative impact could be that the credit 
ratings of the tranches in the samples were considered too high. Hence, this credit 
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enhancement variable led to a minimal balance of the spreads. A 1% increase in 
subordination level is associated with a price discount of 0.2 basis points for QE issues 
and a price discount of 0.04 basis points for ABS issues, respectively. For both samples, 
the time to maturity is insignificantly related with the corresponding risk premium. 
However, yield spreads generally increase (decrease) with longer maturity for the ABS 
(QE) issues sample. Hence, time to maturity is the first variable, which exhibits a 
different impact for the two subsamples. This paper observes the first effects of 
quantitative easing on the pricing of European asset-backed securities. Merton (1974) 
and Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) show that risk premia can either increase or 
decrease with maturity, depending on the risk of a security. Thus, issues with longer 
maturity are associated with a lower risk during QE than prior to the ABSPP. 
Originators have to offer a lower primary market spread for comparable issues with 
respect to time to maturity. QE issues are associated with an average price discount of 
0.9 basis points for every additional year’s maturity, while ABS issues are associated, 
on average, with a price extra of 0.1 basis points for every additional year’s maturity.  
We included two different types of credit enhancements in our model. Internal 
credit enhancement is described through the variable retained interest. The second type 
of credit enhancement is introduced by external credit enhancement. Both variables 
exhibit different results within our comparisons of the two subsamples. There are no 
issues with external credit enhancement in our sample during the period of quantitative 
easing. For ABS issues, we find an insignificant and negative relationship with the 
primary market spread. This relationship is as expected since an external credit 
enhancement reduces the risk of default and thus can lead, ceteris paribus, to a lower 
risk premium. One explanation for the non-appearance of issues with external 
enhancement during the period of quantitative easing could be that originators 
relinquished this feature based on the non-requirement to provide external credit 
enhancement by the ECB. Further, it would be easier for originators to issue tranches 
without a third-party guarantee at lower costs. However, internal credit enhancement is 
required for consideration in the ABSPP. Nevertheless, we observe different results for 
the two subsamples. Retained interest is significantly and positively related with the 
primary market spread at the 5% level for ABS issues, whereas the variable is 
significantly but negatively related with the spread for the QE sample. The results for 
the ABS issues are surprising for this paper, because internal credit enhancement 
should, ceteris paribus, reduce the risk of default. We predicted a negative relationship 
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with spreads for European ABS tranches. However, one explanation could be that 
investors considered internal credit enhancement as a sign of lower credit quality prior 
to the quantitative easing programme. Another explanation could be that investors of 
QE issues associated credit ratings, in which retained interest was included as a factor 
that determined the default risk, as too high and balanced the risk premium with price 
discounts. Moreover, we observed that the coefficients for both samples differed 
significantly. We found that, on average, ABS issues had to pay an additional 20 basis 
points, while QE issues were associated with an average price discount of 30 basis 
points. This, on the other hand, may be explained through the regulations of the ABSPP. 
Since internal credit enhancement is required by the regulations of the ECB, the impact 
of the variable should be, in general, higher for QE issues. The findings for these two 
variables merit a greater in-depth analysis into the consequences of quantitative easing 
for credit enhancement of asset securitization. As a result, credit enhancement is the 
second common pricing factor, which influences the primary market spread differently 
after the implementation of quantitative easing. 
Loan size behaves differently in our samples. Whereas loan spread and loan size 
are insignificantly and negatively related for ABS issues, they have a significant and 
negative relationship for QE issues at the 10% level. The negative relationship between 
loan size and spread means that, on average, larger issues are associated with a price 
discount. The significance could be explained by the fact that the market expects the 
ECB to purchase parts of larger issues and thus, tranches with a larger loan size which 
can be issued at a lower risk premium. Transaction size has a significantly negative 
relationship with spreads for ABS issues at the 1% level, and an insignificant and 
negative relationship for QE issues. One may interpret a significant negative 
relationship between transaction size and spread as evidence of a positive liquidity 
effect related not only to the size of each tranche but also, with the size of the entire 
issue. The findings for the two variables suggest that during quantitative easing, the 
market participants—such as the ECB—consider the loan size more important than the 
size of the whole transaction.  
The number of tranches behaves completely differently for the two samples. For 
the ABS sample, we observe a significant, positive relationship with the spread at the 
0.1% level, whereas for the QE issues, an insignificant and negative relationship 
between the number of tranches and the risk premium is exhibited. For every additional 
tranche, originators of transactions prior to the ABSPP have to pay an additional risk 
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premium of 18.3 basis points. Transactions during quantitative easing, are associated 
with a price discount of 0.7 basis points per every additional tranche. The positive 
relationship with the spread is surprising. We expected the relationship to be negative, 
since investors would benefit from more tranches in the transaction through 
subordination. However, investors prior to the ABSPP associated an increase in the 
number of tranches with an additional increase in risk defaults. This paper suggests that 
this finding merits more detailed research.  
The discrete variable number of lead managers behaves differently for both our 
samples. Whereas spread and number of lead managers exhibit a significantly negative 
relationship for the ABS sample at the 1% level, they are significantly and positively 
related for the QE sample at the 5% level. Further, QE issues are associated with an 
extra risk premium of 14 basis points for every additional investment bank in the 
conglomerate, while the spread reduces by 20 basis points for every one of the ABS 
issues. While a clear interpretation of these contrasting results is difficult to provide, 
one explanation could be found in the different tasks for investment banks engaged in 
the securitization process as a result of certain requirements of the ABSPP. However, 
the variable is an important yield determinant for both samples. The number of rating 
agencies involved in the issuance process has an insignificantly negative relationship 
with spreads for both subsamples. However, we find different coefficients in both 
regressions. The spread is associated with an average price reduction of 7 basis points 
for the ABS sample for every additional rating agency and 14 basis points for the QE 
sample. The findings are as expected. Investors consider ratings more accurate if more 
rating agencies are involved in the rating process given every additional rating agency is 
deemed a sign of stability which grants the originators a discount on the risk premia. 
Creditor protection, described by no automatic stay on the assets, exhibits similar 
results for both the ABS and the QE samples. The findings indicate that creditor 
protection and primary market spread are insignificantly and negatively related for both 
samples. Thus, although we find changes in the market participants in countries with 
creditor protection in the univariate analysis, investors do not rely on creditor 
protection as one of the yield determinants for the European ABS issues. Finally, this 
study observes that the type of interest is a determinant of the primary market spread 
before the implementation of quantitative easing, but is no yield determinant during 
quantitative easing. Float exhibits a significantly positive relationship with the primary 
market spread for the ABS sample at the 0.1% level but is insignificantly and positively 
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related with the spread for QE issues. This indicates that originators, on average, have 
to pay an extra risk premium—of almost 46 basis points for the ABS sample—through 
floating rate notes compared to the fixed rated notes. The 6.1 basis points for the QE 
sample have a rather small impact for floating rate issues. These findings are in contrast 
to studies from before the 2007 financial crisis. Prior to that crisis, investors demanded 
an additional risk premium for fixed rated notes. Since the interest rates declined 
continuously since the financial crisis in the European Monetary Union, we find 
evidence for an opposite trend. Investors believe that, as a result of low interest rates, 
floating rate notes do not pay off as before, such that floating coupon rate notes are 
associated with an additional risk premium. During quantitative easing, floating and 
fixed rated notes exhibit similar risk premia in the European ABS market.  
To conclude the analysis of this section, we determine direct evidence of the 
impact of quantitative easing on the European ABS market. In order to realize satisfying 
results, we perform three further regression analyses: The first analysis is run on the 
high information sample, the second regression is run on the high rating sample, and the 
third regression is run on the senior tranche sample. Other than in Table 31, the 
regressions are performed on loans which have been issued before the implementation 
of the ABSPP and loans which have been issued during the ABSPP jointly, instead of 
separately. This paper follows this approach for all three regressions. To analyze the 
impact of quantitative easing accurately, we include a variable called “QE” that equals 1 
if the loan tranche was issued during the ABSPP, and zero, otherwise. For the purpose 
of this subsection, we are only interested in the results regarding this variable. With the 
help of these results, we uncover evidence as to whether the ECB does directly 
influence the primary market spread of European ABS. This could result in the 
expansion of the findings that the ECB is significantly influencing both common 
security characteristics and the set yield determinants of ABS issues through the 
ABSPP. Table 32 shows the results of the three regression analyses, which were run on 
the primary market spread (dependent variable) and the common pricing characteristics 
as well as the variable QE (independent variables).   
Table 32: Impact of Quantitative Easing on the Primary Market Spread of European ABS 
 
Variable 
High Information 
Reg. #3 
High Rating 
Reg. #4 
Senior Tranches 
Reg. #5 
Constant 0.728 0.159 0.245 
Credit Rating 0.177 **** 0.260 **** 0.186 **** 
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Loan To Value 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Time To Maturity 0.001 0.005 -0.004 
Extern Enhancement -0.293 *  -0.532 **** -0.397 ** 
Loan Size 0.001 0.005 0.193 
Transaction Size -0.143 ** -0.039 -0.199 
# Tranches 0.120 *** 0.020 0.023 
# Lead Managers -0.095 *  -0.156 **** -0.133 ** 
# Rating Agencies 0.017 -0.028 0.0153 
Retained Interest 0.109 0.075 -0.080 
Float 0.479 **** 0.785 **** 0.690 **** 
Creditor Protection 0.074 0.020  -0.084  
Quantitative Easing -0.354 ****  -0.434 **** -0.348 **** 
Number of Observations 
Adjusted R² 
F-Statistics 
368 
0.35 
< 2.2e-16 
225 
0.44 
< 2.2e-16 
209 
0.37 
<2.2e-16 
Significance Levels                                   0 ‘****’ 0.001 ‘ ***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1 
The dependent variable is defined as the margin yielded by the security at issue above a corresponding 
benchmark. The dependent variable is measured in basis points. The independent variables are as follows: 
A credit rating variable: CR=1, CR=2, CR=3, …, CR=15, correspond to credit ratings: Aaa/AAA, 
Aa1/AA+, Aa2/AA, …, B2/B; Loan to Value is the subordination level expressed as a percentage of the 
transaction’s initial principal balance; Maturity is the time to maturity from issuance measured in years; 
Extern Enhancement as dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the issue has an extern enhancement; Loan 
Size is the natural log of the tranche amount in millions of Euros; Transaction Size is the natural log of 
the issue amount of the transactions in million Euros; #Tranches is the number tranches per transactions; 
#Lead Managers is the number lead managers participating in the issuance of the transaction; #Rating 
Agencies is the number of rating agencies involved in the rating process of the tranches at the time of 
issuance; Float has a dummy of 1 if the tranche has a floating rate coupon and zero if the rate is fixed for 
the life of the loan; Retained Interest is a dummy variable that takes 1 if retained subordinated interest as 
beneficial interest in a securitization transaction is provided by the originator. Creditor Protection is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the transaction is issued in a country, which provides no 
automatic stay in the assets. QE is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a tranche is issued during the 
period of QE and zero otherwise; Year dummy variables are included but not reported in the table. 
This paper finds consistent results for all three samples. QE and the primary 
market spread have a significant and negative relationship at the 0.1% level. Thus, the 
findings indicate that quantitative easing significantly influences the yield of European 
ABS issues. Table 32 exhibits that, on average, the European ABS issues are associated 
with a price discount of 40 basis points. This is true of when they were issued during the 
ABSPP. Hence, the results of the regression are consistent with the results of the 
univariate comparison, the Chow test, and the regressions of the previous sections. 
Interestingly, no significant difference in the coefficients of the different samples is 
observed. Thus, the ECB does not only influence the primary market spread of 
tranches, which are more likely to be purchased (like high rating tranches or senior 
tranches) but also all tranches, which meet the requirements of the ECB and thus are 
considered for purchase during the ABSPP. This means that quantitative easing impacts 
Has Quantitative Easing affected the European Asset-backed Security Market? An Empirical 
Analysis 
132 
the European ABS market directly and indirectly through the announcement of 
requirements for purchase.  
 Regression Results: Conclusion 4.5.2.4
Subsection 5.2 investigated the extent to which the ABSPP influenced the 
pricing features of the European asset-backed securities. The purpose was to analyze the 
changes regarding the impact of common pricing features on the primary market 
spreads for the European ABS market. The Chow test exhibited a significant p-value for 
our data sample. This means that the Chow test statistic was higher than the critical 
level, and therefore, we accepted the second research hypothesis, which stated that the 
primary market spreads associated with European asset-backed securities were 
influenced differently by common pricing characteristics since the launch of the 
ABSPP. Based on the results, we had to perform the regression analyses to determine 
the yield determinants for the two subsamples. Applying the same pricing estimation 
model to both subsamples revealed that the common pricing factors associated with 
European asset-backed securities impacted differently on the primary market spread. 
These results were exhibited by the value of the coefficients as well as the significant 
levels of the underlying variables. We documented, for example, that: 
1. lenders demand lower spreads for QE issues with longer maturity as 
compared to ABS issues;  
2. lenders tend to offer a discount for QE issues with higher loan sizes, while  
tending to offer a discount for ABS issues with a higher transaction size; 
3. ABS issues are much more sensitive with respect to the process of 
tranching; 
4. investors tend to offer a discount for ABS issues with a greater 
conglomerate of investment banks as compared to demanding a higher risk 
premium for QE issues with a greater conglomerate of investment banks; 
5. QE issues are more sensitive for internal credit enhancement as compared 
to ABS issues; the higher sensitivity is linked with a spread discount for QE 
issues compared to a higher risk premium for ABS issues; 
6. investors demand a much higher risk premium for ABS issues if they 
provide a floating interest rate than for QE issues; 
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The third research hypothesis stated that quantitative easing was a significant 
determinant of the primary market spread of European ABS issues. The findings of the 
last section indicate that we have the evidence that supports this hypothesis based on the 
results of the last three regression analyses. The regressions exhibit that the variable 
“QE”, which describes if a tranche was issued before or during quantitative easing, is a 
dominant determinant of the risk premium of European ABS issues. This is indicated by 
the relatively great value of the coefficients for all three subsamples as well as the 
significance level of 0.1% in all three regressions. 
Our major contribution lies in the fact that the existence of substantial 
differences between European asset-backed securities—since the launch of the ABSPP 
and the impact of common pricing variables on the spread—could indicate that these 
securities are priced differently during quantitative easing. Investment banks in charge 
of structuring the technical features of certain issues as well as the originators may find 
the estimates useful tools with regard to the size of impact of each variable on the 
primary market spread, today. 
 Conclusion 4.6
The European Central Bank announced during a press conference in September 
2014 that the low inflation rate (Moro Visconti, 2016), as a result of the financial crisis 
and the Euro crisis in Europe, would be raised with the instruments of quantitative 
easing. Hence, in addition to low base rates, the ECB would launch an asset purchase 
programme in order to supply the markets with money. So more investments by 
corporations would help raise the inflation rates. The programme to bring this about was 
called the “Asset Purchase Programme (APP)” and launched in October 2014. As of 
June 2016, the programme consisted of a total investment volume of EUR 1.7 trillion. It 
would end in December 2017 at the earliest. The APP itself consists of several separate 
asset purchase programmes, and is the most interesting programme in this study that is 
concentrated on the European asset-backed security market. The programme has 
purchased asset-backed securities in the secondary market as well as the primary market 
since November 2014. As of June 2016, more than EUR 20 billion of assets were 
purchased by the ECB in the European ABS market. As an addition to and expansion of 
studies with respect to the effects of the ABSPP on the secondary market, this research 
concentrates on the European ABS primary market.    
Therefore, this paper empirically investigated the differences in the European 
ABS market since 2010. The data sample was divided into two subsamples. The first 
Has Quantitative Easing affected the European Asset-backed Security Market? An Empirical 
Analysis 
134 
sample contained Euro asset-backed securities issued between January 2010 and 
November 2014, while the second subsample consisted of transactions issued after 
November 2014. We investigated how common pricing characteristics compared for the 
two subsamples and found that many of the common pricing factors exhibited 
significant dissimilarities, with respect to the security features. Based on the results, we 
accepted the first research hypothesis that the common pricing features differed 
significantly in value between the two time periods.  
Further, we analyzed the data sample by performing a structural break analysis. 
We documented that the Chow test statistic was higher than the critical level. This 
indicated the evidence that supported the second research hypothesis, which stated that 
the primary market spread associated with European asset-backed securities was 
influenced differently by common pricing variables for the two time periods. As a 
natural follow-up, this paper performed two regression analyses on the primary market 
spread as the dependent variable and the common pricing characteristics as the 
independent variables. The procedure aimed to provide an in-depth analysis of the 
results of the Chow test. We found that the regression analyses supported the result of 
the Chow test. The risk premium of the European ABS was differently influenced by 
the common pricing variables during quantitative easing compared to before the ABSPP 
was implemented. This study observed that pricing variables did not only differ 
significantly in value with respect to their coefficients but also, with respect to the 
significance levels. The analysis revealed three major changes that occurred in the 
findings. First, we documented that the coefficients of variables could differ 
significantly in value. For example, for the variable type of interest. Investors tended to 
associate floating interest rate notes during quantitative easing with a lower additional 
risk premium in comparison to their non-quantitative easing counterparts. Second, this 
study found that the coefficient signs differed for several variables, for instance, for the 
variable number of lead managers. We observed that the number of lead managers was 
significantly and negatively related with the primary market spread for the non-
quantitative easing sample, while it had a significant and positive relationship with the 
spread for their quantitative easing counterparts. Third, the analysis exhibited 
significant differences for the significance levels of the set of common pricing factors. 
Only the variable credit rating exhibited the same significance as the determinant of the 
primary market spread for both subsamples at the 0.1% level. All other yield 
determinants for European ABS transaction resulted in different significance levels. 
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To conclude the research path, we analyzed the influence of the quantitative 
easing yield of the European ABS market. The findings of the coefficients as well as the 
significance levels indicated that quantitative easing was a dominant yield determinant 
of European asset-backed securities. This suggested that quantitative easing did not only 
indirectly influence the risk premium through changes with respect to the common 
pricing features but also exercised a direct impact since QE was a determinant of the 
primary market spread. The results provide thus provide the necessary evidence that 
supports the third research hypothesis. Based on the findings with respect to the three 
research hypotheses, we conclude on the overall research question that quantitative 
easing has significantly affected the European primary ABS market. 
Thus, this study provides research that fills gaps in current field research in the 
context of the European ABS market. The three analyzed hypotheses are contributions 
to today’s questions regarding the impact of quantitative easing on the European 
Monetary Union. Based on our results, we accept all three research hypotheses. These 
lead us to our main research question of Chapter 2, which states that quantitative easing 
is significantly affecting the European ABS market. Hence, with respect to the statistical 
and empirical results, we provide evidence that supports the main research question. We 
document that quantitative easing affects the investment decisions of investors of the 
European ABS market. Due to the participation of the ECB in the fixed income market, 
investors are forced to invest in ABS tranches with worse risk profiles. This is indicated 
by the significantly higher risk profile of European ABS since the beginning of the 
ABSPP. Further, as a consequence of the ECB’s attendance on the buy side, investors 
gain significantly lower risk premiums for their investments in the ABS market. Hence, 
as intended by the ECB, originators are able to refinance their sales at a significantly 
lower price than before the implementation of QE. This is in accordance with research 
by, for example, the DZ Bank, which analyzes the impact of quantitative easing on the 
secondary market. They also document that the ABSPP is influencing the spread of 
asset-backed securities in the secondary market. While on the one hand, the inflation 
rate is still low, and therefore, the APP is commonly considered to be ineffective or a 
failure, we observe that the APP influences a company’s refinancing prowess in the 
capital markets as expected. Further, the ECB seems to have reached its goal to supply 
companies in the Euro area with low cost money through quantitative easing. The 
results indicate that intervention of the ECB leads to lower costs for originators when 
issuing asset-backed securities even though the securities offer a higher risk profile 
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compared to their non-quantitative easing counterparts. Since the ECB purchases 
tranches of asset-backed securities with low risk profiles, investors of asset-backed 
securities in the Euro area are forced to purchase tranches with higher risk profiles but 
with lower risk premia. 
The results of this study contribute significantly to current research and activities 
in the work field. Further, the results of the univariate analysis as well as the estimates 
of the regressions concerning the size of each variable’s impact on the primary market 
spread are expected to be of interest to investment banks and corporations involved in 
the European securitization market. Additionally, the findings of this paper have an 
important implication for investors in the ABS market in the Euro area as well as for 
investors in the fixed income sector. Portfolio managers, who take positions in the 
European fixed income and securitization sector, can also consider the results when 
deciding to build optimal portfolios. Finally, the findings for the European ABS market 
indicate that the whole European fixed income market has been significantly impacted 
by the APP of the ECB. 
This study provides statistical analyses aiming to enrich the current 
understanding of the European ABS market and developing a framework of the market 
for further research. The quantitative research design was appropriate to gain an in-
depth understanding of the research objective. Although the richness arising from our 
quantitative research design and the appropriateness for the purposes of this study, the 
results are limited to the underlying mathematical models and analyses. Different 
models and different structures of variables will likely lead to additional insights into 
the development of the European ABS market.  
Moreover, the study is limited to the chosen period of time for the data sample. 
A valuable contribution to research could be further studies on the development of the 
European ABS market after the “Brexit” vote in the U.K.. Whether the market can 
expand the growth despite the predicted negative impact for the European fixed income 
market will be of interest. Further, this study is limited to the asset-backed security 
market. Future researchers can contribute to the work field by investigating the 
development of mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations. 
Findings with respect to these two securitization submarkets may interest scholars who 
are keen to understand the influence of APP on the entire European securitization 
market. 
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 Concluding Remarks 5
This dissertation aimed at enabling an understanding of the development of the 
asset-backed security market after the 2007 financial crisis. To reach this objective, the 
post-crisis ABS market was investigated using an empirical strategy on three secondary 
and large-scale data sets. The results have been presented and discussed within this 
dissertation. This section summarizes the approaches as well as the models and key 
findings of the three essays. Choudhry and Fabozzi (2004) mention that the 
securitization market can be divided into three main categories: ABS, MBS, and CDOs. 
Research papers investigated the first main category of this market—ABS 
transactions—after the financial crisis. Securitization and especially MBS and CDO 
transactions constituted some of the largest fixed income markets globally in the early 
2000s. With the fall of the U.S. mortgage market and the subsequent financial crisis, the 
whole securitization market collapsed—securities defaulted and most of the non-
defaulted securities got downgraded by all the rating agencies. This led to investors 
losing their trust in the securitization market and the issuance volumes hit new lows. 
Since 2010, the securitization market began experiencing a recovery, globally. 
Originators as well as investors started to regain trust in the growing role that 
securitization would play in the future of the world’s economies again, despite its 
contribution to the financial crisis (Vink & Fabozzi, 2012; Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, 
2012; Morgan Stanley Capital International, June 2015; True Sale International, 2011).  
New regulations as well as the fear of another breakdown in the market 
significantly impacted the development of the yield associated with asset-backed 
securities. Hence, the first research paper investigated the influence of the financial 
crisis on non-U.S. ABS transactions issued between 2010-2014. The period described 
the recovery of the ABS market until the year prior to the implementation of the 
European Asset Purchase Programme. The overall research path of Essay I was divided 
into two research hypotheses. The first hypothesis addressed the influence of that crisis 
on the yield determinants associated with non-U.S. ABS issues. Further, one commonly 
held view of regulators was that investors, prior and during the crisis, relied solely on 
ratings of credit rating agencies without considering their own analyses (Fabozzi & 
Vink, 2012). The second research hypothesis investigated the influence of the financial 
crisis on the risk analysis of ABS transactions by investors. The study determined the 
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evidence that supported the hypothesis that investors looked beyond credit ratings and 
employed their own risk analysis on ABS transactions.  
The empirical data sample of the first research paper contains 771 tranches of 
321 non-U.S. asset-backed security transactions. The analysis of this data sample is 
divided into two analyses. First, we analyzed the yield determinants and compared them 
to yield determinants before the financial crisis in order to provide evidence that 
supported the first research hypothesis. Thereafter, the first essay performed an over-
reliance analysis on the credit rating. The over-reliance analysis found evidence that 
supported the hypothesis that investors employed their own risk analysis and looked 
beyond the credit rating provided by rating agencies. The paper found that there was a 
significant influence of the financial crisis on the yield of the non-U.S. ABS 
transactions. The first research hypothesis was accepted based on the results of the 
analysis of yield determinants. First, a univariate analysis observed the financial crisis 
together with new regulations, as a result of that crisis and this, significantly influenced 
the security characteristics. For instance, credit ratings were significantly lower in the 
data sample after the financial crisis compared to the data sample prior to the crisis. This 
indicated that rating agencies were adjusting the process of assigning a rating and 
undertaking stricter analysis of the default risks. Further, a significantly higher number 
of issues provided internal credit enhancement to lower the default risk of the security 
and hedge the cash flows of the underlying assets. Consequently, the transactions were 
divided into more tranches after the 2007 to increase the level of subordination, which 
absorbed the first losses and guaranteed the coupon payments. However, despite the 
higher number of tranches, both the loan size and transaction size increased after the 
financial crisis to increase the liquidity of the securities in the secondary market. 
Another very important change documented was in the number of lead managers. We 
found a significantly greater conglomerate of investment banks involved in the issuance 
process, which indicated greater difficulty in underwriting ABS transactions after the 
crisis. Second, a comparison analysis of the yield determinants of non-U.S. ABS 
transactions was performed to evaluate changes in the preferences of fixed income 
investors. The study highlighted significant changes in the list of yield determinants for 
the ABS market. We found four variables as significant influential factors of the spread, 
which had not been considered by investors before the financial crisis. The most 
important changes were document as the variables that described internal credit 
enhancements. Two out of four new yield determinants described the instruments of 
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internal credit enhancement. Investors of asset-backed securities relied on these 
variables in order to calculate a fair risk premium considering the risk profile of the 
securities. Moreover, we observed three further changes in the list of yield determinants 
of asset-backed securities. The loan size, the number of tranches, and the currency risk 
were no longer considered yield determinants, although they had been determinants of 
the primary market spread in the study of Vink and Thibeualt (2008). 
An intuitive follow-up on the analyses in coherence with the breakdown of this 
market during the financial crisis would constitute an analysis of over-reliance on credit 
rating. Hence, this paper provides evidence that supports the second research 
hypothesis. This conclusion is based on results regarding pricing factors that are already 
considered by rating agencies. The paper observes that irrespective of whether credit 
rating is still the most significant determinant of the primary market spread, investors 
look beyond the ratings and rely on these factors as an addition to the credit rating. The 
results indicate that investors employ their own credit default risk analysis for ABS 
transactions. Investors evaluate these variables for their own risk analysis and decide 
whether or not the credit rating is accurate or if the corresponding risk premium has to 
be adjusted. As a consequence of the results of the over-reliance analysis, essay I 
accepts the second research hypothesis. 
Summarized, the first research paper provides evidence that supports the overall 
research question, which stated that the financial crisis has a great influence on the non-
U.S. ABS market. The results indicate that both preferences and decisions of investors 
as well as originators are affected by the financial crisis. Furthermore, an over-reliance 
as in the years prior to the financial crisis does not appear in our sample. This indicates 
that the markets adjust properly to both new regulations and proposals of regulators in 
order to prevent the events from 2007 from repeating themselves. 
The second and third research papers strive to examine the European ABS 
market. After the financial crisis, the European ABS market experienced disparities 
compared to its non-European ABS counterparts. The European automobile industry 
captured a significant part of the European economy and hence was more important for 
the economic development of a region than any other automobile industry in the world. 
Not surprisingly, the European automobile industry refinanced their market sales and 
loan services in the European ABS market. Nevertheless, the proportion of the so-called 
Auto-ABS had been very small until the financial crisis but suddenly developed into the 
most important submarket in the European ABS market with a market share of almost 
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43% in issuance volume as of 2015. Within the second research paper, we investigated 
the phenomenon that Auto-ABS enormously outperformed the development of all other 
ABS subclasses. This observation only appeared in the European ABS market. Hence, 
the second research paper addressed the research question of how the Auto-ABS market 
was able to outperform the rest of the European ABS market and develop into a major 
driver and flagship of the European ABS market (Porter, 2015). The data sample for this 
study contains 468 European ABS tranches and 413 automobile corporate bonds (Auto-
CB), issued between 2010 and 2015. The empirical study hypothesized two reasons for 
the outperformance of the Auto-ABS sector compared to its non-Auto-ABS 
counterparts. The first hypothesis stated that European Auto-ABS transactions provided 
advantages compared to their non-Auto-ABS counterparts and hence, were more 
suitable for ABS investors.  Further, we anticipated that securitization could provide 
significant advantages for the automobile sector as a refinancing instrument compared 
to corporate bonds.  
A comparison analysis of the European ABS market provided evidence that 
supported the first research hypothesis. We analyzed common pricing characteristics for 
Auto-ABS and non-Auto-ABS tranches over the period of time, first. We observed that 
more than half of the set of common pricing features differed for Auto-ABS. 
Surprisingly, these variables described the risk profile of an ABS tranche. First and 
foremost, the results exhibited great dissimilarity for the credit ratings of the two 
security classes. We found that Auto-ABS had a significantly lower credit rating 
assigned by rating agencies. Second, Auto-ABS exhibited a significantly lower time to 
maturity, a higher rate of internal credit enhancement, and a lower rate of issues that 
faced currency risk. Hence, this led to a significantly lower risk profile associated with 
Auto-ABS and yielded in a lower primary market spread. The study revealed a mean 
primary market spread for non-Auto-ABS tranches of 122 basis points, whereas Auto-
Bonds offered, on average, 64 basis points as risk premium. This effect was even more 
measurable over the period of 2010-2015. The difference between the average spreads 
evolved over 2010-15 and we documented a significantly higher difference within the 
last three years compared to the first three years of our sample period. Hence, after an 
acceleration time, Auto-ABS outperformed the rest of the European ABS market more 
intensely.  
As a natural follow-up, a panel-data fixed-effects regression model was 
undertaken to continue the comparison analysis on the set of yield determinants. The 
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most important difference was documented in the variable that described internal credit 
enhancement. For non-Auto-ABS tranches, the model exhibited a positive relationship 
with the spread. This was a surprising result, since internal credit enhancement should, 
ceteris paribus, reduce the default risk of the corresponding security. This meant that 
investors could consider credit ratings for non-Auto-ABS with internal credit 
enhancement as too good and could associate the risk premium of these issues with an 
additional spread extra of 26 basis points. Investors of Auto-ABS associated issues that 
provided internal credit enhancement with an average price discount of 36 basis points. 
These findings indicated that investors of European ABS issues relied on the advantages 
of Auto-ABS transaction and preferred to invest in this asset class. Hence, based on the 
results of the comparison analysis, we were able to accept the first research hypothesis. 
We concluded that the advantages of Auto-ABS explained a significant portion of the 
outperformance of this asset class in the European market. 
To follow our approach, a second comparison analysis was performed to provide 
evidence that supported the second research hypothesis. We hypothesized that 
advantages of ABS bonds compared to corporate bonds explained a significant part of 
the outperformance of the Auto-ABS market. The structure of ABS transactions 
encouraged automobile corporations to shift issuance volumes from the CB market into 
the ABS market when refinancing their market sales and loan services. We observed 
that Auto-ABS were associated with a significantly lower risk profile than their Auto-
CB counterparts. So, credit ratings for Auto-ABS were significantly lower than for 
Auto-CB. This led us to one of the most dominant characteristics of asset-backed 
securities. Originators could then provide internal credit enhancement for ABS 
transactions. Therefore, the securities relied solely on the credit quality of the 
underlying assets and remained independent, compared to corporate bonds, from the 
originator’s credit quality. This led to a significantly lower primary market spread for 
Auto-ABS compared to their Auto-CB counterparts. The paper exhibited a primary 
market spread that was, on average, twice as high for Auto-CB. This was a major 
incentive for the automobile industry to use securitization instead of corporate bonds to 
refinance their market sales and loan services.  
The second part of the comparison analysis investigated the extent to which 
investors relied on common pricing features when pricing ABS or CB. Unsurprisingly, 
as common in the fixed income market, the credit rating was the most dominant pricing 
variable for both the Auto-ABS as well as the Auto-CB. Besides this mutual variable,  
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the two security classes seemed priced by different variables. For example, the number 
of lead managers and the type of interest rate were yield determinants for Auto-CB. 
Capital markets investors relied on common ABS features, such as the number of 
tranches and internal credit enhancement. This indicated that investors appreciated the 
structure of asset-backed securities. Features, such as internal credit enhancement and 
the process of subordination, reduced the risk profile associated with European Auto-
ABS transactions. These results provided evidence that supported the hypothesis that 
investors and originators in the automobile industry relied on advantages of the asset-
backed security market. This in turn supported the hypothesis that the automobile 
industry shifted issuance volume from the corporate bond market into the asset-backed 
security market. Based on these findings, we accepted the second research hypothesis 
that Auto-ABS provided advantages for originators as well as investors of the 
automobile industry compared to their Auto-CB counterparts. This led to the conclusion 
that the result explained another significant part of the superior performance of the 
Auto-ABS market. Considerably more, it was an acknowledgement of the assets’ 
quality provided by the European automobile industry. Hence, in future the 
development of the Auto-ABS market in Europe could further become a driver of the 
whole European ABS market. Moreover, this security class could become even more 
important for the European ABS market as a flagship for investors and as evidence of 
the importance and the functionality of securitization in the world’s economies. 
The third research paper investigated the European Central Bank’s “Asset-
Purchase Programme”. More specifically, the “Asset-Backed Security Purchase 
Programme”. In September 2014, the ECB announced that the low inflation rate in the 
European Monetary Union, as a result of the financial crisis and the Euro crisis in 
Europe, would be raised with the instruments of quantitative easing. This quantitative 
easing programme would inject money into the Financial Markets through asset 
purchases. Historically, the ECB started the largest QE programme in the European 
Monetary Union ever. In addition to changing interest rates, the ECB started the 
purchase of assets in November 2014 with a total volume of EUR 2.2 trillion until at 
least December 2017. This means, the ECB will double its total assets during this QE 
programme. In November 2014, the ECB started the ABSPP. ABS tranches are 
purchased in both, the secondary market as well as the primary market. The third 
research paper addressed the overall research question how quantitative easing affected 
the European ABS market. We expected to find evidence that supported the overall 
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research question, since the ECB was willing to intervene in the European fixed income 
markets. As a consequence of the low inflation rate, the ECB wanted European 
corporations to invest money in the markets to increase the money supply. Corporations 
would be able to refinance at very low cost levels to increase the investment rate. In the 
case of the ABSPP, the ECB would purchase tranches of asset-backed securities for two 
reasons: First, throughout this channel, the ECB would supply corporations with direct 
money for investments in exchange for the cash flows of the underlying assets of the 
tranches. And second, the ECB intended to force investors to purchase tranches of 
securities with a higher risk profile, since the lower risk tranches had been purchased by 
the ECB.  
 
This research path provided evidence that supported the three research 
hypotheses, which analyzed the research question. The first hypothesis stated that the 
security risk profiles differed significantly during quantitative easing. As a follow-up, 
we anticipated that the implementation date of the ABSPP was a structural break point 
for the European ABS market. The third hypothesis addressed evidence that supported 
direct influence of quantitative easing on the offered yield of ABS issues. We 
investigated all three hypotheses with empirical and quantitative methods. The high 
information sample of the third essay contained 369 European Euro-denominated ABS 
tranches issued between January 2010 and June 2016.  
We investigated how common security characteristics compared for the two 
subsamples, first. We found that many of the common pricing factors exhibited 
significant dissimilarities, with respect to the risk profiles. ABS issues exhibited, during 
quantitative easing, a significantly worse risk profile than their non-QE counterparts. 
For instance, credit ratings were significantly lower in the period before QE. As a 
consequence of the market participation of the ECB, European corporations were able 
to issue higher risk securities at lower costs, as indicated by the significant lower 
primary market spread during the times of quantitative easing. The results indicated that 
the ECB encouraged European corporations to securitize asset portfolios with higher 
credit default risk. The findings were as expected, since the ECB was willing to simplify 
the refinancing process for originators at lower costs. Based on the results of the 
univariate comparison analysis, we accepted the first research hypothesis that the risk 
profiles of the securities differed significantly in value between the two time periods.  
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A structural break was revealed during the empirical analyses of the second 
hypothesis. The structural break was determined on the implementation date of the 
ABSPP and indicated that the securities were priced differently during the quantitative 
easing period. As an intuitive follow-up, we analyzed the pricing characteristics with a 
panel-data fixed-effects regression model. We found that yield determinants, such as 
time to maturity, loan size, the number of lead managers, the number of tranches, the 
type of interest, and internal credit enhancement, exhibited dissimilar results for the two 
subsamples of the European ABS market. As a consequence of quantitative easing, we 
observed evidence that the set of yield determinants experienced significant adjustments 
with respect to significance levels and coefficients. Based on the results of the structural 
break and regression analyses, we accepted the second research hypothesis. Essay III 
provided evidence that quantitative easing caused a structural break in the European 
ABS market. 
As the last part of our research approach, regression analyses on different 
subsets of the European ABS market were performed to analyze whether quantitative 
easing significantly influenced the offered yield, associated with the securities of the 
subsamples. Not surprisingly, the variable quantitative easing exhibited a significant 
and negative relationship with the primary market spread at the 0.1% level. The 
coefficient of the variable indicated that the investors associated issues during 
quantitative easing with an average price discount of 35 basis points. This meant that 
quantitative easing was not only influencing the risk premium indirectly through the 
changes in the set of common pricing features and the set of yield determinants but also 
directly, as a yield determinant of European ABS issues. Hence, with respect to the 
statistical and empirical results, we accepted the third research hypothesis that QE was 
directly influencing the offered yield of the European ABS market.  
The research paper concludes on the overall research path that quantitative 
easing is significantly influencing the European ABS market. This is indicated by the 
results regarding the risk profile, lower risk premiums for investors as a result of the 
attendance of the ECB on the buy side, and the direct influence of quantitative easing 
on the spreads. The findings of Essay III are in accordance to current research by, for 
example, the DZ Bank with respect to the spreads on the secondary ABS market.  
Table 33 summarizes the key findings of the three research essays of this 
dissertation. 
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Table 33: Overview of Essays: Key Findings 
Essay (Chapter) Key Findings 
 
 
 
Essay 1 (Chapter 2): 
Non-U.S. Asset-Backed 
Securities: Yield 
Determinants and Over-
Reliance on Credit Rating 
 Revealed significant changes in the list of yield determinants of 
the Non-U.S. ABS market after the financial crisis 
 Detected that internal credit enhancement, compared to prior that 
crisis, has become one of the dominant variables for the ABS 
market 
 Observed significant changes for the credit rating of ABS 
compared to prior that crisis and concluded that rating agencies 
changed the process of assigning a rating after the massive number 
of downgrades during the crisis. 
 Identified that investors do not over-rely on the credit rating after 
the financial crisis but employ their own default risk analysis 
 
 
Essay 2 (Chapter 3): 
ABS, Auto-ABS and 
Auto-CB Comparisons: 
Evidence From the 
European ABS Market 
 Identified that Auto-ABS transactions provide significant lower 
risk profiles than their non-Auto-ABS and Auto-CB counterparts 
 Detected that automobile corporations in Europe shift issuance 
volume from the corporate bond market into the asset-backed 
security market to exploit advantages of securitization 
 Highlighted different yield determinants for Auto-ABS 
transactions that could explain the significantly lower primary 
market spread for this security class compared to non-Auto-ABS 
and Auto-CB 
 
 
Essay 3 (Chapter 4): 
Has Quantitative Easing 
Affected the European 
Asset-Backed Security 
Market? An Empirical 
Analysis 
 Showed that the European Central Bank through quantitative 
easing  is heavily influencing the European ABS market 
 Pointed out that European corporations are able to sell ABS with 
higher risk profiles at lower spreads 
 Confirmed the structural break with the implementation of ABSPP 
in the data sample of European ABS transactions 
 Emphasized the significant changes in both the common security 
characteristics as well as the yield determinants between the data 
sample of prior quantitative easing and the data sample during 
quantitative easing 
 
 Implications for Theory 5.1
This section will summarize the theoretical value of this dissertation and present 
three central implications. It will also reflect the structure of the research objectives and 
will first discuss the role of yield determinants in the ABS market compared with 
theoretical expectations. Second, it will outline the extension of existing knowledge 
regarding the impact of the 2007 financial crisis on the securitization market. Third, the 
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sections here will also detail the impetus that emerged for the sophistication and 
elaboration of asset-backed securities as a channel of quantitative easing. Limitations 
and potential for further research will be presented to conclude this section.  
 The Role of Yield Determinants in the ABS Market after the Financial Crisis 5.1.1
For more than four decades of research in the fixed income market, scholars 
have investigated the list of yield determinants for all kinds of fixed income securities 
and analyzed their impact on the yield associated with the corresponding security. For 
matters of securitization, yield determinants have been analyzed for asset-backed 
securities, mortgage-backed securities, and collateralized debt obligations before the 
financial crisis as well as for mortgage-backed securities after 2007. The biggest 
contribution of this dissertation is fueling the research into the list of yield determinants 
associated with asset-backed securities in the fixed income market. We built a 
framework of common pricing characteristics, which most accurately described a 
security in the ABS market. Further, this dissertation discussed the expected influence 
of these variables on the primary market spread in two ways. First, we deduced the 
impact of the common pricing features from a theoretical and economical point of view, 
and second, we reviewed older studies for the realized impact of the variables of 
practical data samples on the ABS market. However, today, science has only had the 
last ten years to investigate the list of yield determinants of securitization transactions, 
although this security class has developed into one of the largest fixed income markets 
since the 1980s (Ryan, Tucker, & Zhou, 2016; Lengwiler, 2016). Putting an effort in 
this endeavor, as this dissertation did, seems essential. It will in its later stages result in 
positive spillover effects, especially regarding the discovery of new insights that are 
useful for scholars who are interested in the behavior of yield determinants of fixed 
income markets and how practical frameworks, for example, new regulations after the 
financial crisis, can influence the theoretical point of view on these pricing 
characteristics or discover new pricing features that have to be used to reflect the 
developed pricing process of these markets. Recognizing that the scope of research on 
the list of yield determinants of ABS invites new perspectives on the single variables, 
this dissertation consequently presents the statistical summary, their impact on the 
primary market spread, and their significance levels. Further, the newly achieved 
perspectives on the single variables leads to new perspectives on the pricing of process 
of ABS transactions, which are useful for scholars who are especially interested in the 
pricing frameworks of fixed income securities. We also provide insights that are useful 
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for scholars who are interested in the realization of regulations regarding the 
securitization market and the influence of their implementation on the pricing 
framework and pricing process of securitization transactions. In combination with 
research regarding mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations, 
Essay I and Essay II could serve as examples of how a deeper understanding of the 
pricing process of securitization transactions can lead to the emergence of new research 
questions regarding the prevention of wrong pricing of this asset class before and during 
the financial crisis.  
The research provides new theoretical insights for scholars regarding the 
interaction between the common pricing characteristics in this fixed income subsector. 
First and foremost, the interaction between yield determinants and the credit rating 
presents an essential change in the markets. The over-reliance analysis of Essay I 
provides new theoretical findings for scholars who are especially interested in the 
development of the importance of credit rating agencies in the fixed income market. 
Further, Essay I provides an approach for a credit default analysis which merits future 
research regarding the development of a new credit default analysis framework for the 
securitization market. Thus, Essay I could serve as an example of how a deeper 
understanding of the investor’s usage of his own credit default analysis can create new 
research questions regarding the importance and future existence of credit rating 
agencies in the ABS market.  
 Asset-Backed Securities and the Financial Crisis  5.1.2
During the last decade of research in the fixed income market, scholars have 
investigated the impact of the financial crisis on many fixed income securities and 
studied  how the single security classes adapt post the breakdown. For matters of 
securitization, the consequences have been analyzed for mortgage-backed securities, 
considering their contribution to the financial crisis. One big contribution of this 
dissertation to the work is the research regarding the influence of the 2007 financial 
crisis on the non-U.S. asset-backed securities market. In addition, the impact on the 
European ABS market is further investigated separately and in greater detail. ABS 
transactions were not only immediately influenced by the financial crisis but were also 
one of the triggers. We used our framework of common pricing characteristics to 
empirically investigate the development of the ABS market after the 2007 financial 
crisis compared to the scenario prior to 2007. Further, this dissertation discussed the 
phenomenon of the Auto-ABS transactions and their highly remarkable performance in 
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the European ABS market as well as the impact of this phenomenon on the development 
of the European ABS market and the future applicability of securitization in Europe.  
First, we deduced the impact of the financial crisis on the common pricing 
features from a theoretical and economical point of view, supported our hypothesis with 
empirical analyses, and compared the results to findings of the time period pre 2007. 
Second, we analyzed the single years of the ABS market post 2007 to determine the 
development in greater detail. In-depth analyses of yield determinants of the non-U.S. 
and European ABS market, as an intuitive follow up, completed the studies. However, 
today, science has only recently started the research process of investigating into the 
impact of the financial crisis on the primary market of securitization, despite the 
contribution of asset-backed securities to that crisis and the recovery which the primary 
securitization market is experiencing with respect to issuance volumes, since 2010. This 
dissertation aims to study the positive spillover effects, especially regarding the 
discovery of new insights that may be useful for scholars who are interested in the 
interaction of primary and secondary market. Further, this dissertation investigates the 
behavior and the development of fixed income markets after the financial crisis and how 
practical frameworks can influence the theoretical point of view on these markets. 
Recognizing that the scope of research on the impact of the financial crisis on the ABS 
market invites new perspectives on the development of the fixed income sector all over 
the world and especially in Europe, this dissertation consequently presents statistically 
significant changes in the ABS markets, their impact on the primary market and their 
consequences for investors as well as originators.  
Further, the newly achieved perspectives on the influence of the financial crisis 
leads to new perspectives on the issuance process of ABS transactions, which are useful 
for scholars who are especially interested in the primary market of fixed income 
securities. We also provide insights that are useful for scholars who are interested in the 
realization of regulations regarding the securitization market and the influence of their 
implementation on the primary market. As an extension of research regarding the 
development of the secondary ABS market, essay I and essay II could serve as 
examples of how a deeper understanding of the influence of the financial crisis on ABS 
transactions could enable the emergence of new research questions regarding the future 
development and applicability of securitization as an important part of the fixed income 
market. The research also provides new theoretical insights for scholars regarding 
European ABS submarkets, with a special focus on Auto-ABS transactions. First and 
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foremost, the highly remarkable performance of Auto-ABS in the European market 
presents an essential change in that market. The comparison analysis of essay II 
provides new theoretical findings for scholars who are especially interested in the 
development of the European ABS market after the 2007 financial crisis and in the 
research findings with respect to the largest European ABS submarket. Further, essay II 
provides an in-depth analysis of the yearly development of that market. During the time 
period we studied, the European ABS market reached a market proportion of 43% of the 
European primary ABS market. Essay II could then, serve as an example of how a 
deeper understanding of the investors’ and originators’ preferences could lead to the 
emergence of research questions regarding the future development of European ABS 
submarkets. 
 Quantitative Easing in the European ABS Market  5.1.3
During the last two years in the fixed income market, new research questions 
emerged regarding the quantitative easing programme of the European Central Bank. 
For the matters of securitization, the consequences of the Asset-Backed Security 
Purchase Programme on the European securitization market should be investigated. The 
contribution of this dissertation to the field on the impact of quantitative easing on the 
securitization market heralds a new research path regarding the influence of the ECB on 
the European fixed income market associated with asset-backed securities. The ECB 
decided to implement the ABSPP in November 2014 with the goal of purchasing 
securities in both the primary and the secondary market. Thus, the ABS transactions 
were immediately influenced by quantitative easing since November 2014. Scholars 
have investigated the impact of the APP on the secondary fixed income market in the 
European Monetary Union. To expand current research, especially the research on the 
first asset-backed security quantitative easing programme ever, this dissertation 
investigated the influence of the ABSPP on the primary market of European Euro-
denominated ABS transactions. In addition to a comprehensive structural break 
analysis, we also used our framework of common pricing characteristics to empirically 
investigate the influence of the ABSPP on that market after November 2014 in 
comparison with the market of the time period prior to November 2014.  
First, we deduced the impact of quantitative easing on the common pricing 
features from a theoretical and economical point of view and supported our hypothesis 
with empirical analyses. Second, we analyzed the data sample of the European Euro-
denominated ABS market with respect to a structural break in November 2014 in 
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greater detail. Third, an in-depth analysis of the yield determinants of the European 
ABS market, as an intuitive follow-up, as well as an in-depth analysis of the variable 
QE, which took the value one if the tranche was issued during quantitative easing, and 
zero, otherwise, completed the study. However, science has only recently started 
investigating the impact of quantitative easing on the European fixed income market, 
despite rich research regarding quantitative easing in the U.S., the U.K., and Japan. The 
previous findings are mainly addressed to examine the impact of quantitative easing on 
interest levels or government securities. There is scarce research to address non-
government securities, such as corporate bonds or asset-backed securities. In the case of 
the European APP, only studies regarding the influence of the ECB on the secondary 
security market have been carried out. Putting an effort in this endeavor, as this 
dissertation did, seems essential. It will in its later stage result in positive spillover 
effects, especially regarding the discovery of new insights that are useful for scholars 
who are interested in the behavior and the development of fixed income markets after 
quantitative easing and how practical frameworks, such as central bank decision and 
low inflation rates, can influence the theoretical point of view on these markets. 
Recognizing that the scope of research on the impact of quantitative easing on the ABS 
market invites new perspectives on the development of the fixed income sector globally 
and especially in Europe, this dissertation consequently presented statistical significant 
changes in the ABS markets, their impact on the primary market and their consequences 
for investors as well as originators.  
Furthermore, the newly achieved perspectives on the influence of the ECB lead 
to new perspectives on the issuance process of ABS transactions, which are useful for 
scholars who are especially interested in the primary market of fixed income securities. 
As an extension of research regarding the development of the secondary ABS market, 
Essay III could serve as an example of how a deeper understanding of the influence of 
quantitative easing on ABS transactions emerges new research questions regarding the 
future development and applicability of securitization as an important part of the fixed 
income market. The research also provides new theoretical insights for scholars 
regarding the financing techniques of European corporations, with a special focus on 
corporations that use securitization to refinance their market sales and loan services. 
First and foremost, the drop in the primary market spread presented an essential change 
in that market. The empirical analysis of Essay III provides new theoretical findings for 
scholars who are especially interested in how central banks force investors, primarily 
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institutional investors, to purchase and invest in tranches of ABS transaction that 
provide a significant higher risk profile. The findings indicate that the ECB is providing 
European corporations an easier and more cost-efficient access to the financial markets.  
 Limitations and further Research Potentials 5.1.4
This section discusses the limitations of empirical analyses of the three essays 
and outlines further research potential with respect to the findings. This dissertation, 
however, faced methodological and conceptual constraints which will be outlined 
subsequently such that there are constructive perspectives offered for future research. 
First, the generality of our analysis is limited to the non-U.S. ABS market in 
Essay I and the European ABS market in the Essays II and III. In the essays, all the U.S. 
ABS transactions as well as the MBS and CDOs were excluded from the analysis. 
Further research could be carried out on the U.S. securitization market as well as the 
MBS and CDO non-U.S. and European markets. Corresponding research will likely 
lead to a deeper understanding of the impact of the financial crisis on the securitization 
market. Moreover, future researchers can contribute by considering the influences of 
quantitative easing on all fixed income markets in the European Monetary Union, 
especially the MBS and CDO in that field.  
Second, the empirical models, used in all three essays as well as the structural 
break analysis only consist of factors, which could be mathematically included in the 
analyses. Credit factors that are not quantitatively describable have been excluded. 
Another set of quantitative variables could likely lead slightly different results for the 
same data samples. In addition, our set of variables put into another framework could 
likely result in slightly different conclusions. Corresponding data analysis will likely 
lead to important additional insights, for example new pricing characteristics of the 
ABS markets could be observed as well as new yield determinants could be detected. 
Third, the conclusions of the essays result from findings, which are derived from 
high information samples within a certain time period. The time periods in Essays I, II, 
and III were chosen due to events that could probably influence the dynamics of these 
markets. Hence, further research could be carried out on these events; in fact, industry-
specific research could be useful for scholars who remain interested in the wide ranging 
influence of the political referendum in the United Kingdom leading to “Brexit” and 
how it could impact the European securitization market (True Sale International, 2016; 
Kerr, 2016; Bell, 2016). In this case, research could be useful for scholars interested in 
either the development of the U.K. ABS market compared to their non-U.K. European 
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ABS counterparts or the U.K. housing market. It could be of special interest if the 
falling prices in housing and real estate could influence the U.K. MBS and the European 
MBS markets (Bell, 2016). In addition, research could be carried out on the U.K. 
submarkets, especially the automotive market that is dependent on exports and 
securitization. The development as well as an adaption of originators to new market 
conditions could be useful for scholars who are equally interested in the U.K. ABS 
market. The influence of and the sensitivity to political changes, such as the U.S. 
presidential elections of November 2016, and its impact on the global securitization 
markets could be an interesting contribution to the field (True Sale International, 2016). 
In addition, future researchers could contribute by observing the development of the 
European submarkets especially, the Auto-ABS market in Europe, which is the most 
important submarket and driver of the European ABS market but which currently faces 
uncertainties due to VW emission scandal—an issue that could affect not only the 
secondary market but also the primary market if investors happened to lose their trust in 
it. 
 Implications for Investment Practice  5.2
While our research path on the one hand, provides a variety of theoretical 
implications in the work field, we chose a research path that also provides a variety of 
practical implications. The findings of the essays of this dissertation are of interest for 
originators and investment banks on the sell-side and investors, such as portfolio 
managers, fund managers as well as institutional investors on the buy-side of 
securitization. Lastly, the results of the essays may interest both regulators and central 
banks regarding the consequences of their actions on the development of the ABS 
market. Reflecting the introduced structure of the research objectives, this subchapter 
will first discuss findings for the sell-side of the ABS market. Second, the extension of 
existing knowledge for the buy-side of that market will be outlined. Third, the impact 
for regulators and central banks will be summarized. 
 Implications for the ABS sell-side 5.2.1
The findings of the three essays may interest investment banks involved in the 
securitization process as well as originators of ABS transactions. Essays I, II, and III 
provide interesting findings about estimates concerning the size of each variable’s 
impact on the spread as well as each variable’s significance level for non-U.S. ABS 
transactions (Essay I) as well as the European ABS market (Essay II and III). The 
Concluding Remarks 
153 
estimates, associated with the list of common pricing features, give some indication for 
two important impacts of the variables. First, the value of the estimate indicates the 
extent to which the variable influences the primary market spread, which could be 
interesting in the process of securitization with respect to the choice of characteristics 
for the security. Second, the sign of the estimates indicates the relationship with the 
primary market spread and illustrates the preferences of investors and what relationship 
investors expect for the pricing feature and the primary market spread. The significance 
levels of the common pricing characteristics disclose the list of yield determinants of the 
primary ABS market and thus, present the pricing variables that investors rely on, when 
pricing ABS transactions. This could be very important for the sell-side of the ABS 
market, since the knowledge of the list of yield determinants could be interesting 
especially with regard to the choice of underlying assets for the security. Underlying 
assets could be chosen in order to fulfill technical criteria, which could help originators 
sell the transactions at lower repayment costs and investment banks in order to find 
investors for the security with respect to merchandising.  
In addition, Essay I provides findings regarding the importance and over-
reliance on the pricing characteristic credit rating. Originators employ credit rating 
agencies in order to assign a credit rating to the different tranches of the transaction. 
Essay I supported the hypothesis that investors on the one hand, still relied on the 
ratings, assigned by credit rating agencies, but also, on the other hand, employed their 
own default risk analysis in order to both not over-rely on the provided ratings and, if 
necessary, adjust the ratings. This could be an important contribution for the sell-side 
because then, the originators would be able to equip the securities with pricing 
characteristics, such as internal credit enhancement, that investors relied on when 
employing their own default risk analysis. Further, investment banks could merchandise 
the securities with reference to those variables in order to differentiate the security from 
other ABS and persuade investors to purchase the corresponding securities.  
Essay II provides findings, which could be interesting for originators and 
investment banks involved in the securitization process, especially in the European ABS 
market. The conclusion regarding the differences between the Auto-ABS submarket and 
other security submarkets could be used as a framework for originators and investment 
banks when issuing European ABS bonds. Originators could combine the advantages of 
the own security class with the decisive advantages of the European Auto-ABS market 
in order to construct a security which can be sold to the capital markets at low costs. 
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Further, the combined advantages could be presented to investors in the merchandising 
and selling process as buying argument to reach higher bid-to-cover ratios. 
Essay III provides findings, which could be interesting for the sell-side of the 
European ABS market based on the current nature of the topic of Essay III as well as 
the currency of the applicability of the results presented in the research paper. The essay 
supports the hypothesis that the quantitative easing programme of the European Central 
Bank directly impacts the European ABS market and yields the conclusion that the sell-
side of the European ABS market has to adapt to the forced changes in the primary 
market in order to exploit all advantages the ECB is providing for the sell-side. 
Especially, originators could profit from the presented and documented results of essay 
III for the purpose of refinancing the corporation at lower costs. The choice of 
underlying assets as well as the structure of the security plays an important role for a 
low primary market spread. In times of low interest rate levels and quantitative easing 
programmes in the most important fixed income submarkets, this could be an advantage 
not only compared with other ABS but also with their non-ABS fixed income 
counterparts. 
 Implications for the ABS buy-side 5.2.2
The findings of the three essays may interest portfolio managers, fund manager, 
as well as institutional investors on the buy-side of the non-U.S. as well as the European 
ABS markets. The results of the three essays regarding the yield determinants of the 
corresponding ABS market are essential for both private and institutional investors who 
are interested in investing in those securities. Investors of fixed income securities could 
use the findings of this dissertation when determining whether or not to invest in an 
asset-backed security. The findings provide itemized results for the pricing 
characteristics of ABS and thus, are of interest to investors who determine their 
investment in the ABS market in great detail. 
Additionally, the findings may be of interest to portfolio managers as well as 
fund managers and investment or asset management companies who are constantly 
determining the optimal asset allocation of their portfolios. In addition, portfolio 
managers and fund managers who take positions in the fixed income market especially 
in the securitization sector, can consider these findings when deciding to execute 
buy/sell orders on their portfolios. Further, the findings on the estimates concerning the 
size of each variable’s impact on the spread, associated with the ABS market, could be 
important with respect to their contribution to the risk profile of the corresponding 
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security. Further, the introduction of variables that may be used in order to employ an 
individual default risk analysis is expected to make investors further independent from 
the credit ratings provided by the rating agencies. Besides, especially the findings with 
respect to the default risk variables may interest portfolio managers and fund managers 
during the portfolio optimization process with respect to the portfolio risk.  
As a consequence of a low inflation rate in the European Monetary Union, the 
ECB interfered in the European fixed income market and started—in November 2014—
the largest quantitative easing programme in the history of the ECB. Thus, the findings 
of Essay III may interest the ABS buy-side with regard to the influence of the ECB as a 
new market participant. In addition, the essay highlights important changes attributed to 
the participation of the ECB and these could be used by portfolio managers, fund 
managers as well as investment strategists to adapt their portfolios and future 
investments strategies to the new circumstances.  
 Implications for regulators and central banks 5.2.3
As a consequence of the changes in the ABS market due to new regulations, 
regulators may find this dissertation interesting especially as they will see the impact 
their regulations make on a fixed income market. Further, the results provide regulatory 
insights on the practical influence the regulations have on the development of single 
security classes, sector-specific markets, and the ABS market in total. In addition, the 
results show how regulations that directly impact some variables, indirectly influence an 
entire set of common security characteristics of an asset-class.  
Finally, the findings of Essay III may interest the European Central Bank as well 
as other central banks especially in the context of quantitative easing on securitization 
and other fixed income submarkets. Essay III provides information on the development 
of the European ABS market under quantitative easing and consequently, presents the 
influence of the current monetary policy of the ECB on the common security 
characteristics, the risk profiles, as well as the yield spreads of the corresponding ABS 
transactions. The ECB might be interested in reactions and adaptations of the ABS sell-
side as well as the ABS buy-side. The essay provides findings regarding the changes in 
preferences on the buy-side and the forced investments due to the quantitative easing 
strategy. On the contrary, the central banks may also be interested in the issuance 
behaviors of the originators due to the changed circumstances. Thus, the results are of 
interest since they allow central banks to reflect their quantitative easing strategies and 
Concluding Remarks 
156 
provide useful information regarding the future implementation of fixed income 
quantitative easing programmes. 
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